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THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

I

IN their brilliant historical survey of the Palestinian problem, the Palestine Royal Commission note that Pompey captured Jerusalem in the year 73 B.C., and since that time no independent Jewish state has existed in Palestine. They presumably intended to mark the coincidence that, after exactly two thousand years, the offer is made to the Jewish people to re-establish a Jewish state in a part—a very small part—of Palestine. The Commission do not note another coincidence; that this year of grace will be the fortieth anniversary of the first Zionist Congress at Basel, when representatives of the Jewish communities of the world for the first time in modern history met together, and defined the aim of Zionism as the establishment in Palestine of a home for the Jewish people, secured by international law. For forty years the Jewish people have been—if not wandering in the wilderness—reclaiming the wilderness, in the first efforts to build their National Home; and at the twentieth Zionist Congress, which is being held at Zurich in August, they will have to decide whether the opportunity of a state will compensate them for the deprivation of nine-tenths of the Promised Land. An Arab authority has pointed out a third coincidence: that this year marks the thirteenth centenary—according to the Gregorian calendar—of the Arab conquest of Palestine. These historical coincidences and the memory of them are significant of the historical and psychological complexity of the problem with which the Royal Commission had to deal.

We have become accustomed in recent times to revolutionary proposals of Royal Commissions dealing with imperial problems. We have had the Reports of the Simon Commission on India, and of the Donoughmore Commission on Ceylon, which preluded fundamental changes in the government of our Eastern empire. But the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine is the most revolutionary of all. Fifteen years after Great Britain accepted from the Council of the

League of Nations a Mandate for Palestine, with the double trust of establishing a Jewish National Home and not prejudicing the rights of the other communities in the country, the Commission recommend, and the Government have somewhat precipitately adopted the recommendation, that the trust cannot be executed and the Mandate should be terminated. They propose to cut the Gordian knot. This "least of countries" should be divided into three states: an independent Land of Israel (which, paradoxically, comprises the land of the Philistines and Galilee of the Gentiles, but not Judea): an Arab state, comprising the rest of Palestine cis-Jordan and the present territory of Trans-Jordan; and a British enclave remaining under Mandate, and containing permanently Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a narrow corridor from Jerusalem to the sea by Jaffa, and, temporarily, four towns in the north: Haifa, Acre, Tiberias and Safed, which will ultimately be part of the Jewish state. The policy of building a bi-national Palestine under Mandatory guidance, which has been pursued since 1920, is judged to have failed beyond repair. Neither Jews nor Arabs would recognise the dual character of the policy of the Mandatory: "neither community believes in its heart that it will be safe unless it is master in its home."

The experience of the last years has shown the extreme difficulty of maintaining the Mandate, as it was conceived by the framers of the Covenant of the League, over those countries which were detached after the war from the Turkish Empire, and were to be recognised provisionally as independent nations subject to advice and assistance from a Mandatory Power till they are able to stand alone. The relation of guardian and ward, with responsibility of the guardian to the League of Nations, has had to be exchanged, first in Iraq and then in Syria, for a treaty relation as between independent states, without that international responsibility. And now, if the recommendations of the Commission and His Majesty's Government are approved by the Council of the League and by the Government of the United States, which has treaty rights in the matter, the same process of emancipation—or "emandation"—already half applied to Trans-Jordan, will be extended to all of Mandated Palestine. Modern nationalism, which has become the religion of oriental as well as of certain western peoples, has been too strong for those who believed in a system of gradual self-determination.

Palestine, indeed, from the beginning has been in a special position. Not only is it, as the hearth of three great religions, a sacred trust for civilisation ; but it is the scene of the great experiment of restoring, under the ægis of the Mandatory, to the most historical of peoples their national home. What has been done during the twenty years since the Balfour Declaration was issued is one of the remarkable achievements of our day. In 1917 the population consisted of 650,000 Arabs and about 50,000 Jews. To-day it has nearly doubled : there are 950,000 Arabs and over 400,000 Jews. The bitter anti-Semitism in Germany and in Central Europe during the last years has enormously increased the tempo of the development. Jewish immigration is due to an expulsive force from Europe as well as to the impulsive attraction of Palestine ; and to-day six million Jews in Europe yearn for a home where they may live a free and upstanding life. The Jewish immigration has brought the country amazing development, and made it an oasis of prosperity in a desert of world depression. Jews have invested there some £80,000,000, which have been used to expand agriculture, industry and commerce, and every aspect of intellectual life. Nor has the progress been restricted to the Jewish population. Their enterprise, as the Royal Commission affirms, has raised the economic and social condition of the Arabs, who have multiplied by nearly 50 per cent. The very success of the idealistic enterprise has stirred and inflamed the national feeling of both sides, and engendered a disease of the body politic which, the Commission finds, cannot be cured by any medicine, but only by a surgical operation.

The Report of the Commission is divided into three parts : the first deals with the history, ancient and modern, of Palestine ; the second with the operation of the Mandate and the grievances brought forward by Jews and Arabs against the Administration ; the third with their conclusions. The first part is a masterpiece of historical writing and contains a thorough and understanding description of what has been done under the British Mandate. The second part, while affording a searching analysis of a number of specific difficulties, has an accent of futility, because the recommendations are not intended to be carried out. They find that both nations had legitimate grievances, and make suggestions for drastic administrative changes in matters of immigration,

land settlement, education, public security, local government. But again and again they come back to the theme that no administrative changes and no fresh regulations will touch the heart of the problem. They are convinced that, if the Mandate is continued in its present form, there is no hope of peace in Palestine; and their palliative recommendations appear to be designed to deter, to point the lesson that the Mandate cannot be maintained. In answer to the Jewish complaint that immigration has not been facilitated, they introduce the crippling proposal that regard should be had not only to the economic absorptive capacity, but also to political, social and psychological considerations. They fix a "political high level" for the next five years, of 12,000 immigrants a year, to include Jews of every category. The British Government in adopting the Report at once applied this stringent limitation for the period of the next eight months. Seeing that the immigration figures for 1935 were over 60,000, and for 1936, in spite of the rebellion, 30,000, while the difference between the Arab natural increase and the Jewish natural increase in the land is nearly 20,000 a year, the measure of restriction seems explicable only as a means of pressure on the Jews to adopt the project of partition.

That project had a good press in England, but a mixed reception in Parliament, and an almost unanimously bad press in Palestine and in the organs of Jewish opinion throughout the world. The feeling is general outside England that there is "no wholeness in it," and that it is directed principally—if precariously—for the benefit of British imperial interests. Great Britain would retain her strategic points at Haifa and Akaba, and her trust for the Holy Cities, as well as her bases in the "bridgeland" which are vital to her communications with the Middle and Farther East. She would, too, be freed of a cause of violent Arab irritation against her Empire.

Both Jewish and Arab nationalists complain bitterly of the division of the land they love. Both want the whole, and both, at present, concentrate their attention on that part of which they are potentially deprived. It is, indeed, an essential difficulty which drove the Commission to recommend partition, that Arabs and Jews, both Semites, have, as Lawrence put it, "no half-tones in their register of vision." The English idea of compromise is repugnant to them. Besides, however,

their opposition to the principle, the Jews complain of details of the proposed partition; of the narrow limits placed on their independent state, which comprises in all less than 2,000 square miles, the area of an average English county, out of the total area of Palestine cis-Jordan of 10,000 square miles; of their exclusion from the unpopulated, derelict southern half, which their enterprise and capital alone could reclaim for civilisation; of the inclusion in the Arab area of their two vital enterprises for the development of the natural resources of the country, the hydro-electric station at the junction of the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk, and the works at the Dead Sea for the extraction of minerals from that vast chemical reservoir; of the maintenance of a temporary British mandate over all the towns in their area save Tel-Aviv; and lastly, and most grievously, of the inclusion of Jerusalem, the spiritual and cultural centre of Jewry, in the British corridor. That Jerusalem, or anyhow that part of it which has been built around the Holy City in recent years almost entirely by Jews, and contains the Hebrew University and the principal national institutions, should not form part of the Jewish Home, seems unthinkable. It takes the heart out of the state. Thanks to the Parliamentary debate in July some of these matters will be rectified if the principle of partition is in the end accepted. The Arabs, on their side, complain as bitterly of the division which includes in the Jewish area a large Arab minority and a district in Upper Galilee with a mainly Arab population, and which "gives the richest land to the Jews, the holiest to the English, the most barren to the Arabs."

Yet these complaints of detail do not touch the heart of the problem. For the Jews it is the moral loss involved in division. They are offered a National Home which, though it may be a toy state, gives them scarce any room to develop freely and to build up the ideal community of which they have dreamed for two thousand years. For the Arabs, there is not a corresponding moral loss: and Arab champions like Mr. Philby have urged that they should take with open hands what is offered, seeing that it gives them twenty-three parts out of twenty-four. The creation of a separate Jewish state comprising the coastal plain of Philistia and Galilee is comparable with the creation of the separate republic of Lebanon along the coast of Syria. It would mean that in

either case the Arab is turned to the east, while his neighbour is turned to the west. But partition can give a prospect of peace only if there is goodwill and neighbourliness between the two states into which the country is divided : if, in other words, the Arabs and the Jews make separation a starting-point of co-operation. Economically, the two parts of the country must remain interdependent : they can only attain political well-being if they work with each other and not against each other. If, instead of "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state," the project led to the establishment of two sovereign nations, armed for constant strife against each other, their last fate would be worse than the first. The recommendation of the Commission is almost admittedly a counsel of despair ; before adopting it another counsel might be tried which, though of uncertain hope, is less desperate, and would give a better prospect.

Assuming that the British Mandate will be given up after a definite short period, and that the two peoples will be happy only with self-government—which, like others, they prefer to good government—and assuming that they should enjoy forthwith autonomous regulation of their social life, it would still be possible to make a more earnest effort than has been tried to bring them to some understanding for the maintenance of an integral Palestine. The Report of the Commission disposes brusquely of the idea of "cantonisation," which has been put forward intermittently in recent years. It mentions the administrative difficulties ; it emphasises that it would not settle the question of ultimate destiny which to-day looms so large. But at least the trial of that plan, for a short period in preparation for independence, would give breathing-space for improving the relations of the two peoples in an undivided homeland. If it was found to be unworkable, then partition might be accepted as the inescapable solution. The truth is that neither on the part of the Mandatory Government, nor on the part of the Jews, has there been an earnest and steady effort to bring about co-operation between Jews and Arabs, while on the part of the Arab leaders there has been a steady and relentless effort to prevent it. It may be said that the Arab leaders will remain implacable, and that extreme nationalist feeling has been growing ominously during the last years. Yet there are indications, since the Report was published, of a greater

willingness to face the essential facts, and to recognise that the Jews come to Palestine as of right, and that the country must be a homeland for them as well as for the indigenous Arabs. The biggest difficulty about a *modus vivendi* is the question of immigration. For the Arabs Jewish immigration, unrestricted, or regulated by economic considerations, spells a Jewish majority in a few years, and then, as they see it, the doom. For the Jews, immigration seems to offer both the principal salvation for tens of thousands of their brethren fleeing from persecution, and the means to securing equal rights with the Arabs. Yet if, during a probationary period before the Mandate is ended, the fears about immigration could be removed on the one side, and the measure of immigration could be reduced on the other by voluntary sacrifice with a view to peace, a foundation might be laid of better understanding between the peoples of Palestine, which would extend to the whole of the Arab body politic, and enable co-operation and joint expansion in an area twenty times as large as Palestine cis-Jordan, nearly one hundred times as large as the proposed Jewish state.

The Commission's conclusion is regarded by some as a judgment of Solomon, by others as a more realistic and opportunist solution which follows the experience of Ireland. Those who hold the latter view hope that circumstances and necessity, together with the removal of present irritants, may work to bring the two peoples together if they are each master in their home, and have not to make mutual sacrifices. Those who take the former view believe that the love of the Palestine child which moves the Jews is stronger than any desire for a state, and that they would be prepared to make a sacrifice of the present for the sake of a more ideal future.

Whichever solution is finally adopted, a large measure of goodwill and generosity will be required. It must come from the Jews in the first place, without condition of reciprocity; though, with that unquenchable hope which has kept alive their faith in the return to the land of Israel, and is to-day the theme of their national anthem, they may expect that the Arabs, achieving independence, will bear goodwill to their neighbours. Harold Nicolson wrote of "the immense pathos of that little country [Palestine], twisted and tortured into a thousand arid folds and containing the romance of half the world." The pathos has been illustrated during the last years.

A new chapter may be added to the romance. But a mixture of realism and idealism, of generosity and faith, must precede. Then the dream may be realised of another English writer, George Eliot, who more than sixty years ago foretold: "a new Judea, poised between East and West, to be a covenant of reconciliation between the peoples."

NORMAN BENTWICH.

P.S.—During the first half of August, the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva and the Zionist Congress at Zurich were both examining the Palestine Report, but from very different angles. The League body brought to its work a sceptical and expert criticism, questioning whether Great Britain had been loyal to her mandatory obligations, or had not only failed to try, but tried to fail. The Jewish Congress approached its fateful task in an atmosphere of deep emotion. Could the delegates renounce a large part of the age-long hope? Could they, as the majority felt, on the other hand simply reject an opportunity of realising a home for hundreds of thousands of their brethren and the creation of a State of which they had dreamed? In neither place could the debate be conclusive. The Mandates Commission can only submit its cautious advice to the Council of the League: the Congress can only authorise its executive body to confer with the British Government. It is certain that Parliament, the League, and the Jewish people will not endorse rapidly the proposal of partition.

II

THE Royal Commission rests from its labours after a full year of strenuous inquiry culminating in the presentation of its unanimous report a few weeks ago. The report has come as a shock to all parties in the conflict. The British Government has declared its readiness to cut its losses in an inevitably losing game. The Jews, confronted with the whittling down of their Zionist ideal to a mere shadow of the Balfourian conception, have, after lively discussion at Zurich, realised the opportunity of bargaining for more crumbs of comfort than the Commission was prepared to offer them.

The Arabs, astonished at the concession of nine-tenths of their extremest demands, demand the whole pound of flesh promised by McMahon. It is a strange inversion of the Jew and Gentile contrast—but there it is. The Jews are prepared to entreat for a little mercy. The Arabs insist on a hundred per cent. or nothing. It may well be the latter if they remain unwise.

Almost without exception the friends of the Arabs counsel acceptance of the Commission's recommendations subject to the discussion of details. To their friends they turn a deaf ear, pleading religious scruples to the recognition of a Jewish State in Arab territory. But does their religion countenance acceptance of the suzerainty of an infidel (Christian) Power, to which in general the people of Palestine at any rate have no objection except on the issue of Jewish immigration? Certainly not. Did not the Caliph of Islam countenance Zionist colonisation in Palestine? Certainly. Do the Arabs demand the extrusion of the 400,000 Jews now in the country? No. What then do they want? They want to rule the whole of Palestine and are prepared to give all requisite guarantees for the security of the existing Jewish population. After all, the Jews have no serious ground for complaint in 'Iraq, in Syria, in Yaman, in Sa'udi Arabia. But are the Jews, is the League of Nations or its Mandatory, is America prepared to accept such a guarantee? Unfortunately, and for sound reasons, they are not. Palestine is different—since the days of Moses it has been the apple of discord between Jews and Gentiles.

For that reason alone it must be partitioned as proposed by the Commission or ruled by a neutral Power as it is at the present. The latter alternative can scarcely be other than permanent if it is forced on the League and its Mandatory by Arab intransigence. Partition can scarcely be other than temporary, for that alone can compel the two parties to an agreed settlement on the basis of Arab sovereignty and Jewish privilege. From such a settlement both parties have everything to gain. Only the Jews can profit by the continuance of the existing Mandatory administration.

But that is not the crucial issue. In suitable circumstances—such, for instance, as those envisaged in the Royal Commission's report—an Arab-Jew understanding is perfectly feasible. The Mufti himself has volunteered the suggestion. Nashashibi has gone even further in offering a substantial

extension of the area open to Jewish colonisation and development. The real issue, however, is the old factor of Arab internal discord. The Amir 'Abdullah of Trans-Jordan is implicitly the chief prospective beneficiary from the Commission's proposals. It is obvious that the Mufti objects more strenuously to that than to the accommodation of the Jews. The Government of King Ghazi of 'Iraq has objected vehemently and actively, in a more legitimate manner, followed up its objection to the advancement of King Ghazi's uncle. Ibn Sa'ud himself, the only Arabian King that matters, can scarcely be expected to welcome the enthronement of another Sharifian prince, though he has confined his criticisms of the Commission's proposals to the usual diplomatic representations. And, finally, it is unreasonable to expect the Amir 'Abdullah, with the British Government's support of his candidature, to subordinate his ambitions to the popular will.

So all, except the Amir 'Abdullah, combine to resist the minimum concession to the Jews for no other reason than to prevent 'Abdullah's accession to a throne. That is a fact that cannot be ignored. It is an obstacle that can and must be circumvented. Either 'Abdullah must sacrifice his ambitions to the common weal or his opponents must acquiesce in his realisation of a dream, faithfully pursued for the past twenty years with a skill and tenacity that cannot be denied. It is surely a case for an Arab round-table conference to decide the future of Arab Palestine on the basis of the Partition recommended by the Commission.

Any agreed Arab proposals regarding the actual form of the future Arab State will command attention and respect at Whitehall and Geneva. Any suggestions they may have for the alteration or modification of the scheme envisaged by the Commission will, they may be sure, be considered with sympathy. It may be well, therefore, at this stage to consider the problem from these angles, as the Jews have already begun to do in respect of their State. The Jews, for instance, want the Negeb desert tract included within their frontiers and are far from relishing the prospect of the inclusion of 225,000 Arabs of Northern Palestine within their jurisdiction. Those same Arabs object to being left to Jewish rule—the suggestion of their voluntary or forced removal from their ancestral territories is too fantastic to require examination—and this problem, looming so large in the counsels of both parties, is

happily susceptible of a very simple solution. The Arab tract of Northern Palestine down to Acre on the coast can and should be reunited with Syria. It is surely out of the question to retain it in Arab Palestine by a corridor across Jewish territory. As for the Negeb the Jews cannot reasonably expect the concession of their demand by the Mandatory or by the League. The Negeb may well be the *quid pro quo* of the inevitable Arab-Jew understanding of the not distant future.

The Jews object to the retention of Mandatory control in the four towns of Haifa, Nazareth, Tiberias and Safad. Such control will cease to be necessary if the bulk of the Arab population is left to Syria as above suggested. It might further be agreed that the port of Acre should not be developed in rivalry to Haifa by the Syrian State. To balance this the development of the Tel-Aviv harbour should be banned in the interests of Jaffa. No Mandatory control of the latter would then be necessary, and the economic balance would be held evenly between Jews and Arabs, each having unrestricted sovereignty in one of the two principal ports of Palestine. The surrender of Mandatory control at Jaffa would do away altogether with the need of the proposed strategic corridor linking that port with Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Part of the territory so released could be made over to the Jewish State in compensation for the area excluded from it on the north. The rest would go to the Arab State. And there would remain but one problem to cause concern. For sentimental reasons Rehovoth and the neighbouring villages can scarcely be torn away from the main body of the Jewish State. A Jewish corridor linking the two across Arab territory is as undesirable as any other corridor in any part of the world. The exchange of the Rehovoth area for some tract contiguous to the frontier of the Jewish State would be the best solution if feasible. If not, this section of Jewish Palestine must remain detached from the main body of the State with sea communication in lieu of a land corridor.

The retention of Jerusalem and Bethlehem as a sacred enclave under neutral control is too essential a part of the Commission's proposals to be challenged. The British Government may, indeed, not care to assume responsibility for such a charge without the ample accommodation requisite for a considerable military force. In that case it would surely

not be asking too much of the League of Nations to suggest that an international Commission should be responsible for the administration of the enclave, whose neutrality in perpetuity might be guaranteed jointly by the League, the United States and all the Governments of Arabia. An international police force to maintain peace therein would not be unprecedented in a world that knows Shanghai and Tangier. This would certainly be the solution least likely to give rise to future trouble. And the co-operation of the Arab Kings would remove the one danger always inherent in the actual situation of Jerusalem.

There remains only the minor question of 'Aqaba, where the Royal Commission proposes the retention of Mandatory control. It is hard to see any reason for such a proposal—a proposal inconsistent with the admirable sentiments expressed in a recent speech of Mr. Eden, who deprecated the establishment of a favoured position on the eastern coast of the Red Sea by any Great Power including Great Britain. The 'Aqaba district belongs as of right to, and has consistently been claimed by, Sa'udi Arabia. To Sa'udi Arabia it should certainly be restored. If Great Britain cannot bring herself to rectify that little injustice of twelve years ago, 'Aqaba should certainly be left to Arab sovereignty in the new Palestine.

It will be seen from these suggestions that it will not be a matter of extreme difficulty to put the finishing touches on the necessarily rough sketch of Partition presented by the Royal Commission. If permanent peace in Palestine is the sole objective of all concerned, the British Government should have no qualms in relinquishing the doubtful strategic advantages of a truncated Mandate. On the other hand the Jews will get a less unwieldy State than that actually proposed by the Commission, while the Arab area will be substantially enlarged. Indeed the only serious departure from the scheme adumbrated by the Commission is the suggestion of League administration of the Holy Cities in lieu of a British Mandate.

The Jerusalem arrangement cannot be tampered with. Jerusalem cannot be dismembered. So the Jewish settlement cannot be included in the Jewish State. Apart from that the Jews will have no ground for discontentment with one exception. They want the Negeb, and the Negeb is their

opportunity. Only from the Arabs can they get it. And they must pay for it—not in money, but in surrender of a sentimental dream. If they would have opportunity for expansion and development, they must relinquish the sovereignty they are offered in a limited area. The Arabs are ready to meet them. They could gain access not only to the whole of Palestine but to Trans-Jordan as well. Their co-operation in the development of derelict territories would be welcomed. But they must come as guests. For the Jews then it is a question of sentiment against practical considerations.

And what of the Arabs? Hitherto they have shewn no sign of willingness to consider the great advantages offered by Partition. To them the creation of a Jewish State in a tiny fraction of Palestine seems infinitely worse than the abandonment of the whole country to foreign domination. Let them consider the matter well. They demand the recognition of unrestricted Arab sovereignty over the whole of Palestine and the subordination of the Jews to Arab rule. Neither Great Britain nor America nor the League of Nations will or can accede to that demand. And the Jews now in Palestine cannot be expelled from the country by the Powers that encouraged them to go there. Some compromise is clearly necessary and inevitable. A compromise has actually been proposed by the Mandatory Power. The Arabs can have four-fifths of Palestine for themselves in full sovereignty. The Jews will be segregated in the remaining fifth. As the Commission aptly says, half a loaf is better than no bread.

But the matter does not end there. Partition is only the beginning of a new era, not the end. In their restricted space the Jews cannot develop and expand in the manner envisaged by Zionist ideals. They will be forced to negotiate with the Arabs for more elbow room. And the Arabs can negotiate with them as free men on equal terms. They will have unrestricted control of the valuable asset of vacant land. They can barter it against the sovereignty now left to the Jews. But, if they leave that asset in the hands of the Mandatory, the Jews—whatever limits may be imposed on their immigration—will some day inevitably become the majority of the population of Palestine. And then it will be too late for the Arabs to reconsider the obvious advantages to them of the Partition proposals made by the Royal Commission.

H. ST. J. B. PHILBY.

JAPAN RIDES FOR A FALL.

OUTSIDE the Yamen of the Provincial Governor of Suiyuan there stands a stone lion. Nothing unusual in that. Snarling stone lions guard many gates across China ; often they are so covered in dust that the snarl seems a comical grin. But on the pedestal of this lion up in Inner Mongolia four characters have been carved : "Wake up, sleepy lion!" Past the lion, across a great courtyard, in a small room in the heart of the Yamen, I was interviewing the Chinese Commander-in-Chief of the Suiyuan campaign. He had come from the front, and was dressed like his soldiers. "Two days ago our troops captured Pailingmiao," he told me. "It was a sharp engagement but the enemy is routed." Chinese soldiers had beaten Mongols officered by Japanese and using Japanese guns and aeroplanes.

The scene changes. I am in another Yamen 300 miles from the first, far across the Great Wall. This headquarters is more elaborate and lies far from the fighting line, deep within the double walls of the old city of Taiyuan. The man before me is one of the most important war-lords in China, Marshal Yen Hsi-shan, Commissioner of Shansi and Suiyuan. We have been talking a long time and come at last to the main point, the new Japanese aggression up in Inner Mongolia. Marshal Yen speaks quietly : "Not only will China cede no more territory ; she must regain her lost provinces, and by her own power. That is how the nation feels to-day, and the nation is right."

Again the scene changes and again I have travelled hundreds of miles, through the bare dusty lands of Western China where camel trains pad down the dried riverbeds, and no white men are seen. I have crossed the Yellow River, am in another walled city, and before me is another war-lord. He is round-faced and bullet-headed, younger than the other two. He seems keyed up and excited. Suddenly he leans forward and taps me upon the knee. "Listen," he says. "There have been many examples in history of a strong power attacking a weaker one, seizing some territory and holding it. If this was the case with Manchuria it would be bad enough. But it isn't that way." He ticked off on his fingers the encroachments of the Japanese Army ; first Manchuria, then Jehol, then Chahar ; penetration into North China ; penetration into Fukien ; now the attack on Suiyuan.

"Where is it going to stop?" asked the young man. "Why should it stop at all, unless we ourselves cry a halt? Are we to wait until they are on the Yangtze? We did not want to fight Japan or anyone else, but they give us no alternative." His voice sank and he leaned back in his chair, but his eyes bored as keenly as ever. "There is a new China to-day. The world may not believe it yet. They will see. Young China demands that we *shall* resist the invader. Young China is right."

Chang Hsueh-liang marched out of my bedroom in Sian, to be swallowed up among the crowd of secret police, war-lords and bodyguards who then swarmed in the hotel. Chang marched to his destiny. Forty-eight hours later this "Young Marshal" had arrested the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On the outcome of that incident has turned the history of the Orient. For Chiang Kai-shek was considered "pro-Japanese." At Sian he was put on the spot by his subordinate officers and confronted with the people's demand for a firmer resistance.

One more interview I will quote, this time from the far-away Province of Kwangsi, on the borders of French Indo-China. I am in a little white tropical city, miles beyond any railhead. No fur caps to be seen here, cotton uniforms and conical straw hats for the soldiers; naked men on the junks on the great river; bamboo-hidden villages instead of mud-walled towns, a warm sun in mid-winter. Marshal Li Chung-yen is small and fiery; he talks much but is friendly. His partner, Marshal Pai Ching-hsi, is tall and morose. Six months before I met them they had revolted against Nanking, again on the Japanese question. The Kwangsi leaders demanded war on Japan; Chiang Kai-shek attacked them instead. Li's eyes glinted as he told me his version of events which had puzzled the world.

"Here in Kwangsi we were vastly outnumbered when the Central Government surrounded our frontiers. We resisted and the would-be invader withdrew. And that," he said fiercely, "is the attitude which I want the Central Government itself to adopt towards Japan." He paused a moment, then snapped out again: "An invaded country cannot afford to bargain. It must defend itself. The more China resists the Japanese, the less will her territory be encroached upon, and the less, therefore, will be the threat to world peace. It is by weak-kneed concessions to bluff that peace is really endangered."

And so it went on, throughout the three months that I spent wandering the interior of China; demonstrations by school children; demands by the soldiers; students in the freezing north giving up meals for a day and heated class-rooms for a week—in order to send the money to the One Big Cause. I ask a question about the political situation and am dragged across the road by my arm and planted before an enormous painting on the wall of a Marchants Guildhouse. The painting shows a map of China with arrows indicating where the Japanese are in control. Manchuria is coloured black and above it grins the Sun flag of Japan. On the black background Japanese troops are depicted bayoneting Chinese farmers. More Japanese troops stream through the Great Wall, which zigzags across the painting. But down in the South is a picture of China resurgent, armed and mounted, riding to resist the invader. Again I am jogging in my ricksha through the Legation quarter in Peking. We are passing the Japanese barracks when suddenly Ssu, the ricksha boy, drops the shafts on the ground, almost spilling me out. With a face flushed with anger he turns to me, “You like Japanee, sir? You likee?”

Never has a people made themselves more universally detested than the Japanese have made themselves on the mainland of Asia. And can one wonder? These people, who can be so charming at home, behaved abroad as the Italians behaved in Ethiopia or as their Nazi friends treat their own countrymen. Terror is their weapon and savage oppression their interpretation of the “kingly way.” Murder, rape and robbery go on wholesale, not merely all over Manchuria but in North China as well, where the Japanese have established their own hired Chinese puppets in control of the Provincial administration.

Not content with having trebled the traffic in narcotics and ruined the finances of China by their smuggling, they draft labourers wholesale to help build their own “national line of defence” against the Chinese on Chinese soil. Individual atrocities are literally without number. I myself saw men beaten on railway platforms; I spoke with many who had seen murders and some who had themselves experienced torture. In Jehol two Chinese coolies inadvertently crossed the corner of a field which the Japanese had seized for an aerodrome. They were then and there buried alive. In

Northern Manchuria an old woman and a child were digging dandelions for food near a Japanese fort. They were shot down by the sentry on the wall. In Tientsin, which is already virtually a Japanese city, over 300 bodies were recently discovered within two days, floating in the river near the city. They were young coolies who had been used to dig secret fortifications, and, like the slaves of old, had then been drowned to prevent them talking. It is no exaggeration to say that the West would not credit half the things which the Chinese to-day are experiencing under the Japanese.

It has had its effect. For the first time in Chinese history the illiterate masses have combined with the "intellectuals" to stage a revolt. From all over China comes the cry: "Down with the traitors. Forward against the devils from the Eastern sea." And by "traitors" they mean not only Chinese who have been bought outright by the Japanese, but all those in Nanking who are "pussyfooting."

Nor are the masses of China remaining illiterate. In the past few years there has come a new alphabet, reduced to a more normal number of characters. Millions have already learnt to read by it. Children teach their elders, one village educates the next one. The avidity for education can be likened only to what happened in Russia after the Revolution. That is why what is happening in China to-day is so fundamental. Four hundred and fifty million people are, for the first time, taking a voice in the control of their destinies. In Shanghai I have seen a crowd of ricksha coolies milling round a class-room door, rushing in when it opened, scrambling to miss not one moment of their short lesson-time. They never wished to read before. They do not want to learn now in order to read poetry. They want to read in order to learn better how to kick out the Japanese.

Japan has feared only one thing in China. Not Chiang Kai-shek or the Army or the League of Nations. They knew they could buy war-lords, bamboozle the Great Powers and defeat the Chinese Army with their machines. But Japan has feared a revolutionary movement among China's millions; for such a movement must necessarily be, above all, anti-Japanese. That movement they have created, and it alters the whole balance of forces against them.

Eighteen months ago China was on the verge of civil war. To-day she is more united for one thing than at any time in

her history. The Japanese militarists see history repeating itself. In 1931 they could have taken Siberia from Russia. They took Manchuria instead, and now Siberia cannot be taken. The Far Eastern Red Army has become too strong. The Japanese fear the same thing will happen in North China, if the Tokyo industrialists have their way and "peaceful penetration" continues. They have therefore staged an "incident," on the strength of which they intend to force a show down and, they hope, defeat China before unification makes it altogether impossible. General Sung Cheh-yuan, Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, has seen this coming. Although Sung has gone a long way to meet Japanese wishes, he would not repeat, on his own territory, the surrender of Manchuria. He has been away from his post for some time, those he has left behind will surrender, but China will fight.

The outcome is by no means certain victory for Japan. Numerically the Chinese are far stronger. They have some 2,500,000 men under arms, and, though many of them are inadequately trained and poorly armed, a large number are as well equipped as the Japanese. As mercenaries the Chinese make poor fighting material, but, roused as they are to-day to an unprecedented fervour of patriotism, most observers believe they will give a good account of themselves. Their weakness is the irregular quality of their air force and the fact that they lack aeroplane factories. As mechanics and pilots the Chinese are better than the Japanese. Leaving aside the disadvantages of fighting in a thickly populated and hostile country, the position of the invaders is not encouraging. Japan has a standing army of seventeen divisions, approximately 250,000 men. Of these more than half are already on service abroad; the new campaign will mean that hundreds of thousands of reservists will have to be called to the colours in order to maintain the long-drawn lines of communication. Those lines of communication themselves lie across hostile country. The Japanese have been in Korea for thirty years, but the Koreans hate them and only wait for a favourable opportunity to revolt. They have been in Manchuria six years and still have on their hands a perennial war there.

When I crossed the border recently from Korea to Manchuria, every spare corner of the train was filled, at the frontier station of Antung, with Japanese soldiers. They were

the armed patrol, necessary to protect even this main-line railway from "bandits." Since Japan took Manchuria the country has cost the Japanese taxpayer at least 300 million gold dollars, some 5,000 Japanese lives, and over 200,000 evacuated for wounds and sickness. But it will not take many months of fighting in North China before this is doubled. The Japanese have succeeded in convincing the world that all they have against them in Manchuria are "bandits," and that these "gangs" are being liquidated. On the spot they are not quite so naïve. They told me that if I went to one place I would do well to "ride in the armoured car with the machine-guns."

The term "bandit" in the Far East is elastic. In Manchuria it is used to describe a scattered but organised force of nearly 150,000 men. Some of these troops are or have been real bandits, others are dispossessed farmers, both Chinese and Koreans, remnants of old armies, political refugees, deserters from the "Manchukuoan" Army, and, although the Japanese strenuously deny it, even deserters from their own Army who have turned "anti-Imperialist." This mixed but cohesive force operates with the assistance of the Manchurian peasantry. They prove a formidable enemy and have often broken regular detachments sent against them, for they employ guerilla tactics and the Japanese are routine fighters and hate all surprises. These North-Eastern Anti-Japanese Allied Armies, as they call themselves, have been operating to hamper the Japanese occupation. If fighting breaks out on a large scale in North China, the Japanese will require enormously increased forces if they wish to hold Manchuria.

And all this costs money. A few years ago Japan possessed a financial genius in her 80-year-old Takahashi. Takahashi set 10 billion yen as the danger line of debt for the country. If this was exceeded inflation would follow. Takahashi was murdered by the military and to-day the Exchequer has exceeded his limit by over 135 million yen. Japan's total indebtedness is now double that of five years ago, and well over 50 per cent. of the budget is devoted to the fighting services. There are many competent observers in the Far East who have said for two years that, whatever the result in the technical sense, any war in which Japan was involved would break her financial back.

But even this is not the worst in the Japanese house of

cards. Despite the Police terror and such devices as the "Bureau for Suppression of Dangerous Thought," open discontent with the régime is growing apace in Japan. I found signs of it in the poverty-stricken rural villages and amongst the fisher folk, as well as in the great cities. Not for many years has the military clique been so unpopular, and hence come their repeated attempts to dispose of such semblance of "democracy" as exists in the country. Japanese agriculture is conducted chiefly by a smallholder peasant class. The total agricultural production is 2,100 million yen annually, and this production carries a burden of debt amounting to 7,000 million yen. It is little wonder that the Japanese farmer has to sell his daughters to the brothel keepers. Behind the polished façade of Japan's feudal industrial system the situation is little better. With commodity prices rising steadily (they are already 25 per cent. higher than last year), labour troubles have become too widespread to be hidden. During 1936 there were 2,000 cases of labour strikes and disputes, and the demand for a political Popular Front has begun to rise. Recently the railway and street car operators of Tokyo and Kobe went out on strike with the slogan: "If our wages are not raised we can but wait for the arrival of the god of death." That, indeed, is all that awaits the peoples of both Japan and China from the Japanese military.

HARRISON BROWN.

THE WAR IN SPAIN.

A YEAR ago, in August and September 1936, it seemed as if the insurgent forces might quickly overrun the whole of Spain. The military revolt, crushed almost miraculously in Barcelona, Madrid and other towns of eastern Spain, had nevertheless gained sufficient strength in the north and south-west to appear an almost irresistible force. Advancing from the south and the north the fall of Madrid in the autumn seemed inevitable. In the maps published on July 18th of this year, the insurgents can show large gains in territory in the last year, but nine-tenths of those gains were made in the first few months, Malaga and Bilbao being their only notable achievements, so far, in 1937.

To-day the map shows a "front" which, including that of the provinces along the Biscay coast still held by the Government after the fall of Bilbao, extends to something like 1,200 miles. Of course, not a "front" as we knew it in the Great War, but nevertheless sufficiently defined for the changing hands of villages to be an event of importance. On both sides efficiency in man power and equipment has increased, so have the number of men under arms and the quantity of war material available. Moreover, except where special circumstances prevail, the war seems to have reached the stage where the defence is more powerful than the attack. The insurgents still hold out, almost surrounded for months, in the University City. Their capture of Malaga in the spring was not followed up by their expected drive along the Mediterranean coast, albeit the retreat from Malaga by the Government forces was a rout. Nor were the Government able to take full advantage of the crushing defeat of the Italians on the Guadalajara. The war drags on; the outcome is still uncertain, and it may be, as in the Great War, that the military factor will not be decisive. But in the meantime, before considering other factors, let us examine more closely the military situation.

The insurgents started of course with an immense technical superiority. This superiority has been maintained, in quantity of material if not always in quality. The following quotation from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of April 22nd with

regard to the offensive against the Basques illustrates the situation :

A comparison of arms must reveal an absolute disadvantage on the side of the Red northern provinces. Since the approach from the sea is as good as blockaded the Basques and their allies have only existing supplies of arms and armoured cars . . . still worse is the comparison in air arms. The twelve or fifteen dozen bombers and pursuit planes which have been mustered by the nationalist command can if they are not prevented by the weather fly over the entire Red country practically undisturbed. It is only rarely that one of the ten or fifteen Red planes gives battle or that their anti-aircraft guns come into operation.

It has been stated on good authority that the Spanish Government lost more than fifty aeroplanes, attempting to get through to Bilbao. To all intents and purposes the Basques possessed no anti-aircraft guns whatever. The large fleet of aeroplanes that General Franco brought to the attack consisted of German types, including the types Junker 52 heavy bombers, Heinkel III which made their appearance only during the campaign, and Heinkel 51 (chasers). Of the aeroplanes brought down by machine-gun or rifle fire, the personnel, numbering ten, all were German without exception, and unanswerable proof has been provided by documentary evidence that crews and aeroplanes had left Germany many weeks after the agreement on volunteers which came into force on February 20th.

The superiority in the air was probably not as decisive as that on land. As the offensive battered its way towards Bilbao, the number and size of the guns employed steadily increased. In the final assaults upon the defences of Bilbao, *The Times* correspondent estimates that 10,000 shells were fired in the course of a few hours against a small section of the front. And a peculiar feature of the final attack was the use of twelve-inch guns, not hitherto used elsewhere in Spain or on the Basque front, suggesting their recent arrival. In the artillery and infantry the Italians took their part. I have the captured list of one "mixed" battery in which all the important positions are held by Italian officers and men. A captured cook remarked with regard to another "mixed" unit that all the food was Italian. As against this no suggestion has been made, either by insurgent headquarters or by press correspondents, that non-Spanish personnel was employed by

the Basques. Undoubtedly, the working of the non-intervention agreement was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Basques. The northern coast of Spain is assigned under the naval observation scheme to the British Navy. And quite apart from the blockade instituted by the insurgent naval forces—largely a paper blockade, especially after the sinking of the *España*—the Basques were unable to obtain supplies by the only channel open to them—their ports.

The non-intervention agreement has of course made it much easier for the insurgents to institute a *de facto* blockade. Let it be remembered that without being granted belligerent rights they have no legal status whatever. In law, whether inside or outside territorial waters, their ships are pirates. When in the latter part of the last century two Spanish warships hoisted the red flag, British and German men-of-war sailed in and arrested them within territorial waters, even before they had taken any action and solely upon the ground that they were rebels. But Britain was on this occasion prepared to take the view that non-intervention must apply within territorial waters but not without, and that the British Navy should abstain from giving protection to British merchant ships within the three-mile limit, even when the insurgent warships have themselves remained outside territorial waters and fired upon British ships within. British acquiescence in the insurgents' blockade has, however, gone farther. By issuing warnings to British merchantmen, the British Government has assisted very materially in making the blockade effective. If it had not been that on April 20th the *Seven Seas Spray*, disregarding the Admiralty's advice, ran the blockade and set the example to other merchant ships, a very peculiar legal position would have arisen, and British commercial interests might have found themselves liable to very heavy damages to the Basques for non-fulfilment of contracts. Not only has careful investigation by experts shown that the reports given credence by the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty and others, of the extent of the dangers from mines and warships, have been enormously exaggerated, but in actual practice during April seventy-one, and during May ninety-five, cargo ships entered Bilbao without casualty.

But undoubtedly the delay, difficulty and expense that this abortive blockade caused to the Basques in obtaining food

and other supplies necessary for their civilian population, hampered them vitally in the conduct of their defence of the province. The same position exists now at Santander, with some difference, in that at Bilbao the shore batteries were more than adequate to command not only the entrance of the harbour, but the whole and more than the whole extent of territorial waters outside. At Santander and Gijon the batteries are not so powerful, and the *de facto* recognition by the British Government of the blockade is even more damaging to the trade of these ports.

General Franco's drive along the north coast of Spain came to an end when the Spanish Government launched an offensive north of Madrid which broke through, and very nearly succeeded in freeing the immediate neighbourhood of Madrid from the insurgent threat. It was only partially successful, but neither was the very powerful counter-offensive launched by General Franco after he had time to withdraw his best troops and equipment from the north. Brunete was recaptured, at the head of the salient which the Government had forced into his lines. But it was not possible for the insurgents to recover the whole of the ground lost. In Biscay the insurgents had three great advantages. They had undisputed control of the air; owing to the isolation of Biscay they had overwhelming superiority in artillery, machine-guns and tanks; to the terrors of bombardment by land and from the air they were able through the blockade to subject the civil population to famine conditions.

On the main fronts these advantages are less definite. In the air the Government has for many months enjoyed a qualitative if not a quantitative superiority. The defences of Madrid, by anti-aircraft guns and chaser planes, have reduced the air raids that were a daily if not hourly occurrence last autumn to a rare event. The city is constantly shelled with a growing intensity, but the Government has made it not worth while carrying out air raids.

In the field the insurgents probably maintain a superiority of ten to one in the number of machine-guns. The days when the Government's militia were armed with museum blunderbusses are past, but the rifles of the insurgents are still greatly superior to those of the Government. German technicians have undoubtedly given General Franco invaluable service in fortifying his lines. His guns are better, and the marksmanship

of the German and Italian gunners is said to be excellent. On the other hand the Government enjoy an overwhelming superiority in Spanish man power. It is perhaps not worth entering in any detail into the controversy as to exactly the relative numbers of foreigners on either side. Since casualty lists were published in Italy, and the *Popolo d'Italia*, Mussolini's paper, has announced that "Italy has not been neutral," and with regard to the withdrawal of volunteers, "the Italian Government cannot do it and in the present circumstances will not do it" (July 1st), and since large numbers of Italian and smaller numbers of German prisoners have been captured, there is no doubt whatever that such intervention has been of immense importance to General Franco. Moreover, a considerable body of detailed evidence exists to show that substantial numbers of Italian and German personnel have arrived in Spain since the agreement on volunteers on February 20th.

But perhaps the attitude of the two parties to the proposals for the withdrawal of volunteers affords the most definite clue to the question of which side is benefiting most by their presence. When the British Government's recent proposals were first announced, a few statements appeared in Germany and elsewhere suggesting that General Franco was willing enough to forgo such assistance, but following a broadcast from Portugal General Franco made a categorical announcement that for his part he intended to retain the foreigners. This is to be contrasted with the Spanish Government's repeated statements that they were at any time prepared to agree to withdrawal. The best informed and least biased estimates give a balance of foreign personnel of at least five to one in favour of the insurgents.

But "war is too serious a matter to leave it to the soldiers." It may well be that the end of the struggle may come as a result of the influence of other considerations not purely military. In the Great War it was Germany's collapse rather than her defeat in the field that brought the end. It is possible that either side might collapse, but the Government rests upon a wide democratic basis, and the remarkable reorganisation of its forces in the last six months would not have been possible but for a mass of support from the rank and file of its people. Both sides represent composite forces with varying ultimate aims, but observers constantly report the increased

unity and efficiency of the forces supporting the Government. On General Franco's side the unity would seem to depend more upon an individual. The recent disappearance of Manuel Hedilla and other leaders of the Falangists suggests that all is not well between the newer fascist movements and the old aristocratic elements supporting General Franco. There are repeated and consistent rumours of rebellions behind the insurgent lines, and the possibility of a restoration of the monarchy as a means of cementing differences is not to be overlooked, though such a solution might create as many difficulties as it solved. To such a question General Franco is reported (*Times*, June 16th) as stating: "they judged it as much an error to propose a monarchical restoration as to reject its possibility in the political future of Spain."

Undoubtedly the Germans and Italians have made themselves exceedingly unpopular in insurgent territory. It was widely believed in Madrid in the winter that the continuous bombing of the civilian population was dictated by Germans, and that Spaniards had refused to take part. Whether that be true or not, it represents a similar state of mind to that which immediately after the destruction of Guernica attributed it to the Germans acting without the authority of Salamanca.

A Spaniard who has returned from Junta territory informs me that there are many of them [German airmen] and that he as a Spaniard and a Conservative was ashamed to admit that many Spanish and Basque men, women and children were being killed by German bombs from German machines piloted by Germans. (*Morning Post*, April 29th.)

After questioning many persons on their return from insurgent territory, I have failed to find anyone who has experienced the same type of deliberate terrorisation of the civil population by aerial bombardment as has been practised by the insurgents on Madrid, at Guernica and elsewhere. It is possible that in the end "frightfulness" does not pay, especially when it is committed in a civil war by foreigners. Of course it is possible that within insurgent territory the myth that Guernica was fired by the Basques may receive credence. No even moderately impartial person can believe that it was not the work of the insurgents, after looking into the evidence. But in any case it is possible perhaps to lay

too much importance upon the "morale" of the contending parties. The Italians have not been conspicuous by their military achievements, nor have the Germans their heart in the struggle, neither those in Spain nor the mass of Germans at home. Equipment and war material does count for much, but not for everything, and General Miaja's forces believe with him that time is on their side.

Diplomatically the insurgents have undoubtedly improved their position. The British Government would not hear of the granting of belligerent rights until after the fall of Bilbao. And though the plan by which such rights should be granted conditionally upon a "substantial withdrawal of volunteers" seems to be indefinitely shelved, yet the very fact that such a proposal has been discussed strengthens the insurgents' position. Undoubtedly General Franco's plan was to conquer the whole of the north of Spain, then, having obtained belligerent rights, to proceed to a similar campaign along the Mediterranean coast. The plan failed for two reasons, one military and one diplomatic. The Spanish Government's offensive north of Madrid was too effective and dangerous, and called for the whole of General Franco's forces to repel it. The other reason was that the Basque offensive had relied too patently upon German and Italian assistance, and with the change of French Government the French people have become absolutely united from Left to Right in their alarm at a possible victory for the insurgents. British opinion is more difficult to assess, but the British Foreign Office sometimes gives the impression that the only question to which they are anxious to find the answer is "Who will win?" Mr. Winston Churchill's argument that because the German guns installed on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar can command both the sea passage and our fortifications, therefore we should "hasten to make friends with our enemy while he is in the gate," seems to proceed on the same reasoning. The argument is, of course, that if the insurgents are going to win we should first grant belligerent rights in order that we may show our goodwill, and that later we shall be able to overbid both Germany and Italy in the financial assistance which General Franco will require to reconstruct the country.

While it is true that General Franco has already enjoyed in fact some of the advantages of a belligerent, he would if he were recognised as such reap considerable additional

advantages in any further blockade he might attempt. On the other hand the formal recognition of belligerency does not seem to Germany and Italy to be worth the price that the British Government has asked, namely the withdrawal of volunteers. Possibly they hope that in effect the advantages of belligerency will be obtained without paying any price at all.

In conclusion, in the first year of the war there can be little doubt that the whole policy of non-intervention has assisted General Franco. The simple reason is that the "gaps" in the system have been easier for him to slip through than for the Government. General Franco's friends have been able to fly their aeroplanes into Spain, while the Government's sources of supply being far distant, South America or Russia, have had to come by boat and elude the control scheme. General Franco's sources of supplies for munitions and equipment are also nearer and more easily able to elude control. It is also true that Germany and Italy, while frequently protesting their disinterestedness in Spain, stand to gain enormously by victory for the insurgents, and are prepared to run risks of international complications which the democracies dare not take.

It is doubtful really whether the inextricable complications of non-intervention diplomacy have not been more likely to involve Europe in war than a simple and more orthodox neutrality. Be that as it may, while the insurgents have enjoyed superiority in equipment, the Spanish Government has been steadily building up a more powerful war machine. The war seems to have reached the stage when the unsuccessful attack becomes, owing to its cost, in reality a defeat. It is possible that the collapse of one side may bring a speedier end than is in sight to-day, and of the two sides, the insurgents seem the more likely to suffer from such internal conflict.

WILFRID ROBERTS.

NEW TENDENCIES IN HUNGARY.

THE political season in Hungary closed amid symptoms of harmony and goodwill. For years, nay decades, there has never been better feeling between the Government and the opposition. The cause of this unwonted mood is not far to seek. To a certain extent parliamentary government in Hungary has always been a *fable convenue*. With one notable exception no government has ever failed to secure a majority at the elections. The power of the Government is so great and the administrative machine mostly so unsparingly used in its favour that a prime minister who knows his business rarely does run any appreciable risk. On the other hand, Hungary has always had a parliamentary opposition, even in the times of the all-powerful Liberals, and the opposition has frequently had the support of dissident groups of the Government party, much as in post-Gladstonian days the Unionists voted with the Conservatives in the British Parliament. In spite of the present authoritarian system the opposition is making its voice heard. Hungary, greatly to her credit, has never gone in for a totalitarian form of government, implying the identification of State and party and the enrolment of all national forces in the service of one individual and his immediate henchmen.

That even in the heyday of dictatorial rule Hungary is not likely to fall a victim to it is due in the first place to the personality of the Prime Minister, Dr. Daranyi. When he was appointed to his present office it was widely believed that he was chosen as a stopgap, but he has proved himself a statesman who combines energy with reasonableness and is averse to all extremist political courses. He keeps right-radical tendencies under control far more effectively than the late General Gömbös. He is more imbued with a sense of impartiality. He endeavours to effect a compromise between opposing factions and is not carried away by demagogic catchwords. Among the matters to which he has had to give his attention the settlement of the question of the successorship to the Regent Admiral von Horthy stands out prominently. It is humanly understandable that the head of the State wished to secure the continuance of the conservative course and the present system of government beyond the span of his life. In this question the country, the Government and the Regent himself

had one interest in common, namely, to prevent this issue from becoming fiercely controversial and leading to commotion in the country and a deadlock in Parliament.

Under the act which the Government succeeded in passing, important prerogatives are conferred on the Regent and his rôle in the legislative side of the Government is defined. In the absence of a full-fledged right of sanction the Regent is endowed with a suspensive veto which he can exercise twice against bills of which he does not approve so that he has the means of delaying for a considerable time legislation to which he objects. The Regent will also have an important voice in the appointment of his own successor, being entitled to propose three nominees. In framing the Regency Act, Government and Parliament have carefully avoided a wording which might be construed into a prejudice against a return of the Habsburgs or an identification of the powers conferred on the Regent with the prerogatives vested in a crowned king. It was statesmanlike of Dr. Daranyi not to stress the issue too much and to content himself, after listening to the opposition, with a compromise which, while ensuring parliamentary influence in the case of an election of the head of the State, excludes the possibility of unwelcome surprises which might place Hungary in a dangerous position in regard to other countries. He had the satisfaction of securing the support of all parties for the solution proposed by him.

This is the more remarkable as Hungary, notwithstanding the common front her people has always presented in international issues, is strongly divided in a great number of questions by deep economic and political cleavages. In the Unity Party, as the majority group supporting the Government is called, the lower middle class, inspired by the ideas which the late General Gömbös professed, is represented along with the legitimists and the radicals of the right who form perhaps one-third of the Government camp, but the majority also includes numerous adherents of Count Bethlen, the former Prime Minister. The Government party as a whole, it should be remembered, was formed by and owed allegiance to Count Bethlen, and it was only through a bold and almost desperate operation that Gömbös succeeded in winning it over. Under the Gömbös Government, therefore, Count Bethlen was in open opposition to the Prime Minister. It frequently seemed as if the duel between them would end with the political death

of one of the adversaries. Under the Daranyi Government the tension between the former and the present leader of the party has almost disappeared and made room for a tacitly agreed co-operation.

A similar easing of the tension has taken place in the Government's relations with the "Small Holders' Party," a very active group under the leadership of M. Tibor von Eckhardt. In the course of the last months he has expressed views which would have been considered nearly revolutionary under the former Government, but which fit better into the political frame of mind encouraged by the new dispensation. The right-radical tendencies, which temporarily assumed alarming proportions, have found a determined opponent in M. von Eckhardt. He considers that absolutism, dictatorship and the abrogation of civil liberty, as he recently told his constituents, make for national weakness and not for national strength, and he added: "The exercise of arbitrary power is not a natural growth of the Hungarian soil and does not bear fruit in Hungary. To the adherents of the absolutist fashion, now already on the wane, I declare that the Hungarian nation is ripe for the most advanced type of parliamentary government. A strengthening of civil liberties and an enlargement of the political power of the people must not, therefore, be further delayed." Revolutionary attempts from above or from below, from the right or from the left, are abhorrent to him. In foreign politics he is averse from intransigence. He also deserves credit for his firm stand against occasional cases of corruption and the infusion of narrow party views into the government administration. It was largely due to his efforts that one of the Ministers resigned his office when certain incompatibilities between his position as a member of the Cabinet and as a party politician were insistently drawn attention to. Towards the Daranyi Cabinet, however, and more particularly the Prime Minister, M. von Eckhardt has never indulged in violent or impassioned oratory and the compromise in regard to the Regency Act received his blessing in a solemn form.

No more than M. von Eckhardt did the competent leaders of the legitimist group, the Archduke Joseph and Count Sigray, or even the democrats under the leadership of M. Rassay, refuse their co-operation to the Prime Minister. One can hardly fail to see an analogy with British parliamentary

traditions in the rally of all parties round the Government when issues of truly national importance are at stake. It is to be hoped that this tradition will not fail the country in the solution of other important problems with which it is faced. This is notably the reform of the electoral law and of the Upper House which require concessions on the part of the ruling classes and a larger measure of confidence in the political reliability of the masses. The reform is urgent because Hungary still has a system of open voting in the country districts, and the benefits of the secret ballot are on the whole confined to urban constituencies. The Government is desirous of introducing democratic principles into the electoral system while taking all precautions lest the pendulum swing too suddenly and too far in a new direction. The Government is naturally anxious to avoid a political landslide which might bury the rigidly conservative system of to-day. It would be a great triumph for the Prime Minister if he were able to find a middle course, satisfying all legitimate aspirations, for the solution of a problem which is beset with difficulties. The effect would be to give more reality to parliamentary government and to keep it from degenerating more and more into a sort of hallowed fiction. Competent observers, however, are by no means certain that a reform of the electoral system can be effected without rousing fierce passion in the country.

Another important turn of government policy concerns foreign relations. It is still in its initial stage and—remembering Bismarck's saying that fruits do not ripen quicker if you hold a lamp to them—it is best not to over-rate its scope as yet. However, it deserves notice that from statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister Koloman von Kanya, references to territorial questions have been absent. Hungarian policy, according to these authoritative expositions, aims at full equality of rights and a better treatment of Magyar minorities in other countries ; but territorial revision, implying the return to Hungary of purely Magyar districts which the country had to relinquish under the Treaty of Trianon, does not occupy the foreground of the Government's foreign policy platform, at any rate for the time. This does not mean, of course, that a decisive change has taken place in Hungarian public opinion with respect to the territorial provisions of the peace treaty, or that a sincere reconciliation with some of the neighbouring countries is a near

contingency. Visitors to Hungary are still greeted at the frontier stations by a plan showing the territorial amputations which Hungary suffered under the Treaty of Trianon—and the words “*Nem, nem, soha!*” (No, no, never!) which strike their eyes on the railway station of Buda-örs, at the gate of the capital, still show a mood which is very far removed from resignation. There may thus be no more than a strictly limited and relative softening of the tone, but it is already something that at least hatred does not flare up sky-high and that there are signs of a more conciliatory spirit. It is more or less in keeping with this new shade of policy that Hungary has refrained from following the example set by Germany in the open defiance of the military clauses of the peace treaty.

Such subtle touches are sometimes of greater practical importance than full-dress diplomatic actions. They have already produced a better spirit between Hungary on the one side and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the other, though in the improvement of the relations with the latter country Italy has also played a hand. The Regent paying a visit to Rome was able to travel over Yugoslav territory where he received a cordial reception. Another sign of an improved atmosphere was that Dr. Milan Hodza, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, unveiling a memorial to a celebrated Hungarian author in the latter's native place, now included in Slovakia, in a speech in the Magyar language gave the assurance that the rights of the Magyar minority would be protected and enlarged.

Hungarian relations with Germany are now also viewed in a significantly, if ever so slightly, different shade, as even in its foreign policy the Government seems bent on rejecting extreme ideologies. Since the death of General Gömbös a more reserved tone and greater circumspection are in evidence. Two circumstances have contributed thereto: The discountenancing of Hungarian revisionist aims in the German press, among others also by Hitler's powerful paladin Rosenberg, and certain subversive tendencies which made themselves felt among the German population in Hungary, causing considerable anxiety to the Government as well as to the moderate leaders of the Hungarian Germans, above all Dr. Gustav Gratz. The German-speaking population in Hungary numbers about 500,000, many of whom have become converted to a camouflaged Nazidom. However, thanks to the

energetic action of the Government and to the efforts of Dr. Gratz, the majority of Hungarian Germans did not depart from their loyalty to the State and were kept free from contamination with the Nazi spirit. No exception could be taken in Germany to the statement of the very efficient Minister of the Interior, Dr. von Szell, that Hungary will certainly protect the rights of her German minority but will not permit any existing under-currents to become dangerously strong.

The political frame of mind in which the German and the Austrian Governments are facing each other has naturally also had an influence on the relations between Germany and Hungary. It is perhaps true that certain Hungarian quarters do not sufficiently realise what a Nazi Austria, or an Austria having practically the status of Danzig, would mean for Hungary. In pre-war times Hungarian politics were frequently affected by a morbid vision of "Vienna" as the seat of centralised power, oppressive, blood-sucking and tyrannical. If such apprehensions were entertained of Vienna in the easy-going times of Franz Josef, whose rule in the latter half of his reign was decidedly Magyarophil and who as Emperor of Austria nearly always recognised the supposed obligations which the kingship of Hungary imposed upon him—what would not have to be feared from Vienna if the city towered near the Hungarian frontier as the exponent of a country of 70 million people united by nationalist fanaticism? If it came to that, Hungary would be little more than a corridor to the Balkan countries for the Third Reich. One must assume that the competent personages in Hungary realise the implications of such a contingency.

All these problems are also, and in some cases mainly, economic problems. With skill and large-mindedness, German economic policy has aspired to and gained the first place among the countries which trade with South-Eastern Europe. The accretion of political power and prestige which Germany has gained thereby is not substantially diminished by a realisation on the part of her clients that German trade with them frequently takes forms which, by the usual economic standards, would appear irrational and even grotesque. To Hungary, Germany has supplied many hundred thousands of mouth-organs, many of them probably in exchange for rye, and to the Balkan countries enormous quantities of cigar-lighters were exported. On the other hand Germany, in the

endeavour to find an outlet for her industrial products, frequently pays more for her imports than she would otherwise have to. For Hungary, however, the export of her agricultural surplus is vital, and, even if the goods offered in exchange are not for her of primary necessity, she cannot afford to disdain a barter operation of the kind.

Until the conclusion of the Pacts of Rome three years ago Hungary received no more than about eight pengö (7s.) per metric quintal for her wheat, i.e. substantially less than the price of production. Through the co-operation of the signatories of the Rome Agreements it has been possible to obtain a price of 20 pengö and more. The progress is enormous, and particularly so if the social conditions are taken into consideration under which the Hungarian peasants are still existing. Other countries are also certain to benefit largely by this improvement. Dr. Hodza has estimated that British industry has lost about 500 million pounds through the decline of purchasing power in the agricultural countries, and he supported his argument by a reference to the Czechoslovak textile industry whose machines, imported from England, stood idle for years owing to the inability of the peasants in the distressed agricultural areas of Central Europe to afford the purchase of textiles.

In Hungary, with a population of 9 million, the number of the destitute is put at 3 million by competent authorities. Altogether 5 million people, though not all distressingly poor, would be called indigent by Western standards. Among the poorest of the poor are the agricultural labourers, who frequently have to eke out an existence with 1 pengö a day, and in some cases with one-fifth of a pengö only. They are not in danger of starvation because food is extraordinarily cheap on the farms; but the satisfaction of any cultural needs and the most elementary boons of technical civilisation are entirely beyond their reach. The Government is giving this question its anxious attention, and the very capable and progressive President of the National Bank, Dr. von Imredy, whose opinion carries great weight, no less than the Minister of Finance, Dr. von Fabinyi, feels the urgency of remedial measures.

Hungary, like many other States, is a country of sharp contrasts. Crying need and ostentatious wealth, seething unrest and smiling contentment are to be found side by side.

Walking or driving through the imposing thoroughfares of Budapest, through Andrássy Street, for instance, with its resemblance to a Parisian boulevard, or taking in the glorious vista of the Danube quay, which in some of its perspectives reminds the visitor of Prague and in others of Salzburg, one is able to give oneself up to that enjoyment of life which is nowhere more intensely felt than in Hungary. The splendour of the city, capital wines and excellent food and music create an enchantment against which few foreigners are proof.

Objectively, Hungarian economic conditions have recently shown an extraordinarily favourable development which has moved parallel with the general world recovery. Since 1927 industrial production has risen by over 30 per cent., and the value of exports in the first five months of the present year was nearly 40 per cent. above the corresponding figure of 1936. An adverse foreign trade balance of 6 million pengö has been turned into an export surplus of 70 million in the current year. In consequence, Government receipts have risen and the budgetary position as well as the status of the National Bank have improved considerably. The budget, one cannot help feeling, might with advantage be a little clearer and present a more comprehensive picture of Government receipts and expenditure. In contrast to the methods adopted in Austria the gradual rehabilitation of the Hungarian banking system was effected by conservative therapeutics. The situation has long ceased to present any acutely critical symptoms. The present relatively favourable position may perhaps offer an opportunity for an attempt at concentration, which Dr. von Imreedy has under contemplation, as in conditions of comparative health such an operation would present fewer difficulties. At any rate the opening of new sources of credit, both external and internal, will be an important task of the Government, and in this connection the new arrangement made with the foreign creditors will prove of great advantage. In conversation with the writer, a prominent Hungarian financier expressed the opinion that only an honest co-operation between Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia can guarantee the existence of these countries. With luck we may witness a gradual development in that direction. Already the first indication of such a turn would be an historic event.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

FRANCE: A CAUSERIE.

ON reading Professor Ritchie's masterly symposium on France and French culture,* one inevitably asks oneself the question: Why is it that the average individual of either nation is such a *terra incognita*, not to say enigma, to his fellow-creature across the Channel? Here are two peoples who are only divided by a strip of salt water which at its narrowest is only eighteen miles across, and which in the early days was the principal highway between the Belgæ whom Cæsar knew and their closely related brethren in what is now called East Anglia. It continued to be so during the period when the northern coast of France was known by the significant title of the *Litus Saxonicum*, while the connection was later maintained through the Norseman settlements in Kent and Normandy. It became still closer under William the Conqueror. Thereafter for some 150 years the boundary ran not along the southern coast, but along the shifting land-frontiers in France itself, of the Angevin kings. These possessions were lost, but subsequently the southern part of France became and remained for a long time English. Bordeaux was an English town for two centuries, and even Montaigne, some hundred years later, could recall with pride his English ancestry. After Agincourt Henry V became *de facto* monarch of the greater part of the kingdom of France, while Calais remained English till the reign of Mary. In the eighteenth century, as Professor Ritchie shows at length, there was a second English invasion, this time of the "English Ideas," which lasted till the French Revolution, itself the consequence of the teachings of English philosophers adapted to French conceptions. In fact, during the whole of the eighteenth century a close understanding and appreciation existed, especially between the aristocracies of the two nations. There was even a moment at the beginning of the French Revolution, when a similar understanding and appreciation became possible between the Whigs and Radicals and the makers of the Revolution; but the Terror killed it, and so what might have been a real understanding and *entente* between the rank and file of the two peoples was nipped in the bud. Even the *entente* that preceded the war of

* *France: A Companion to French Studies*. Edited by Professor Ritchie. Methuen.

1914 was the work of Edward VII and the upper classes. Considering that the English and French are the only two real democratic powers in the West, it is a misfortune that there is so little mutual comprehension and sympathy between the proletariat in the two countries. By the average Englishman the Frenchman is still regarded as a slightly comic person whose principal diet is frogs, snails and "kick-shaws." He is quite oblivious of the fact that French cooking in the lower classes is far superior to the standard found in the bulk of English homes. On the other hand, the stay-at-home Frenchman is wont to regard the holiday tripper, in plus fours or jumpers according to sex, as typical of the whole nation. The reason why such a *rapprochement* has only taken place between the two aristocracies is that it has been largely one of intellect and taste, helped no doubt by the fact that the two aristocracies had certain ideals, common to both, that date before the rise of the notion of nationality, while though both democracies are sincere lovers of liberty, each no doubt after his own fashion, the average Englishman has no use for equality. And fraternity, which with the French people means fraternity between groups or between nations, makes little appeal to the more insular English character, except in trade union circles; even the word "comrade" seems to have largely a communistic flavour in this country.

The two nations are in many ways really very unlike. Where the French excel we are weak, and *vice versa*. Our opportunist philosophy of life makes us unpredictable to the French, their regard for logic seems to us to make them slaves to a system. There is a Latin phrase—*Primum vivere, deinde philosophari*. The Englishman stresses the first (*vivere*), the Frenchman the second; the one pins his faith to experience, the second to reason, which is codified experience. In a word we are in all sorts of ways really complementary. And this brings me to the conclusion that we are so unlike, yet so interesting, that we have every reason, without ceasing to remain good Englishmen or good Frenchmen, to learn more about each other: there is much to be gained from such studies. Let us take a few of the differences.

The tie, as Professor Ritchie points out, that binds Frenchmen together is not race but a common heritage of ideas, or in other words a common culture and a common civilisation. Even the notion of nationality came later. It only woke to

consciousness under Joan of Arc. This explains how Alsace, a German-speaking region, is largely French at heart, and how coloured races are also proud of their French citizenship. As Sisley Huddleston points out, there is no colour bar, and the coloured deputies who sit for Martinique and elsewhere are held in high respect in the Chamber. French patriotism is clamant but not aggressive. Germany, on the other hand, is held together by a race theory *plus* a folk-culture theory. German patriotism is both clamant and aggressive. Above all it is a Government concern, a rigid creed that all must profess under penalty of excommunication. We again are different. We are English because we are English, we do not analyse our ideas, and we are content to leave it at that. Moreover, we have been so long English, we cannot imagine that we could be anything else or that there could be anything better. You may remember the story of the Frenchman who said : " If I were not born a Frenchman I should like to have been born an Englishman " ; and of the Englishman who replied : " If I were not born an Englishman I should like to have been born one " ! Nor do we try to make our subject races proud of being English ; we often treat them as second-class citizens. The same is true of political refugees, whether the Huguenots of the seventeenth century, Germans of 1848 or Jews in the twentieth century ; we admit them to citizenship, or rather we suffer them to become citizens. Patriotism also, like nationality, is taken for granted with us.

Take another point of difference. In the volume under review emphasis is laid on the strength of the French family. Compared with it, the connective tissue that binds the English family together is far looser. One reason possibly is that in the past the younger members were expected to leave the family nest to seek their fortune. The family and the peasantry (unfortunately a diminishing number) constitute the backbone of France. If I were asked what is the chief strength of England, I should say the social structure. There are no hard and fast barriers due to caste or religion, which latter unfortunately splits France from top to bottom into two nations—Catholic and non-Catholic. The split extends to every charitable or social activity ; there are two Red Cross Societies, two Boy Scouts, two Girl Guides. I only know of one society which embraces both elements ! On the other hand the social structure in England ranges without a break

from the woman in the slums who does not wash her front door steps, through the woman who does, up through a hierarchy of infinite social gradations to millionaires and the oldest members of the aristocracy. Social advancement is a kind of race open to all, in which the charwoman competes with the duchess. Naturally she does not beat the duchess, but there is always someone whom she hopes to get her head in front of. English society is rather dynamic, French rather static. We are always hoping to better ourselves. With the Frenchman it is often a case of safety and comfort first. I remember once interviewing a French firm of world-wide reputation. I asked one of the principals why he had not a branch in London. He said: "I make a good living a year. I don't want any more money. A branch in London will no doubt bring more money, but also a great deal more trouble. What should I really gain?" Nothing again illustrates better this French idea of safety first than the universal desire of parents to put their children in the Civil Service, in which the pay is poor but the position secure. Thirty years ago the reverse was true in England, though to-day the competition to enter the Civil Service is far greater.

The same desire for security is to be seen from the French passion for saving. English people are much more inclined to live up to their income, or, like Mr. Micawber, beyond it. The French are a nation of savers. With them economy seems inbred and instinctive. The reason for this seems to me that while the labouring classes in England have had their periods of short commons during the Industrial Revolution or the Hungry Forties, it has only been incidental. We have had no Hundred Years War, no lengthy civil wars, nor extravagant sovereigns like Louis XIV to maintain generations of peasants in penury and starvation, such as the author of *Aucassin and Nicolette*, La Bruyère and other contemporary writers have described. Again, quite early in our history the Commons asserted the right to tax everyone except the clergy, and even they were taxed after the Reformation. So that for generations the Englishman has always been willing to pay because he feels he calls the tune. Whereas till the French Revolution in 1789 the peasants had to find all the money, and the revenues were farmed out. So even to-day the idea of paying one's share has never caught on in France. Hence evasion is rife, with periodic flights of French capital to foreign countries.

Here is another instance. French education, especially secondary, differs profoundly in its fundamental objectives from English. Putting aside physical training, education may be considered under the threefold aspect of intellectual, æsthetic and moral training. In France the training of the intellect and of taste are considered equally important. Knowledge is valued not for its own sake as in Germany, but as a means of culture. Moral training, on the other hand, is largely left to the home, due no doubt to the difficulty of finding a common ground for the children of parents who range from free-thinkers to devout Catholics. If in turn we consider English education, all I think will agree that we put the training of character first, the training of the intellect comes second, while the training in taste and appreciation comes a very bad third, except in some girls' schools. Far from teaching appreciation, there is still a widespread feeling that to dissect a rose is apt to destroy the rose ; and in my school-days at least, appreciation was regarded as a matter for private judgment. In fact, it was almost sacrilegious to pry into these particular recesses of the pupil's mind.

Another interesting contrast is the close connection that has existed in France for over three centuries between literature on the one hand and the State and Society on the other, and the far looser link between them in England. State and royal patronage dates from the foundation of the French Academy by Richelieu, and has lasted on to the present day, reaching its apogee in the time of Louis XIV. The influence of Court and private patronage was never so strong in England, and gradually waned from the time of Dr. Johnson, as authors were able to find a public of their own to pay for their work. Literature in France has always been the pet of Society from the Salons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onward, though some of the greatest writers have preferred Bohemia, and the Salon to-day no longer occupies the same place. In this country the existence of the word "lionise" is enough to show how the notion of a Salon has always been an exception, in spite of Horace Walpole, and Samuel Rogers with his breakfasts ; while the name of Grub Street is sufficiently indicative of the wide gap that long existed between the average writer and Society. Nothing illustrates the difference better than the treatment of the budding poet. In France his work is often greeted with

kindly applause; possibly a post is found for him in the State Service. Here he is welcomed with verbal brickbats, and like a witch left to sink or swim, if he has not also to go through a sort of *Probezeit* that rivals the ordeals of the Red Indian or the schoolboy of Tom Hughes' days. One has only to contrast the treatment meted out in their early days to Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats with that accorded to their fellows in France.

It may be interesting here to recapitulate what each country already owes to the other from their long if often intermittent contact. Our indebtedness to France starts from the time of William the Conqueror who, as the late Dean of Winchester once forcibly said, dragged Anglo-Saxondom by the scruff of the neck into the orbit of Western civilisation. Again, English chivalry owed much to French, with its imposition of a code of honourable warfare and its respect for women, even if these were only confined to a privileged class. In the Middle Ages the University of Paris was a focus of learning to Western Europe and to the numerous English and Scottish students who flocked to it—so numerous that they constituted one of the four nations into which the students were divided, while its influence on Oxford was considerable. During the Renaissance, and especially in the time of Elizabeth, the influence of France, though much less than that of Italy, was considerable. At the Restoration the theatre fell under the influence of the French stage, while Pope and his school were also profoundly affected by the theories of Boileau. The Court of Charles II served as a centre of dissemination of French manners, including table manners, themselves already profoundly influenced by Italian models. At the same time, modern furniture of French make took the place of the more austere household gear with which people had hitherto been content. Pepys speaks with wonder of the luxury of the furnished apartments of the Duchess of Portsmouth, Charles the Second's French mistress.

French influences again in aristocratic circles steadily increased during the first part of the eighteenth century, thanks to the Grand Tour which always included France, and the close intercourse between the two. The books of Smollett indicate how these influences penetrated to the ordinary county gentry. The Napoleonic Wars produced a profound rupture in the reciprocal influences of the two countries on one

another. England turned more and more towards Germany for models; but Matthew Arnold in the latter part of the century founded his battle-cry: "Organise your secondary education," on what he had seen of French secondary education, while the discoveries of Pasteur renewed English interest in French science and revolutionised English medicine. French impressionists also appealed to many English painters, as have also the later schools that followed; while during the last thirty years the influence of French writers like Proust and philosophers like Bergson has exercised an increasing effect on English authors and thinkers.

Turning to France, it was not till the invasion of English ideas (already alluded to) in the eighteenth century that this country exercised the first outstanding influence on France. But no influence exercised by either country has ever been so potent or permanent. It changed the whole political conception of the French, and ultimately led to their successful intervention in the American Revolution, and to the French Revolution itself. Modern French democracy is essentially its offspring. Newton, Locke, Shaftesbury and others supplied the ferment from which Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu distilled the intellectual and heady vintage, which not only turned the heads of the French politically, but profoundly affected the course of literature and the theatre—the two latter being further influenced by the discovery by the French of Shakespeare, and later of the novelist Richardson. Many English words passed into the French language. Professor Ritchie's chapters on the eighteenth century are an amplification of the penetration and permeation of English ideas. It is only in the twentieth century that the influence of England after the war has been again appreciable, in certain experiments in education on English models like the *École des Roches* and in the realm of sport and physical culture. To put the two influences in a nutshell, one may say the French, if periodic, has been far longer, but the English, if shorter, far more intensive. It is indeed for the admirable way in which Professor Ritchie and his team have brought out these differences as well as for the wealth and abundance with which they have described the nature and growth of the French genius, especially during the last three centuries, that one feels compelled warmly to commend the present volume.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE UPPER SILESIAN SETTLEMENT.

THE month of July saw the formal conclusion of one of the most courageous and salutary moves for peace undertaken by the League of Nations in post-war Europe. I refer to the completion of the Fifteen-Year Interim, provided for in connection with the drawing of a new German-Polish boundary in Upper Silesia. Two agencies which, during good times and bad, have made a real contribution to the maintaining of law and order in a densely populated area, will now terminate their work. They are the Mixed Commission, with Felix Calonder, the veteran Swiss statesman, as President, which was charged with supervising in particular the claims of Minorities to fair treatment ; and the Tribunal of Arbitration, under the presidency of the Belgian expert on international law, the much younger Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L.(Oxon.). Apart from such cases as have not yet been concluded—and some of those coming before the Tribunal require years for settlement—these two League agencies will now be ready to fold up their tents and depart. It is certainly in large part due to them that in spite of all disputes and tension during the trying period 1926-31 the German-Polish frontier here was never closed.

For years there has been little " news " from Upper Silesia, and the work of the League agencies could go on relieved of the limelight of publicity. This is what Dr. Kaeckenbeeck has always earnestly desired, and what in his field he has for the most part enjoyed ; whereas the work of the Mixed Commission has nearly always, in the nature of things, provided the Powers with material out of which to make political capital. One recalls the anxious years of 1926-8, when the Schools question was made the subject of a special inquiry by the League, and even the Hague Tribunal was requested to hand down a decision as to the interpretation of the Articles of the Convention. No less troublous were the following two years, when charges were brought by the German Minority in Polish Silesia with regard to terrorisation and other injustices at election times. We had the spectacle of the usually so self-controlled Dr. Stresemann striking the table with his fist, and of the studied replies of the Polish Minister, M. Zaleski. From then on, however, the face of things changed. Much more readiness has been seen to deal with matters on

the spot ; notably since 1933, when both Berlin and Warsaw realised that disputes could be settled at home, and perhaps even better than by carrying them to Geneva. Of course, when Germany left the League, further appeals to that body were unlikely, not to say unwanted.

What we all would like to know now is, whether the end of the Fifteen-Year Term will bring any disturbance of the more or less normal relations obtaining between Germany and Poland ; and in particular what sort of changes will ensue in Upper Silesia itself ? Neither party concerned has been too pleased with the presence on its territory of a League agency, whose powers meant an infringement of its "sovereignty." Both seem to be well satisfied that this unnatural state of affairs is over. This does not at all mean that Poland and Germany have not collaborated throughout with the Commission and the Tribunal : perhaps more loyally than powers of Western Europe might have done this. It does seem, moreover, to compel the inference, that the said agencies have done their work with detachment and fairness, and have made their presence felt in the land, even to the point of becoming unpopular. As to the changes likely to follow in the land, one or two will affect closely a larger number of people, and may give rise to dissatisfaction. In order that these may be understood, a brief review of the provisions and working out of the Geneva Convention, signed on May 15th, 1922, is necessary.

The special and complicated nature of this singular document, which is longer than the Treaty of Versailles, was not due to the fact of a new boundary being drawn in Upper Silesia. It was due to the drawing of that boundary right through the heart of the highly developed "Industrial Triangle," as it was called ; whose growth during the nineteenth century had been only less phenomenal than that of Westphalia itself. Here an intensive production of coal, iron and steel products was made possible by a net-work of railways, and a single system for providing such necessities as electric light and water, so that the cutting of such an "organism" in two was felt to be nothing less than an operation that would kill the patient. The Germans claimed the whole area, as being the creation of their capital, and their energy and organising abilities ; the Poles on the ground that they had provided 90 per cent. of the labour, and that the Triangle was nothing less than an island, virtually surrounded

by Polish peasant communities. The German population there was overwhelmingly "immigrant," the area lying well out to the east from the Oder river.

Once a plebiscite was decreed, the only thing to do was to live by it. True, there never was a territory less suited to, or fit for, an ordeal so serious as a plebiscite, in the world. But out of it came a counting of heads and a division of the territory *pro rata*. Roughly three-quarters of the land was left to Prussia, but two-thirds of the precious Industrial Triangle was assigned to the new Poland. The terms of the Convention provided for every possible contingency—even for some which never arose. Railway rolling-stock was to be divided, the railwaymen slowly to be sorted out into German and Polish. An interchange of indispensable materials, across the new frontier, was permitted; so that no branch of industry would be lamed. The same was done with light and water, etc. The right was given to such nationals as wished to move to the other side of the new line, and tens of thousands did so. Opting for citizenship as an alternative was permitted; and the right of Germans to remain Germans, but live on the Polish side because they were needed in some industrial plant, was conceded. (This last only during the Interim years.) In the same way care was taken to make as easy as possible the adjusting of property claims. Finally, and most important of all, provision was made for the passing and re-passing of the new boundary, just as of old, for those whose domicile was on one side, but who earned their bread on the other. Of course the respective Minorities were given special attention, a guarantee of equal and just treatment in all respects being assured, on the basis of reciprocity between the two nations.

And right here a surprise was in store for those concerned with the working out of this project. All the tangle of technical and material adjustments, such as transportation, industrial relationships and business matters, straightened themselves out in unexpected fashion. On both sides the will was shown to make the best of a settlement neither liked, and to have done as soon as possible with any dependence on one another. In the sequel useful ends were thereby served, and the chances of conflict greatly reduced. On the other hand the whole field of cultural relations, the things concerning the mind and the spirit, refused to settle down in the new conditions. They remained a serious and growing instrument of

trouble. The chiefest of these issues was the schooling of the young generation.

Only less fruitful in disputes was the unavoidable question of earning a living—*die Brotfrage*. Grave enough at any time, this problem became especially acute as the depression deepened, owing to the density of the population. There were times when up to 40 per cent. of the able-bodied men were out of work, and many more doing only half-time. This state of things would have material significance in any country; but in the upper Oderland it had social and political consequences too. Large numbers of these workers had been half-way Germanised in pre-war times, largely because the job demanded this. At heart they were Polish, however, and they welcomed the new order with open arms. As long, that is, as it gave them work and a weekly wage. When hunger threatened, they did not stop to ask who was to blame, but like most such put the responsibility on the "government." This had happened in the bad winter of 1925-6, but it was much worse six and seven years later. A careful observer can only wonder that there was so little real trouble; but everyone has been relieved things have got steadily better since 1935.

Against this background stands the ending, on July 15th, of the Interim ordained by the League. During that time the German land-barons, the Prince of Pless (Pszczyna), the Henckel von Donnersmarcks, etc., who owned half the province in the old days, have been exempted from the Agrarian Reform being achieved in the rest of Poland. This protection has now ceased, and radical steps may be expected toward "parcelling"—for compensation, of course—the bulk of these estates. As for industry, what was a virtual monopoly of German ownership has been substantially reduced. Prussian state enterprises naturally passed to Poland anyway. The Giesche zinc interests were bought out by the Americans (Harriman). Finally, a long series of abuses, in which every man was robbing his neighbour, compelled the Polish authorities to interfere in the big *Friedenshuette* (Peace Foundries), and more recently in the *Interessengemeinschaft* (United Interests); with the result that the German shareholders retain up to 40 per cent. of the shares, but the control is now in state hands. This has affected directly the personnel, both clerical and manual: notably the "black-coated" group, which as late as 1934 were still two-thirds of the whole. Many of these

had special permission to remain on the Polish side, though they did not become Polish citizens. Numbering some thousands, they will now have to return to Germany.

Allied to all this is one of the most troublesome changes faced by the public on July 15th, viz. the cancelling of the special Travel Permits, which served as passports over the new frontier for all people who lived in one land, but whose business or daily work was in the other. Many people have spent their week-ends at home, say in Poland, but earned their living in the Reich, or *vice versa*. As many as 300,000 of these Circulation Cards, good only for the plebiscite area, have been in use in certain years. They were a unique thing in Europe, a concession to the fact that the province had developed as a single unit, and that not even political division could convince the people that they were not still "one folk." All this going and coming must now cease. At best some arrangement can be expected, by which a small fraction of these people will, for good reasons, be given some such rights in the future. Of course, as everywhere, those living close to the frontier have always been able to get *laisser-passers* for a single visit on the other side. This curtailing of freedom of movement will be resented by large numbers of people, and general grumbling is inevitable.

In effect, the two parts of Upper Silesia realise at last that they are sundered. This realisation has, it is true, been steadily growing ever since the spring of 1933, when the Nazi régime was established on the upper Oder. One side of the line has been getting more obviously German, the other more obviously Polish. In the circumstances, this is the best thing that could happen.

With regard to cultural questions proper, certain trends have emerged, and may be expected to mature in the future. Taking the general fact of the Minorities, it may be said that on both sides of the frontier their numbers have been steadily declining; and thus getting nearer to their real dimensions. Tens of thousands had only the foggiest of ideas in 1920 where they belonged. Neither names, nor domicile, neither religious faith nor even speech, could be taken as a criterion. After fifteen years the groups are fairly clear. Of course, as before, the two Minorities are disparate in structure, the Polish one in Germany being mostly workers, the German one in Poland being largely the owners of lands and foundries or mines,

with their extensive staffs and professional people. This disparity has made any sort of equality of treatment almost a joke from the beginning. On the Polish side the very well-organised German group have splendid schools, libraries and other institutions ; while on the German side there is almost nothing to correspond to this at all.

Grouped together under the ægis of the famous *Volksbund*, German self-help organisations in Polish Silesia offered for years a striking example of efficient service. The *Volksbund* was spokesman, whether within or without the province. Its most active agency was the School Union, whose leaders were careful to see that German children got German schooling. Convinced as the years went on that what they wanted could not be provided by State schools (though the work done here was of uniformly high-grade), they have come more and more to build private institutions, whether elementary or secondary. Of these the palatial High School in Chorzow (formerly *Koenigshuette*) is a notable example.

But the School Union was over-zealous. Better said, they were the victims of a widespread illusion. While claiming the results of assimilation as seen under pre-war conditions, German Minority leaders were slow to admit that the same thing would go on under the new order. Only now it went on faster, since it was rather reassimilation : the recovery by the Poles, as they saw it, of numberless " children " lost to them in the nineteenth century. This process has been a feature of a dozen areas of post-war Europe, and will continue as long as the effects of the old imperial system are still felt. In Polish Silesia it was checked by the depression, but in the main it has brought a steady decrease in the number of children being reported for the Minority Schools. There will be still further decrease in the future.

This kind of thing, which ought to be acceptable to the prophets of " purity of race " everywhere, has been advocated long since by certain wise people inside the German Minority ; who knew that the true Germans in the upper Oderland were far fewer in number than was always reported. Led by Dr., formerly Senator, Eduard Pant, these men and women demanded long ago a " genuine " Minority, whose members were to be depended on, because they were not bread-and-butter patriots. The same group took another, at that time unpopular, attitude, viz. that " cultural activities " among the

Minority were not likely to build the cause, if and when paid for by funds provided from the Reich. A *quid pro quo* was always demanded ; and this sort of thing made the Minority into a political bone of contention, as well as fostering artificial rather than real loyalties. Being Roman Catholics by conviction, these people could not accept the Nazi view of life, and declined to be " regimented." As a result, Dr. Pant has been branded as an outcast since 1933 by all " one hundred per cent." Germans, and his courageous weekly, *Der Deutsche in Polen*, condemned as traitorous newsprint.

His casting out has meant the creating of a Minority inside the Minority—about one-fifth of the Germans in Polish Silesia have had the courage to follow him. These are the people who face facts, who accept the lot that has come to them, involving a double loyalty on the one hand to their nation, on the other to the Polish state. They alone have been warning their compatriots that the Geneva Convention was, in fact, going to end ; and that to fancy anything else was to cherish an illusion. By contrast with the two German dailies, they have made their weekly a paper that does try to serve the community, not to hoodwink it with fine theories about the grand destinies of Germandom, etc., etc.

The Hitler régime in the Reich has affected the appearance of things in Polish Silesia rather than the reality. The almost moribund *Volksbund* was revived, a " forward movement " for everything German was proclaimed by a Young German Party, and the news spread abroad right through the summer of 1933 that " Hitler was coming!" Nothing happened, however, and the Non-Aggression Pact of January 1934 dealt the hopes of credulous people a cruel blow. Clearly they had been fooled again. Soon a sense was growing that the Minorities on both sides of the frontier were victims rather than beneficiaries of the said Pact : since neither government concerned was as ready to take up complaints as before. Actually, in the opinion of sober observers, only short-range losses can be registered, the more permanent effects have been distinct gains in every way. Not only on the 1,000-mile-long frontier, but all over Central Europe the good results have been manifest.

It is not the least thanks to this fact that the termination of the Interim in Upper Silesia can be faced without misgivings. The single group that has cause for fears are the 8,000-strong

Jewish community on the German side. Protected hitherto by the Convention, they have already been warned that the Nazi legislation affecting non-Aryans is now extended to them. In general the Minority groups realise how tried a friend they are losing in President Calonder ; whose absolute faith in the goodwill of all those around him made possible the solution of knotty problems, where a man of lesser calibre would have failed utterly. Close beside him was the cool and keen mind of Dr. Kaeckenbeeck, resolved at all costs to maintain the dignity of law and order, and setting an example of a different, but no less needed kind, to both nations. During fifteen years these men have had the help of not a few able and resolute colleagues, both German and Polish. This alone is something worth recording on the page of history. But the salient facts of the whole experience should be brought in due course to the attention of the widest possible public. It is to be hoped that one of the chief actors in the drama can be prevailed upon to tell us the story.

WILLIAM JOHN ROSE.

EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

NO one, I think, would deny that international relations are profoundly affected by education, the attitude inculcated into the children of to-day and the recruits and voters of to-morrow with regard to their opposite numbers in other countries and with regard to the value or the iniquity of war. In the democratic countries, where free discussion can occur, and governments depend upon free expression of majority support, the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion is obvious ; it is perhaps more remarkable that not even the most arbitrary dictatorship dares to take important international action without having sought to convince its subjects that this action was necessary and justifiable.

Few countries other than Germany since the Hitler régime supply direct political teaching at school, and it is therefore generally agreed that, in shaping the attitudes of children towards international questions, history is the most important subject in the school curricula. Here the achievements of France in the last ten years or so are of particular interest. Even before 1914 there was a strong internationalist and pacifist element among the school teachers of France. This re-emerged and developed prodigiously after the war, strongly condemning Poincaré's policy and the French occupation of the Ruhr. In 1926 the National Union of French Elementary Teachers decreed a boycott against all chauvinistic history text-books. "We wish to end historical misrepresentation which contains the germs of defiance, of suspicion, of hatred and of war," they declared ; "we hope that a great gratitude and a great pity will be born in them [their pupils] for men of all ages and of all countries." The teachers were backed by the *Confédération Générale du Travail* or French Trades Union Congress, and the boycott was systematically carried out so that publishers found it in fact impossible to sell sufficient copies of history text-books with a jingoistic flavour. The books in widest use since then are the series compiled by the famous historian, Ernest Lavisse. A characteristic passage from his history of France for the children of eight and nine, after telling its readers

that they will be proud of France, concludes with the words :

“ But you will not be arrogant. You will not wish to dominate or humiliate other nations. War is a terrible scourge ; you will detest it, and you will work in your turn with all your heart to make France prosperous in peace as she was valiant in war.”

As a matter of fact C.G.T. officials regard even the Lavissee text-books as too unprogressive and too chauvinist in tone, and it is true that on one occasion Lavissee writes, “ No country has done so much for humanity as France.” Typical of a group of text-books rather more to the left is the sentence, “ Pasteur, who served humanity so well, saved more millions of lives than ever the folly of men destroyed upon battlefields ” (see Gauthier et Deschamps—*Histoire de France—Cours élémentaire et moyen*—Hachette). Marshal Pétain, as his speech at the *Revue des Deux Mondes* annual dinner in 1936 showed, is among those who consider that pacifism has gone much too far in French education.

The efforts of the teachers of France towards putting an end to “ historical misrepresentation ” extended beyond their own frontiers. After wearying delays partly to be attributed to the stormy nature of events in Germany, it was at last arranged towards the end of 1935 that representatives of the elementary teachers of France should consult with representatives from Germany as to the possibility of agreement over controversial points, so that French children should not constantly be taught to interpret history in a manner exactly opposite from that prevailing in Germany. The French readily made various admissions ; they agreed, for instance, that chauvinistic influences had increased in France from 1911 to 1914 (as typified by the extension of military service, etc.). But when in their turn they asked their German comrades, as they habitually called them, to admit the bellicose influence exercised by the German General Staff in July 1914, the German elementary teachers found themselves compelled to refer to Berlin, and nothing further has ever been heard from them.

While the large majority of French elementary school teachers has had pacifist and internationalist sympathies for a sufficient number of years to affect the results of the Parliamentary elections in spring 1936, the accession to power of the Blum Cabinet removed what little resistance

was offered by the Ministry of Education. As a matter of fact the Ministry has not been in the habit of interfering very much ; teachers are left almost entirely free to choose text-books so long as they succeed in preparing their pupils for the examinations set by the State. In the secondary schools of France the teachers are much more evenly divided between the Right and the Left ; it is especially in private (mostly Catholic) schools that a strongly nationalistic note prevails and the influence of writers such as Jacques Bainville no doubt makes itself felt. In the *Lycées* and *Collèges* (organised respectively by the State and the municipalities), the admirable Malet-Isaac text-books have been generally used among history teachers for some time. M. Albert Malet was killed in the war in 1915, since when his books have been more or less re-written by M. Jules Isaac and purged of everything which might conceivably be condemned as chauvinistic. Instead M. Isaac has made a number of valuable additions. He has, for instance, included an account by a German colleague of the causes both of the war of 1870 and of that of 1914, and he has taken great care to mention the German belief in Belgian sharp-shooting as an exonerating circumstance with regard to the worst barbarities in Belgium.

It is sometimes alleged that there can be no valid co-operation between states which have adopted political systems of a strikingly different kind. In France and England school children are fairly certain to imbibe some respect for constitutional democracy at the expense of dictatorial systems. The defence of democracy, as it is presented to them, is, however, based upon the necessity for the tolerance upon which democracy is built up, and this tolerance provides some sort of foundation for constructive internationalism, and involves the condemnation and avoidance of war. Not only tolerance, but any attempts to achieve objectivity, are frankly condemned in the authoritarian states. Among contemporary German educationalists there is an overwhelming number of assertions that history must be taught as part of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*, and that it is foolish for Germans to attempt to understand anything but a German point of view. An authoritative statement to this effect was, for instance, provided by Professor Walter Voigtländer of Berlin in a lecture entitled " Historical knowledge and historical teaching " ; this was given at the

first historical conference of the Nazi Teachers' Association held at Bremen from September 28th to October 6th, 1935. At the second of these conferences at Ulm in 1936 the same principles were duly re-emphasised ; one of the lecturers was Karl Alnor, who wrote in his *Geschichtsunterricht* (1935) that it is too intellectual a goal in historical education to attempt to provide understanding of foreign conceptions.

The prevalent attitude to war, in Nazi Germany as in Fascist Italy, is summed up in the sentence " War, the father of all things, is also our father ; it has hammered, chiselled and hardened us into what we are," quoted in Wilhelm Rödiger's *Geschichte, Ziel, Stoff und Weg*, 1934. Whereas in France history teaching has turned away from battles, and instead of the old Bonapartist cult the youngest pupils of Lavissee learn that "*Napoléon aimait trop la guerre*," in Germany the view is taken that " in order to awaken comprehension of military questions, the history of war must be more cherished than under the Republic " (Professor Ottmar Fecht). Even a well-known publisher's catalogue (*Pädagogische Nachrichten der Verlag Moritz Diesterweg*) takes care to explain that the German schoolboy " must know that mathematics are not a subject needed merely for a few technical professions, but that one must master them in order to comprehend the life in the body of the nation and in order to learn to use arms to defend it." The Great War is presented in all school books or hand-books for teachers as a demonstration—in the midst of a malevolent world—of heroic national solidarity out of which National Socialism was born.

German education to-day is hampered with regard to international relations in two ways in particular. In the first place the word " international " itself has been turned by Nazi ideology into a term of positive abuse, representing treacherous and Jewish qualities inimical to Germany. In new Nazi history books Charlemagne has become a dangerous cosmopolitan, over-influenced by the sinister international traditions of the Roman Catholic Church and consequently a slayer of good German Saxons ; in one historical picture book (*Anti-Semitismus der Welt in Wort und Bild*, by Dr. Theodor Pugel and others, Dresden, 1936) he is even accused of being himself a Jew. As for modern internationalism, that is bitterly, and often lengthily, denounced, along with the

Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, in the history books which deal with the post-war period.

The second obstacle placed by contemporary German educationalists in the way of international agreement is the Race Theory, which does not ask simply that political should be identical with racial frontiers, but proclaims a hierarchy of races. The Germans, according to Reich Home Office instructions in 1933 and according to Dr. Hans Bogner's lecture at the Bremen Conference, are to be specially associated in the minds of children with the ruling caste in Ancient Greece. For the heroic Germanic race is held to be superior to all other races, and, of course, to racially confused communities; indeed the Germanic race is described as a race of masters with a mission to rule others—how the others are to be ruled unless they are first conquered is not always clear. Even in official teachers' journals one constantly reads such sentences as "Only peoples with a specially valuable blood inheritance find enough strength to become masters of the space they need to live in" (see *Nationalsozialistische Erziehung*, No. 47, November 21st, 1936). Statements about the Eastern frontier—a favourite topic—express constant regret that Bohemia and Western Poland were not more thoroughly Germanised in the past (cf. *Studienleiter* Helmut Lüpke at Bremen, 1935).

Nazi doctrine is taught in special "national-political" lessons, which are nowadays attended twice every week by all school children in Germany, with the exception of the top classes in the secondary schools; the Race Theory pervades the history lessons as well. The well-known Nazi educationist, Herr Dietrich Klagges, has recently brought out a book on the teaching of history (*Geschichtsunterricht*; Frankfurt a/Main, 1936) in which, among many other statements of the kind, he writes that the "nordic colony, Rome," was not able to fulfil its greatest purpose, "*den ganzen Erdball nordisch zu bestimmen*," because it had failed to keep up its racial strength. Of the dark ages he writes, "The Germanic will to live is at this time dynamic; its impulse is directed towards the Germanisation of Europe and finally succeeds in achieving its goal through constant fights against Celts, Slavs, Greeks and Romans."

The most deliberately fanatical teaching of all occurs in the Adolf-Hitler Schools which prepare boys from 12 to 18 for

the *Ordensburgen*, i.e. for the final training of Nazi leaders. Tremendous care is taken, however, to ensure that teachers of every possible kind are impregnated with the Nazi point of view. According to the decisions of the Bremen conference, and according to official and semi-official instructions to teachers, the Race Theory is to be closely related to biology, for race is a matter of physical forces finding their equilibrium. History teachers are in future to make history a thing that is felt, rather than a coldly comparative study of facts. In pursuance of this objective, a now approved method is to send groups of students training to become teachers, and even school children from crowded towns, to camp near some small village on the German-Polish frontier. Here they are to be made to feel that German is superior to Slavonic culture, and that across the frontier there is space for Germans from over-populated cities. Many camping expeditions are also made by the Hitler Youth groups; indeed young Germans depend as much upon the Hitler Youth organisation as upon actual schooling for their education to-day. There is nothing in the democratic countries to compare with this virtually compulsory State organisation of the young. In France, for instance, scouting is usually organised by the *curé* or by the Protestant minister; there are unconfessional scouts as well, but none of the scouting has anything to do with the State nor is there any pressure upon boys to go in for it.

It is easy to understand that the Germans, whose country has been subjected to the sufferings which followed the Treaties of Westphalia, the Napoleonic occupation and the last Treaty of Versailles, all of which were to some extent justified in the name of internationalism, should readily accept condemnation of this word. Nor must it be forgotten that many German teachers would wish to formulate the Race Theory as a belief that several races should have equal rights. The history of Italy, also, makes intelligible an angry reaction against anything that savours of international control. Yet however explicable these attitudes are, the consequent educational systems are such as to tempt one to accept the inevitability of the division of the world into politically irreconcilable blocs.

Before one succumbs to this dismal suggestion, two mitigating achievements deserve to be mentioned. The

reading books recently brought out by the Schuschnigg régime in Austria provide an interesting example of an authoritarianism which is not provocative. If one considers, for instance, an official reading book, *Ich bin ein Österreicher*, for the top forms (children aged 13 to 14) of the elementary schools, one finds that democracy is condemned, and that there is a great deal of homage paid to military heroes of the past. Yet war is not praised *qua* war, nor are "internationalists" like Charlemagne decried. And, whereas all the new German books invariably refer to the "present" frontiers of the Reich as if they could not be its future ones, the Austrian reading books refer to the tremendous losses of Austria in 1919 without any implication that lost territories should be recaptured. No Austrian is indifferent to the fate of the South Tyrol. Yet many of the best friends of the South Tyrolese will agree that international relations in general are perhaps better served if the children of Austria are brought up to something more constructive than bitter indignation.

The second mitigation consists in a remarkable agreement, which was reached early this summer, between some French and German professors of history with regard to the teaching of that subject in secondary schools. Late in 1935 two German historians, representing the *Verband deutscher Geschichtslehrer*, Professor Herre of Leipzig and Dr. Reimann of Berlin, approached M. Jules Isaac (who now holds an important position in the French Ministry of Education) as to the possibility of eliminating the most glaring discrepancies in the history text-books in use on each side of the frontier between Germany and France. M. Isaac gladly put the two Germans in touch with the French Society of History Teachers, who provided five further representatives; a representative of the French elementary teachers also attended the meetings of this Franco-German commission. A joint memorandum had been compiled with difficulty and even reluctance when, in June 1936, the German Government caused the whole transaction to be broken off. On March 31st of that year Herr Hitler had himself proposed, *inter alia*, that in the education of the young in France and Germany "everything shall be avoided which might be calculated to poison the relationship between the two peoples," so that the interference from Berlin with the Franco-German historians' deliberations seemed to be strikingly inconsistent. Any

compromise, even with the most liberally-thinking Frenchmen, would, however, necessitate the revocation of all the history books which had appeared in Germany since 1933.

It is all the more perplexing that in the spring of 1937 the negotiations were allowed to be resumed, and the results were published in two educational journals in both France and Germany in May. Among other things the French have agreed to put a stop to suggestions that Bismarck was essentially a war-monger, and are willing to teach, in future, that he only desired war in the interests of German unity. The Germans, on their part, agreed to recognise that Napoleon III was not an inveterate enemy to German unity, and that Alsace, though essentially German in the Middle Ages, had become an integral part of "*la communauté nationale française*" with the revolution of 1789. The Germans wished to depict the wars of Frederick the Great as less guilty than those of Louis XIV because Frederick's aggressions occurred, as they claimed, only within German territory; the French believed that this distinction could not be historically justified.

When it came to less academic and more recent controversies, the discussions became more difficult. It was agreed that French text-books had tended to exaggerate the importance of Pan-Germanism, and that German writers had made too much of the "*idée de revanche*" which had ceased to count after 1890. Even over the Moroccan question, from 1904 to 1911, agreement was possible, but over the outbreak of the war in 1914 and especially over reparations and the post-war period the difficulty naturally increased. The agreement is nevertheless an astonishing achievement. The negotiators have promised to keep in touch with one another while exerting all their influence to get their recommendations applied, not only in secondary, but even in elementary, schools, where there is of course very much less time for the subject. In France very little change is indicated since the Malet-Isaac books, for instance, are already consistent with the suggestions in the agreement. As for Germany, it can scarcely be imagined, though it should still perhaps be hoped, that the influence of Professor Herre and Dr. Reimann will affect the stream of educational publications and appeals which condemn objectivity and denounce internationalism, especially in the only form in which it has been tangibly if faultily realised at Geneva.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE FIGHT FOR MONGOLIA.

ONLY a short time ago the roaring of cannon, bombs and machine-guns was sounding over the Chinese province of Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia, where "irregular" Mongol and Manchukuo forces, assisted by the aeroplanes, tanks and all the equipment of modern warfare of a "certain Power," attacked the Chinese provincial and Government troops. Hitherto the invaders have been repulsed. But this is not the first fighting in Mongolia and it probably will not be the last. Its location between three interested Powers, the sparse population of the vast region with newly developed but not uniform ideas of nationalism, and the complicated international and legal relations of the different districts of the country make the situation difficult and dangerous.

It is indeed a fiction to speak of "Mongolia," for in reality no such country exists. The region where the Mongols live has belonged to China since the time of the Ching dynasty at least. It is separated into Outer and Inner Mongolia by the Gobi desert. To-day it is politically divided into three different territories: Outer Mongolia under Russian influence, Manchurian Inner Mongolia belonging to Manchukuo, and the rest of Chinese Inner Mongolia where the fight between China and Japan is now taking place. To understand the situation in this key position in the Far East, one has to follow the developments and political relations of all these different parts of Mongolia.

Under Ghengis Khan and his successors the Mongols were a world power. Although it is said that the famous legal code which to-day is still respected by the nomadic tribes—the so-called code Ghengis Khan—dates from that time, they were never able to build up a true Mongolian state, but were satisfied with the domination of conquered nations. Or they were absorbed as, for instance, in China, which they ruled in the time of the Yuan dynasty (1260–1367). They were strong only when united; and not until Ghengis Khan were they one people with the new name "Mongols." But the golden age had passed and they remained under Chinese domination.

Chinese policy towards Mongolia had its own tradition. Knowing that only unity made the Mongols strong and dangerous, the Chinese dynasties learned to apply the principle

of *divide et impera* to their north-western neighbours. The Manchus, who themselves were first allies, made an alliance with the Mongols in 1640 in order to conquer China. But the policy of the Manchu Emperors towards the Mongols remained the same. The absolute power of princes was limited by the introduction of democratic leagues, the heads of which had to be appointed by the Emperor. The highest authority was the colonial ministry, but the actual Chinese control of Outer Mongolia was carried out by Chinese officials in Urga, Uliassutai and Kobdo, while Inner Mongolia came more and more within the reach of Chinese colonisation and was finally formed into Chinese provinces. Buddhism also played an important part in the Chinese domination of Mongolia, and the relations of the Chinese Government to the leading Lamas of Tibet are to-day as in former times an important chapter of this policy.

Chinese policy in the past towards Mongolia shows frequent change from domination of the regions, as well as control of the important silk roads to the West, to self-defence behind the fortifications of the Great Wall. The mechanisation and improved communications of the present time would give China, with her natural talents for colonisation, a great advantage over the nomadic peoples. Indeed the colonisation of Mongolia through a united China would probably make rapid progress, if it were not for the appearance of two outside powers, Russia and Japan.

Russia has had relations with the Mongols ever since the expansion of her power in Siberia, but only in modern times has she become one of the most important factors in Mongolian affairs. After her Far Eastern advances into Manchuria had been repulsed in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and her ambitions at that time still limited to northern Manchuria, the Governments of the Tsar and later of the Soviets concentrated their attention on Outer Mongolia. This vast country between Altai and Gobi is to-day of vital importance to the Soviet Union, not only because it lies along the Siberian railway, but because it protects also the central and most important industrial basin of Kusnetzsk, newly developed by Russia.

After the fall of the Ching dynasty in China in 1911, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia drove the Chinese officials away and declared their independence under the Hutuktu, the

living Buddha at Urga. The Pro-Russian party organised the new government. Russia guaranteed autonomy in the agreement of November 1912, protecting Outer Mongolia against China. The Mongols were partly disappointed by their new friend, as Russia, for the sake of her foreign relations, assisted the movement only in Outer Mongolia, and even there did not help the Mongols to achieve full independence, but only autonomy. Chinese sovereignty was recognised in a Sino-Russian agreement of November 1913, while China recognised the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. And the Mongols tried in vain to start relations with other Powers.

Under the new Mongolian régime imperial Russia initiated a policy of commercial, financial and military control. The agreement of 1912 had given her the right to import and export goods duty free. To this advantage was added that of natural proximity. Not satisfied with this, she had plans to levy duties on goods coming from China proper, which were renounced at last because she feared international complications. But it is interesting to note that the Russian Government felt that the collection of custom duties on the Chinese border was in contradiction to Chinese sovereignty, although the latter was embodied in a Chinese representative without much power. Financially Russia made a "loan" of 3 million roubles and secured herself a virtual monopoly in railway construction, not because she wished to build railways herself, but to prevent a more favourable commercial connection with China.

During the world war, while Russia was preoccupied in the west, China brought about the conclusion of the tripartite treaty of Kiachta, 1915, with Russia and Outer Mongolia. Chinese sovereignty was again recognised by Mongolia herself, which promised not to conclude any treaty of a political nature or with territorial clauses without consulting China. When Russia broke down in the revolution, the nominal Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia revived and General Little Hsü regained power. Later Mongolia became one of the battlefields of White and Red Russian troops; and after a short interval of government by the White Russian officer Baron Ungern-Sternberg, Outer Mongolia was conquered in 1921 by the Soviets, who since then have kept it under their influence.

The rights of the princes were abolished, the debts

repudiated ; as a result Chinese commerce suffered greatly. A treaty of friendship with Soviet Russia was concluded in 1921, in which no mention was made of Chinese sovereignty. But an abortive rebellion of the princes in 1922-3, in which Chinese help was called for, made Russia more inclined towards a new understanding with China, which was also in accord with the Sino-Russian relationship at that time. The Sino-Russian treaty of May 31st, 1924, stipulated that Outer Mongolia should remain an integral part of the Chinese republic, that Chinese sovereignty should be respected, and that the Russian troops should be withdrawn. In March 1925 the Soviet Ambassador informed the Chinese Foreign Office that the Red Army had been withdrawn.

Nevertheless Russia maintained control over Outer Mongolia. After the Hutuktu had died in 1924 no new reincarnation was allowed. The People's General Congress adopted a Russian-made constitution, abolishing the feudal theocratic system and reorganising the state according to the Russian plan. The experiments in introducing a communistic economic system failed, after the attempt to introduce the national ownership of cattle caused a great reduction in number. Only the state monopoly of external trade was maintained despite its bad results. Outer Mongolia is a " democratic and anti-imperialistic " but no more a communistic republic. All commercial and political relations with the rest of the world are barred, and all Japanese influence is cut off. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the resulting pressure on Outer Mongolia, Russia again took more active steps towards the military protection of the country. In March 1936 she made a military pact with Outer Mongolia, showing her intention not to give it up without a fight.

Russia's position in Outer Mongolia to-day is the same as in the time of the Tsars. Besides the Sino-Russian treaty of 1924 recent statements of the Russian Government indicate that she still recognises Chinese sovereignty. When she concluded the new agreement with Outer Mongolia in 1936, China protested twice that her sovereignty rights had been violated. Russia rejected these protests, " for the agreement granted no territorial concession in Mongolia to Russia," and expressly recognised anew Chinese sovereign rights. According to the Russian interpretation therefore territorial integrity is the basis of these sovereign rights.

This situation has been differently interpreted. Most of the textbooks on international law regard Outer Mongolia as a dependency of Russia, neglecting totally the formal Chinese sovereignty. But the very history of Outer Mongolia shows us that Chinese sovereignty, as long as it is recognised, must be interpreted as more than a farce. We agree with Cleinow who states in his book, *Neusibirien*, that there has been no fundamental change in Russo-Sino relations since the time of the Tsars, and that, although the Chinese government has practically no possibility to-day of exercising its sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, the situation may change with the changing political constellations in the Far East. One has only to think of the episode of 1919, when General Hsü re-established Chinese power in Outer Mongolia; and it is even possible that this country could become a link in a new Sino-Russian understanding. We define Outer Mongolia as an autonomous country under Chinese sovereignty and inside the framework of the Chinese state. Internationally China is bound by treaty with Russia to respect its autonomy.

Inner Mongolia had taken part in the independence movement of 1911 under more important leaders than Outer Mongolia, but had been left without assistance. The leaders of the quasi-revolutionary Mongolian party tried to find help in China, and thought to use Sun Yat Sen's programme of local autonomy and self-government of national minorities. This programme includes the principle of the union on an equal footing of the five nationalities which form the Chinese Republic represented by the five colours in its first flag. There was some hope that Inner Mongolia could be organised on a federal basis, but it vanished when the Chinese Government chose a policy of subjugation. Thus it was the short-sightedness of the local Chinese colonial administration that drove the Mongols back to their ideas of independence, a dangerous policy in a time of international complications.

Inner Mongolia had more reason than Outer Mongolia to rebel against China. There had been real pressure brought to bear by the Chinese, especially in the economic field. The Mongol princes, a number of whom had been bought, had been the nominal heads of the local government; but to the extent that colonisation by Chinese penetrated into the country—cramping more and more the life of the Mongols—the country and with it the Mongols came under Chinese

administration. And this administration, far from the central control, was often corrupt. The Mongols had leased land to the Chinese for colonisation and were financially dependent on these leases. But after a while the money was not paid in many cases, on the pretext that the country and with it the land belonged to the Chinese nation. The concepts of *dominium* and *imperium* were confused, and the land was seized without compensation to the owners. To prevent this the Mongol princes themselves tried to draw up modern title deeds but the Chinese did not recognise them. This colonisation of the land of their fathers, dividing the country into provinces and districts, threatened the very basis of Mongol life. It was the cause of the autonomous movement of Inner Mongolia. The idea of autonomy remained in the minds of the Mongols, and was, for example, expressed at a meeting of Mongol representatives at Nanking in 1930, but in vain. And very likely the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, having no possibility of union with Soviet Outer Mongolia, would have been absorbed by Chinese colonisation if a new outside factor had not changed the situation.

Japan was well aware of the advantages of promoting the Mongol movement. The well known Tanaka memorandum, though a forgery according to Japanese statements, and the Sino-Japanese agreement of 1915 illustrate the Japanese point of view: to use the Mongols as a basis for their continental policy against China and Russia. Young Mongol leaders had been educated in Japan, and in founding the new state of Manchukuo Japan did not forget to grant within her territories a special status to the Mongols. Some of the Mongols had favoured the creation of the new Manchurian state, hoping thus to get a better understanding of their wishes on the part of the Japanese than they had obtained formerly from the Chinese. As a matter of fact Japan has granted them a degree of local self-government in the newly created Hsingan province, where they are also protected against further Chinese encroachment. But as the administrative centre is still Hsinking, the new capital of Manchukuo, all important questions are decided by the officials and Japanese advisers there. The Lytton Report says: "*Si l'appui de certains de ces éléments Mongols est actuellement sincère—encore que prudent—ils sont tout prêts à le retirer s'ils viennent à constater que les Japonais menacent à un moment*

donné leur indépendance ou leurs intérêts économiques." The situation seemed to have come to this point when last year the Mongol governor, chief of General Staff, and chief of police of Hsingan province, were shot by the Japanese as Russian spies.

The status of Hsingan province from the legal point of view, as well as of the province of Jehol where also many Mongols live, is not easy to define. It can be judged only in connection with the status of the whole of "Manchukuo," of which it is supposed to be an autonomous part. And here facts as well as legal regulations have to be taken into consideration. For more than four years there has been no actual Chinese control of the region; and the power exercising the actual control does not recognise any Chinese rights. Thinking of the Japanese influence one is tempted to call Manchukuo some sort of Japanese protectorate or colony. But the difficulty is that Japan herself denies such a state of affairs and speaks of Manchukuo as an independent state. And if we consider the somewhat independent policy of the Japanese army and advisers in Manchukuo, we find some truth in the thesis of the "independent state," though not the Japanese interpretation of the term. Legally, on the other hand, China has never yet renounced her rights, and the other states still recognise them. As long as the actual state of things is therefore not legally recognised—or changed—we find a discrepancy between legal and actual situation, as is often the case in international relations. International regulation, generally a stabilising factor in the ever-changing political events, became here a political weapon. At this point the Mongolian problem in Hsingan and Jehol, as well as in the other parts of Inner Mongolia, links up with the development of Sino-Japanese relations—in itself perhaps the greatest problem of the Far East.

It was through the establishment of Manchukuo that the Mongol autonomy movement in the rest of Inner Mongolia, consisting of the Chinese provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, became of new importance. After the fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops was ended by the Tanku agreement in 1933, northern Chahar was included in the neutral zone. So-called irregular troops from Manchukuo occupied after some fighting the strategic towns on the way from Kalgan to northern Chahar, so that most of Chahar

province was cut off from any Chinese control. It would have been easy now for Japan to include this part in the new state of Manchukuo, but she apparently had more ambitious plans.

In the region in question lives the Mongol Silingol tribe which has not been much influenced so far by Chinese colonisation. Its leader, known under the Chinese name as Prince Teh, had played a leading part in the Mongolian struggle for autonomy. It was said that he went to the new capital of Manchukuo to meet Pu Yi's Japanese advisers. He became the head of the new autonomy movement whose leaders in June 1935, in a meeting in Pailingmiao in North Suiyuan, decided to emancipate the Mongols from the Chinese provincial governments of Suiyuan and Chahar. Because of the danger of foreign interference China could not use force. The Mongols themselves did not aim at complete separation from China. After negotiations on the question whether the Chinese control over the Mongolian autonomous government should be exercised by the central or the provincial authorities (the latter much less to the advantage of the Mongols) China finally accepted the Mongol point of view. Chinese Inner Mongolia obtained local autonomy while the central government of China remained the highest authority. But Japanese military and political influence spread over the autonomous region.

The territory in question is, as the map shows, of great military importance. It borders on Outer Mongolia and so links China and Russia. If this region, including the important Peiping-Suiyuan railway, were in Japanese possession, China could establish connections with Russia only by means of the long route through Chinese Turkestan, which also could be broken by flank attack. So it was not astonishing that the Mongolian autonomous movement came more and more under Japanese influence. Permanent military and political advisers remained with the Mongol princes ; ammunition and war material were stocked ; radio stations and aerodromes were established. The Mongols could not resist this " assistance." And in January 1936 the news came from Pailingmiao that Prince Teh had proclaimed a new independent Mongolian state, " Mengkuo." This news was denied by the Chinese government ; but subsequently the Suiyuan section of the Inner Mongolian autonomous régime was split off, and

a new autonomous council of Mongol princes faithful to China was established to balance the power of Prince Teh.

This countermove from the Chinese side upset the plans of the Japanese in Inner Mongolia. The recent attack on Suiyuan was the result. But the Chinese Government was firmly decided this time to resist. Troops were massed in the region, and the attack was not only repulsed with great loss, but Pailingmiao, formerly occupied by Prince Teh, was conquered by the Chinese troops. Prince Teh has withdrawn to Chahar, where according to the latest news he will now formally establish an independent government with the help of Japanese "advisers." The attack will very likely be followed up. Both parties are making preparations, and Inner Mongolia may become a starting point in the fight between China and Japan. Both countries are weakened by internal difficulties ; but there is at the same time less room for compromise than before, as China has gained in strength.

What can be said about the Mongols themselves ? Their tragic scission has gone farther than ever. Their number and importance has decreased. It remains an open question whether venereal diseases or lamaism, political weakness or other factors are responsible. But under the pressure of Chinese colonisation and Russian and Japanese plans, they have learned the necessity of protecting their own people and mode of living against outside aggression. Their national feelings are a mixture of modern thought and of pride in the past, based on the history of Ghengis Khan, from whom the autonomous council of Inner Mongolia dates their new calendar. In Outer Mongolia the new thought came in from communistic Russia. In Inner Mongolia, which sticks to tradition and where the princes uphold their feudal rights, Western ideas came in through the young Mongolian intelligentsia. But the Mongolian national question seems hopeless with the Mongols standing in different political camps, unable to do much against the will of their different powerful "friends." Mongolia, split into different parts among the three Powers of China, Japan and Russia, might well attain new historical importance. It seems to become gradually clearer what place China will take in the new grouping of the Powers. But no matter from which aspect the situation is viewed, Mongolia will always retain a key-position.

FRANZ MICHAEL.

NEW LIGHT ON AGADIR.

ALMOST nothing is known of the intimate story of the weeks which immediately preceded the great European tension of 1911, just before the outbreak of the Italian-Turkish war, namely the second Morocco Crisis. Despite the big volumes of German and British documents, we have practically nothing on the decisive days of June 1911, nothing on the German deliberations which led to the despatch of the *Panther* to South Morocco. Why was she sent, followed by the sister gunboat *Eber* and the small cruiser *Berlin*? Was it one of the Kaiser's sudden decisions, as the outside world was always inclined to think, or who else took part in the preliminary steps? Kiderlen, the Foreign Secretary, stated that he wanted a "*Faustpfand*," a pledge to get some compensation. But this is no solution of the problem how the decision to send the *Panther* was arrived at. This question can now be answered from the diaries of a German, Dr. Regendanz, whose active part in colonial acquisitions of Germany has been mentioned in the memoirs of Dr. Rosen, a former German Ambassador and Foreign Minister.

There were on the German side two driving forces in Morocco: the Mannesmann group, which in 1911 was already in possession of mining rights, and the Hamburg group, which had recently founded the "*Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft*" with Dr. Melchior as chairman and Dr. Regendanz as managing director. As the latter had been a member of the German Colonial Office he regarded his task more from a political than from an economic point of view, and he naturally found himself amongst the chief promoters of an active policy. The Morocco market should have been open to every signatory of the Act of Algeciras, which granted equality as to trade and mining rights. But since 1906 Germany had not been able to prevent France from considering Morocco increasingly as an exclusive French domain. Despite the efforts of German trade and finance the Government had not been induced to move: only now, in the hot summer of 1911, it made up its mind to ask for a fair share. It was six years after England's entente with France, when Morocco had practically been handed over to France. Was it not already too late?

On Sunday, June 18th, a telegram from the Under-Secretary,

Zimmermann, reached Dr. Regendanz at his home at Hamburg. "He would be grateful if I could come for a discussion at the Foreign Office on Monday morning," wrote Dr. Regendanz in his diary the same day. "Certainly that means political talk on Morocco. France with troops in Fez, France performing a '*pénétration pacifique*' with 42,000 soldiers, Spain with troops landed at Larache—and all that though there is an Act of Algeciras, and though we have a State Secretary von Kiderlen whose energy is being praised. Shall we march at last? My last memoranda on the position in South Morocco have not excited the Foreign Office sufficiently yet."

"It was amusingly diplomatic in the Foreign Office," he noted after the discussion. "For five minutes Baron Langwerth von Simmern talked about the weather or similar things before broaching his subject. Germany intends to occupy the port of Agadir, perhaps Mogador, too, with battleships. We shall then have a *Faustpfand* which will ease the diplomatic discussions with France (what about?). Reason to be given: allegation of a violation of the Act of Algeciras not quite possible, as France and Spain have, after all, for justifying their measures some sham reasons which cannot be called by their real names amongst diplomats. Therefore the German Government will declare almost the opposite to be true: your measures, dear Frenchmen and still more beloved Spaniards, are completely in order; you had to intervene as it has become obvious that Morocco by itself cannot recover. That it could was the presumption under which all the Powers signed the Act of Algeciras. As this has proved wrong the Act is void, and we have a free hand in Morocco."

Thus, on June 19th—more than ten days before any foreign Power was informed—the outline of the action to be taken was already decided upon and the reasons which should be given were fixed: a new start in Morocco, one, perhaps even two, ports to be occupied. A week before Zimmermann had outlined this plan, the first draft of which, dated May 30th, had been drawn up with Baron Langwerth. It had been based, as the *Grosse Politik* says, on "very confidential information from Messrs. M. M. Warburg in Hamburg"—the memoranda sent in by Dr. Regendanz which he mentioned in his diary as quoted above. Messrs. Warburg were the principal shareholders of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft, and

had been interested in colonies by Adolf Woermann, the shipping magnate, who played an important part in Germany's colonial history. Zimmermann had then proposed to send four cruisers to Mogador and Agadir (two to each port), and to inform the Powers only twenty-four hours before their arrival. Now, says the diary of Dr. Regendanz, the number of the vessels has been diminished; but there remained the question how to procure sufficient material to justify the intended action. Some time before Dr. Regendanz had told Baron Langwerth that he collected all the complaints of the firms in Morocco about the French violation of the promised equality of rights in the economic field, such as tricks of the customs authorities, police measures, intimidation of Moroccans dealing with German or English business men. But Baron Langwerth had then declared that it was still too early officially to take note of this, and Dr. Regendanz had therefore only sent in some general memoranda on the situation in South Morocco, where, as he stated, all the chiefs were friendly towards Germany. Only a few days before the meeting of June 19th, two of these Moroccan chiefs had been deprived of their positions on account of French influence.

These accounts seem to have influenced the Foreign Office when drawing up the plan of action and helped to overcome the aversion of the Government to move. "Baron Langwerth to-day wants an address to be sent to the Foreign Office which justifies the Reich in intervening by force in South Morocco; but the content and the purpose of this address shall still be kept secret, even from its signatories, so that France cannot become aware of the plan and thwart it." Thus Dr. Regendanz got the order to procure the reason for the intended action and to get the necessary assent of the companies without even telling them: a leakage would upset the whole plan. Even Max Warburg, who was to have lunch the same June 19th with the Kaiser, and who was to be with His Majesty again the following day, must not hear too early, "so that the Kaiser, who does not yet know anything about it, will not learn from him . . ."

Thus, according to Dr. Regendanz's diary of June 19th, the idea of the German Foreign Office was this: "A battleship shall put into Agadir, perhaps one also into Mogador and a third into Saffi and stay there, we thus occupy the whole South Coast of Morocco, though at the beginning troops shall

not be landed. The purpose of this move is to have a *Faustpfand* during the negotiations with France, which will ease the discussion necessary on Morocco and on other things. If the German Reich does not get a share in Morocco, it can thus obtain 'compensations,' perhaps in the Congo. The Kaiser, who knows nothing about it, will get a report from Kiderlen and from the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg on Sunday, June 25th, when they will ask for his authorisation and for the sailing order for the battleships. It is still very uncertain if he will agree with such a policy of force. He is incalculable. Prince Reuss XXXII for instance, a friend of the Kaiser's son August Wilhelm, told me recently that the Kaiser—since he had been attacked so very much in the November debates owing to his speeches, etc.—has lost any initiative and does not really dare to decide even the most unimportant things. I cannot believe it. Certainly he is a difficult factor, the more as already people have said that he is afraid of a war. 'Peace Kaiser'!

This summary is most important. First it shows once again that the Kaiser, especially during the last ten years of his reign, was not an autocrat deciding German policy exclusively on his own lines: On the contrary, very often things were prepared, like this on June 19th, when he did not even know that Germany was going to move, when he was informed only after the decisions had practically been taken. The November debates referred to are the famous Reichstag proceedings of November 1908, when there was talk of abdication following an "interview" published by the *Daily Telegraph*. Furthermore, the diary of Dr. Regendanz shows that the Foreign Office had not yet decided if Germany should lay hand upon one or two or three ports, and if she should land troops too as Spain and France had done. It is interesting to note that on the Saturday chosen for informing the Powers of Germany's sudden action, July 1st, the German Ambassador in London did not know whether troops would be landed or not. Sir Arthur Nicolson asked for information about this important point, but Metternich said he could, officially, add nothing to his communication. Agadir was one of the ports not open to shipping under the Act of Algeciras, but it was considered important owing to the pretended fertility of the valley of the river Sus. Mogador, the other port in question, is about eighty miles north, and Saffi, the third, still another sixty-five

miles farther north---a long strip, indeed the whole coast of South Morocco. But would Germany really claim this? The idea of asking for compensation was envisaged from the beginning. Even the Congo was mentioned as a possibility in Zimmermann's first draft and now again in the conversations with Dr. Regendanz.

In the afternoon of June 19th Dr. Regendanz had finished a draft of his address and showed it to Baron Langwerth: his proposal was to declare the whole district from Cap Youbi to Mazagan to be chiefly a German sphere of interest. But as Casablanca seemed to Baron Langwerth to be too close to Mazagan, Dr. Regendanz had to omit this port. The two men agreed on the text of the letters to be sent by the representative of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft at Mogador, Herr Wilberg, to all the chiefs of the South telling them that the German battleship was coming as their friend.

On June 20th Dr. Regendanz, back in Hamburg, wrote the final text of the address by hand (to keep it strictly secret), and made the other companies sign it without seeing its contents. The following day Max Warburg also signed. "According to my request," Dr. Regendanz states in his diary, "Warburg had carefully avoided talking about Morocco with the Kaiser, who does not yet know. The Kaiser seems to be not much prepared for the carrying out of the plan which seems to be urgently necessary for raising the prestige of the Reich in foreign politics. On Monday he said in a large company that we had no objections at all against France in Morocco: France would bleed to death there. This conception is as wrong as it is inconvenient for the Foreign Office. I am going to Berlin."

"Berlin, June 21st, in the evening. Geheimrat Schoeller of the Disconto Gesellschaft refuses his signature. A war on behalf of Morocco would not be worth while. (There will be none in spite of the fact that we are now proceeding energetically---therefore without any foundation.) The interests of his company were very small---as for the rest he was a good patriot, as the Foreign Office knew from Venezuela." This was the only refusal, though Dr. Regendanz had been allowed to tell in this one case the reason for the address and its content. The other signatories trusted that it was, as Dr. Regendanz told them, a necessary address of patriotic

importance. The same day he handed the memorandum to Baron Langwerth, "whose joy was great." The address, dated Hamburg, June 21st, 1911, is a fairly lengthy document which has never been published, as the editor of the *Grosse Politik* quoted only a few sentences. It says that owing to the march of "foreign troops" into North Morocco there is a certain alarm in the South, too. "Already attacks on Europeans have occurred on the road between Saffi and Marrakech," and the danger of great disturbances in the whole district is imminent. "Now the undersigned firms have large economic interests there; they own houses and wide districts around Agadir, Mogador, Saffi and Schiema." The memorandum then gives a few figures, pretending for instance that the Moroccan ore contains up to 30 per cent. of copper. Security for these great German interests is only to be found, the address goes on to say, if the Government will now show its readiness to act. Nothing else will impress the Moroccans, and it is necessary to act before the actual outbreak of disturbances.

This is the gist of the address which was to justify the action of the German Government, and which was used on July 1st, when the representatives of the Reich called at the Foreign Offices of the Powers concerned. "*Des maisons allemandes, établies au Sud du Maroc et notamment à Agadir et dans ses environs, se sont alarmées d'une certaine fermentation parmi les tribus. . . . Ces maisons se sont adressées au Gouvernement Impérial. . . . Sur leur demande le Gouvernement a décidé d'envoyer au port d'Agadir un bâtiment de guerre. . . .*" Now at last we know how this request had been brought about and who were the initiators. It is interesting to know the signatories of the address: (1) M. M. Warburg & Co., (2) Gebr. Marx & Co., Hamburg, (3) S. Elkan & Co., Hamburg, (4) Weiss & Maur, Saffi, (5) Oldenburgisch-Portugiesische Dampfschiffs-Rhederei Aug. Schultze, (6) Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft, Dr. Regendanz, (7) Gebr. Marx & Co., Mogador, (8) Heinrich Freiherr von Ohlendorff, (9) Retzmann & Co., (10) W. Marx & Co., Marrakech, Medinah, (11) W. Marx & Co., Marrakech, Mellah. Eleven signatures? Yes, but the Marx firms have signed not less than five times since Weiss & Maur also belonged to the same concern. Similarly Messrs. Warburg, the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft and a few others are only different names for the same

company or, in any case, are all shareholders of the Hamburg-Marokko-Gesellschaft. It has always been pretended—and one writer copied it from the other, including M. Tardieu in *Le Mystère d'Agadir*—that the Mannesmann group pressed the German Government to act. This is not the fact as we have seen: Even the Hamburg group, which took such an active part, did not supply much more than the screen behind which the Government could hide, although these German bankers were really interested in protecting the important trade in Morocco, whereas the Government was already thinking of the action as a mere move to get “compensations” elsewhere.

“I asked,” Dr. Regendanz noted, after the handing in of the address on June 21st, “if Kiderlen, who is still in Kissingen, knows about the whole plan. ‘Naturally.’ Kiderlen-Zimmermann therefore! An excellent team! Kiderlen met the French Ambassador Cambon at Kissingen yesterday and they talked in a ‘friendly’ way! The greater the surprise will be.” Now all depended on Kiderlen’s success when he tried to convince the Kaiser that Germany had to act. It seems that the Chancellor had not been consulted, Kiderlen feeling that he would always follow his proposals. On Sunday, June 25th, Bethmann and Kiderlen went to see His Majesty, and Dr. Regendanz wrote in his diary the next day: “The Chancellor and Kiderlen have to report on Sunday. They intended to give him a nice account, but they saw no advantage in approaching him now, because the Kaiser had just said again in a large circle that France was in quite a dilemma, that for us the best to do was to look on. Bethmann (in order to find a friend of the Kaiser who could work upon him) asked Ballin if Max Warburg was on board. ‘No,’ but he could send for him. ‘For the moment not necessary yet.’ Then Bethmann told Ballin all about it and asked him to prepare the Kaiser. Ballin did it; then Kiderlen gave his report, and the Kaiser agreed. Hurrah.”

This is the interesting unknown story showing how the Kaiser, of all the deciding factors, was the last to be informed. In the *Grosse Politik* we only have a single sentence in a dispatch from Kiderlen saying that the ships were agreed to. The new version shows how uncertain Bethmann was of his own capacity to influence the Kaiser, and what an important part was played by the Emperor’s friend, Ballin, the director

of the Hamburg America Line. Even Zimmermann and Langwerth did not know anything of Ballin's help when Dr. Regendanz told them on June 28th. On this day Dr. Regendanz was back in Berlin, as Baron Langwerth asked him to telegraph to Herr Wilberg of his company at Mogador to go as quickly as possible to Agadir : At the end of June there was not one German or other white man there, and it was therefore urgently necessary that at least Wilberg should reach it earlier than the gunboat to protect the German citizens! Wilberg has since been nicknamed the "endangered German." But how to inform Wilberg? All the telegrams were transmitted by the wireless in Morocco, French of course. Though Wilberg and his company had a secret code, there was no code word for Agadir. The difficulty was at last overcome by sending three telegrams : the name of Agadir could be made out by Wilberg by taking the first letters of the words of the second telegram. The French were unable to read them, and all they could do was to delay them, so that Wilberg received them only on June 30th, when he immediately started for Agadir. He arrived only on July 3rd. Thus, when the *Panther* steamed into the Bay of Agadir on July 1st, there was not a single German at the port.

The story of the international crisis which followed the appearance of the gunboat *Panther*—and, later, of the gunboat *Eber* and the small cruiser *Berlin*—has often been told. Finally, Germany renounced her share in Morocco and, in the coming years, her trade was more and more hampered, until, during the war, the German settlers were imprisoned and several of them shot. A good many died in the French concentration camps of Sebdou and Laghouat. The official end of the crisis itself was the agreement of November 4th, 1911, by which Germany got a small strip in the Congo. It was signed on the French side by a young official of the Colonial Office, Monsieur Lebrun, to-day President of the French Republic.

F. W. PICK.

NOTE.—Dr. Regendanz, London, adds the following information : The *Panthersprung* was the beginning of Germany's effort to acquire new colonies, seconded by four German diplomats, Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann, Colonial Secretary Dr. Solf, Ambassador Baron Langwerth von Simmern, and the German Ambassador in Portugal, Dr. Rosen. The

mistake Germany made in 1911 was completely to neglect diplomatic preparation. The German Ambassadors either in London or in Paris had not sufficient information and had not been consulted. The German Minister in Morocco, Baron von Seckendorff, told me in 1911 that he could not get any information from Berlin concerning the intentions of his Government, even when the German ships were already in the Bay of Agadir. When he tried to send a few suggestions of his own he was told that he should only make proposals when asked to do so. Many Germans undoubtedly desired the conversion of part of Morocco into a German colony. On the failure of this plan Germany hoped to acquire some other colonial possession in a peaceful way.

After the failure in Morocco—attributed to the diplomatic assistance England had given to France—a new way, the understanding with England in colonial questions, was chosen. In consequence of this new policy Geheimrat Hardy of the German Ministry for Colonies was attached to the British Colonial Office, on the invitation of the English authorities, for six months in 1913-14. The Anglo-German agreement on Mesopotamia and Africa was in 1914 ready to be signed. In anticipation of its conclusion, I made, with the consent of the German Foreign Office, on May 27th, 1914, an agreement in London with Sir Edmund Davis, by which Germany acquired the control of the Nyassa Company, a Chartered Company which owned practically all the sovereign and economic rights in Portuguese Nyassaland. The purchase price was paid out of the secret fund of the German Foreign Office, nine weeks before the war began, which proves that the German Foreign Office at this time had no warlike intentions. During the war the English Public Trustee confiscated the Nyassa shares which Germany had deposited in London.

English assistance was also sought in 1914 for the protection of German commercial interests in Morocco. Since 1906 the fight by the French officials against English and German trade in Morocco had been going on: the export and import trade was then nearly exclusively German and English, though the banks—except the Moroccan State Bank—were solely French. This led to negotiations with English bankers, represented by Lord Milner, in 1914, for the purpose of establishing an Anglo-German bank for Morocco. The German Foreign Office had consented to this project and I am convinced that Lord Milner had the consent of the English Foreign Office. The agreement was already printed and ready for signature after I had got the approval of the German Foreign Office, in July 1914. Then the war broke out.

FRANCESCA DA RIMINI IN ART AND LITERATURE.

AS a result of the disintegration of the Carolingian Monarchy and the neglect shown by the German Emperors of the "Garden of the Empire," Italy was gradually breaking up into a number of small feudal states, partly urban, partly rural, a process which reached its culminating point in the city communes of the thirteenth century, divided into Guelf and Ghibelline factions. Two of those reigning families were the Polenta of Ravenna and the Malatesta of Rimini. Malatesta da Verrucchio had helped Guido il Minore da Polenta against the Traversari, an enemy faction of Ravenna, whereupon the two families decided to cement their friendship by the marriage of their children, Francesca, daughter of Lamberto di Polenta, and Gianciotto, son of Giovanni di Malatesta. Unfortunately, Gianciotto or il Sciancato (the Lamé) was deformed, and it was feared that the high-spirited Francesca might refuse to become his wife. A ruse was resorted to. Gianciotto's brother Paolo, "Il Bello," already married and famous for his charm and insinuating manners, was prevailed upon to represent his brother at the marriage ceremony (1275).

Having found out the trick played upon her, Francesca's loathing of her husband and passion for his brother led to the tragedy in Rimini. Being found together by Gianciotto, they were killed by the infuriated husband (1285). Boccaccio who, in his capacity as Lector Publicus in Florence, commented on Dante's *Divine Comedy*, treats our subject in a surprisingly discreet, almost prudish, fashion. Even the fact that Dante places the lovers in Hell, in the circle of carnal sinners, is no proof of their guilt, but may be partly due to their having been cut off from life without the Sacraments of the Church. Being a contemporary, he knew Paolo as Capitano del Popolo in Florence and enjoyed in 1317 the hospitality of Guido da Polenta, Francesca's nephew. He may therefore have been better acquainted with the family skeleton than Boccaccio, who shows by other minor historical misstatements that his speciality is not history, but fiction. The bare facts, whether we side with Dante or Boccaccio and later chroniclers, tell of a commonplace domestic tragedy, the eternal triangle. But instead of an hysterical Press and a public affected by

psychosis erotica, the case Gianciotto versus Francesca and Paolo is represented by the greatest poet of the Middle Ages, without whose testimony the names of the ill-starred lovers would never have come down to us. Francesca, in the fifth canto of the *Inferno*, is the first soul to meet the poet and pour out to him her tale of woe. Even the most casual reader of Dante knows the passages where he compressed in sixty-nine lines a narrative that ranks together with the stories of Heloïse and Abélard, Romeo and Juliet, Tristan and Isolde, Faust and Margarete and Pelléas and Mélisande among the world's greatest love stories. Sublimated passion, not artificially stimulated by a love-potion as in *Tristan and Isolde*, is here brought to its climax through the lovers reading together the legend of Guinevere and Launcelot. "*Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse.*" (Galeotto was the book and he who wrote it.) [Gallehault : the go-between in the story of Launcelot and Guinevere.] The plangent *leitmotif* of "*Amore,*" the desperate longing for "*Pace,*" no repentance, the blissful certainty that her lover will never be separated from her, all this is expressed in a language of such tragic simplicity that it moved Carlyle in his commentary on the episode (*Heroes and Hero-worship*) to define it as "a thing woven as out of rainbows, on a ground of eternal black. A small flute-voice of infinite wail speaks there into our very heart of hearts."

More than any other love story in European literature, Francesca da Rimini became a fruitful *motif* for painters, sculptors, musicians, poets and dramatists. The story is depicted in numerous illuminated codices of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, two of the finest being in the British Museum (Codex Egerton 943 and additional Codex 19587). Among Italian drawings and paintings Botticelli's illustrations are known to every lover of Dante. Michelangelo's sketches were lost in a shipwreck. French artists felt themselves particularly inspired by our subject : Ingres (Musée Chantilly), Ary Scheffer, Alexandre Cabanel (Museum of Amiens) and Gustave Doré who treated the episode in five versions. German painters, such as Anselm Feuerbach, and the Swiss, Arnold Böcklin, laid chief stress upon the *milieu* and stage-setting of Dante's tale. Besides innumerable plastic representations by Italian sculptors, Rodin's grandiose "Portal of Hell" for the Musée des Arts Décoratifs counts among the world's masterpieces.

Musicians did not lag behind other artists in their enthusiasm for the episode. An amusing instance is Boito's (the composer of *Mefistofele*) setting of a number of lines from Canto V to Schumann's *Abendlied*. Rossini in his *Otello* made a gondolier sing Francesca's "*Nessun maggior dolore*," etc., to an Italian folk tune. But the greatest musical sponsor of Dante's story was Liszt who in *Fantasia quasi Sonata après une lecture de Dante*, and in his *Dante Symphony*, created a magnificent evocation of the "*Lasciate ogni speranza*" inscription and the Francesca episode. Tschaikovsky's Symphonic poem *Francesca da Rimini* is known to most concert-goers. Leaving aside numerous older Italian operas, we meet with names like Ambroise Thomas (1882), whose opera is somewhat spoiled by Meyerbeer's influence (Ballet, Apotheosis). Hermann Goetz, the composer of *The Taming of the Shrew*, wrote a highly effective operatic setting which, unfortunately, remained a fragment. Gabriel Pierné, well known through his *Croisade des Enfants*, set Marion Crawford's text to music. Rachmaninoff's setting was the musician's most ambitious effort as an operatic composer. Among quite recent dramatic and semi-dramatic works, I mention Zandonai's opera and Paul Gibson's dramatic cantata, both having been broadcast a few months ago.

It cannot be the object of a short, comparative study to give a full account of the deep and vast influence Dante's Francesca episode had on European literature. Literal quotations galore occur in Petrarca, Luigi Pulci, Ariosto, Tasso. Arturo Colautti dedicates a whole chapter of his remarkable epic poem *Il terzo peccato* (1908), a history of famous amorous episodes, to Francesca. Chaucer paraphrased in his *Troilus and Cressida* the famous line: "*Nessun maggior dolore*." Byron, whose stay in Ravenna brought him into close contact with the *milieu* of our story, intended to write a five-act tragedy on the subject. In a letter (Ravenna, March 20th, 1820) he tells his publisher, Murray, with his usual sarcasm: "Enclosed you will find, line for line, in *terza rima* of which your British blackguard reader as yet understands nothing, *Fanny* of Rimini. You know that she was here born, married and slain [*sic*], the last also by such people as Cary" (alluding to Dante's translator). Byron calls his own translation modestly "the cream of a translation." In reality it is clumsy and unpoetical, not to be

compared with Dante Gabriel Rossetti's version. That Byron in his *Corsair* uses as mottoes three quotations from the episode, proves the lasting impression the Florentine made upon him. Nor could Tennyson escape Dante's influence, as shown in his *Locksley Hall* where he translates the most famous lines in the episode :

" This is true the poet sings,
That a sorrow's crown of sorrow
Is rememb'ring happier things."

Keats in a letter to George and Georgiana Keats (April 18th, 1819) describes vividly a dream caused by the reading of Canto V. And even a novelist like George Eliot, whose vein was not exactly lyrical, selected as motto for a chapter in *Daniel Deronda* the eternal "*Nessun maggior dolore*" outburst.

No English student of Dante's poem can forget Leigh Hunt's charming *Story of Rimini* in four cantos, in which Francesca, "a lily at the portals of Tartarus," as Hunt calls her, appears in all the fragrance of a Botticellian maiden. The poem is also technically remarkable for the happy use Hunt makes of Chaucer's and Spenser's rhythms. A play by an American dramatist, Henry Boker, ought to be mentioned, as its Shakespearean atmosphere (even the Fool is not forgotten) may have influenced Stephen Phillips. And finally, no enumeration of Dante's influence would be nearly complete without a grateful acknowledgment of Longfellow's masterly translation which caused Sainte-Beuve to exclaim : "*La belle destinée de ne pouvoir plus mourir sinon avec un immortel !*"

Compared with England's share in the universal Francesca cult, France's contribution is but meagre. Certainly, the great poets know and admire the episode, but only a few use it for their own artistic purposes. Sardou ought to have been sued for defamation on account of the hotchpotch of his Dante drama or rather melodrama. The one French author who employed the *motif* effectively was Prosper Mérimée in an impressive passage of his *Colomba*, where he makes the young Corsican officer Orso della Rebbia read Francesca's story to his sister Colomba and Miss Nevil.

" Orso chose the canto from the *Inferno* with the Francesca episode and began to read it, bringing out to the best of his ability the lilt of those sublime tercets. Colomba came nearer to the

table, raising her head, her pupils dilated and shining with an extraordinary fire. Now blushing, now turning pale, she moved about restlessly. Admirable Italian mentality which needs not, in order to understand poetry, a pedant to explain its beauties!"

German authors felt themselves particularly attracted towards the dramatic adaptation of the subject: Uhland, Martin Greif and Paul Heyse, all of them well-known names in German literature. Unfortunately not one of them had the indispensable experience in dramatic technique to do justice to their otherwise outstanding poetical gifts. Uhland's dramatic fragment formed later on the basis of Goetz's Opera. An interesting reminiscence, almost a paraphrase of Dante's exquisitely descriptive lines, is to be found in Gottfried Keller's delicate fifth Legend, *Dorothea's Flowerbasket*: "Like two doves, separated by the storm, who have found each other and are circling in wide rings around their native nest, thus the united lovers were soaring hand in hand and without stopping towards the extreme domains of Heaven." (Cf. *Inferno*, V, ll. 82 seq.:

"Like doves who, driven on by sweet desire,
Are soaring, wings outspread, towards their nest;
And whom their longing carries through the air,
Thus out of Dido's crowd those two came near.")

Dante's Francesca poem not only influenced the receptivity of admirers, but stimulated the creative faculty of a number of authors who thus enriched the literature of their country with works of abiding worth. I shall briefly discuss a few dramas by Silvio Pellico, Marion Crawford, Stephen Phillips, d'Annunzio, and Echegaray, and a novel by Wildenbruch, treating the Francesca *motif* either by adhering closely to Dante's tale or modifying it in the spirit of their own age.

Silvio Pellico, chiefly known as the author of political reminiscences, *I miei prigionieri*, was one of the first Italian poets after Dante to dramatise the story (1814). Living during the most romantic period of Italian literature and political events, the gifted poet and fervent patriot erected in this dramatic version a lasting monument to love of country and its traditions. However, though greatly admired by Byron, its many purple patches, for instance the praise of Italy in Act I, cannot compensate for lack of dramatic grip and realism.

Gabriele d'Annunzio's drama (1902), which owed its success as much to Eleonora Duse's and Rosaspina's art as to the author's lurid verbal orchestration, has scarcely anything in common with Dante's immortal couple. D'Annunzio himself calls his play "a poem of blood and lust," a statement defining perfectly the author's work, which is certainly a magnificent reconstruction of the thirteenth century as far as stage-setting goes, but which constitutes at the same time a slander on the mentality of the two lovers as Dante, their contemporary, saw them and on their times which, however crude and realistic, were not perverse and pathological. In this play, as in many of his works, the brilliant Italian cannot help bluffing his readers by unnecessarily shocking every feeling of artistic decency, a curious trait which made the critic, Marc Monnier, write about the first book *Il primo vere* of the sixteen-year-old d'Annunzio: "If I were one of his masters, I should give him a medal and the stick." But although the satyr d'Annunzio shows his cloven hoof in more than one passage, there are pages in this play which deserve a prominent place in any anthology of modern Italian poetry, e.g. the love-scene with its Dantesque reminiscence of the *leitmotif* "*Pace*," and Francesca's dream, both in the third Act. A strangely repulsive and yet fascinating play, it is undoubtedly the most racially characteristic adaptation of the story after Dante.

We are indebted for two of the most interesting dramatic versions of Francesca's story to an English and an American author, Stephen Phillips and Marion Crawford. Phillips' *Paolo and Francesca* (1899) was written under manifold influences: Dante, Shakespeare, Greek tragedy, Maeterlinck. The dramatist, and there Phillips followed Shakespeare, is fully entitled to expand and colour the original plot, as long as he adheres to the essential psychological basis of his story. Phillips introduces two figures foreign to Dante's plot: Lucrezia degli Onesti, Malatesta's cousin, a weird creation, composed of jealousy and Freudian elements of suppressed emotions, and the truly Shakespearean Angela, the blind servant girl who, Cassandra-like, foretells the coming tragedy. Malatesta, stripped of the original brutality of the thirteenth-century *condottiere*, is built on the heroic lines of Othello. Paolo and Francesca are moving almost instinctively towards their final fate like Pelléas and Mélisande, wrapped in an

atmosphere of spiritualised affinity, the Greek idea of inevitable fatality finding its expression in Malatesta's words before the lovers he has slain :

“ Unwittingly they loved, unwittingly I slew them.
They look like children, fast asleep.”

The mere fact that Marion Crawford, the Italian-American novelist, dedicated his play (1902) to Sarah Bernhardt proves that the author lays stress on the “ *pièce bien faite*.” And its success with Sarah Bernhardt in the title role and M. Marx as Malatesta testifies to Crawford's skill as a playwright. Amongst other innovations he introduces a character which has escaped the attention of other adapters : Paolo's wife, an historic figure which Crawford has somewhat modified ; she is the “ mad woman ” in the play, which would, with an adequate cast, prove a definite hit on the English stage.

As in the Don Juan legend, the timeless universality of the central *motif* is proved by its adaptation in modern garb, one dramatic, the other narrative. The eminent Spanish playwright José Echegaray used it in the “ *Gran Galeoto*,” his best-known tragedy, where the two lovers are driven to betray husband and friend owing to the malicious gossip of society and relations. The world has in this modern version taken the place of Galeoto. Ernesto, the hero of the play, expresses in the great speech of Act II the author's bitter philosophy : “ A man and a woman are living happily in peace and friendship. No one takes any notice of them when suddenly Society, without rhyme or reason, proclaims that a shameful secret is hidden behind the placid course of their existence. Their honour is gone, they are condemned. And the most terrible result is that whereas in the beginning Society had no reason for its verdict, in the end it may really find one. For pressure of circumstances has become so strong that they are unconsciously drawn close to each other, the world being the battering-ram which brings virtue to the fall, another Galeoto of infamy.”

Max von Wildenbruch's interesting novel *Francesca da Rimini* is a “ *Selbstbeichte* ” in Goethe's sense. Francesca von Maienberg, a brain temperament, destined for the humdrum life of a Prussian provincial town, marries a General considerably older than herself, whom she learns to esteem and love in her quiet way. A young officer, Paul von Gartenhofen,

of exceptional artistic gifts, awakens her dormant senses. The General's Adjutant, also having fallen in love with her, commits the indiscretion of purloining a sketch made by Paul, depicting Francesca as Dante's heroine. Her husband, finding this sketch, breaks down under the blow. Paul fights a duel with the Adjutant in which he is mortally wounded, dying in Francesca's arms. The novel is a valuable contribution to psycho-analysis and the art of transposing a well-worn theme into a different social atmosphere.

We see from this brief study, how, out of the cell of a comparatively insignificant event, "*un petit fait*" as French newspapers call it, owing to its powerful incubation by the genius of a supreme poet, a complicated organism developed in the searching mind of other artists, laying bare all the possibilities for artistic treatment. Dante's "faultless tale of Francesca da Rimini," as the historian Prescott called it, had thus become the centre and focus of a vast treasure house of masterpieces to which numerous artists contributed their share, inspired by the poet's own words which might well be written over each of their works :

"L'amor che muove il sol e l'altre stelle."

M. JOUBERT.

A MADRAS CENTENARY.

AT a moment when India is passing another milestone of her history, an especial significance attaches to the attainment of its centenary by the Madras Christian College. The new Indian constitution which came into operation on April 1st is much more than a political change. It is significant of great social developments, and part of a process that must have profound consequences in many aspects of India's life. At such a time, a people is particularly conscious of its constant need of sound leadership in public life—of men (and women) of wisdom as well as knowledge, of character as well as executive ability, of generous social sympathies and a sense of vocation to public service. So the motives and ideals that inform an educational system are tested. India is pre-eminently a land where all human activities are seen as having real spiritual significance, and we may believe Sir Francis Younghusband that "religion in the future as in the past will probably occupy the supreme place in Indian life, above, though informing, all political, economic and social life." Yet India, not less than other lands, has suffered from "the wounds of reason too exclusively turned to material purposes." It has not been easy to preserve higher education from becoming a system whereby Indians were prepared to participate in the government of the land by passing examinations. So it would be hard to measure the value of the fact that, when Government accepted the task of "advancing by education the moral and material progress of the Indian peoples," Christian educators like Duff of Calcutta and Wilson of Bombay were already at work in the land. Inevitably, if somewhat slowly, Government recognised that it must call the mission schools and colleges into co-operation. It was also inevitable that such men of vision and conviction, holding that true education is a process in which spiritual values inhere, and that secular education is a contradiction in terms, should exercise a considerable influence upon public educational policy in India.

For such reasons the celebrations of January 29th and 30th last were a significant occasion. Such a centenary would be notable at any time, for behind it lies a distinguished history and a remarkable record. It may be doubted whether an institution of learning has made a deeper impress upon a

people than has the Madras Christian College upon South India. Its *alumni* have done incalculable service in every field of activity in Indian life—politics, administration, education, medicine, economic and agricultural development. The congratulations showered upon the college—by the Viceroy and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lords Zetland, Halifax, Willingdon and Lothian, and a host of former students like Sir M. Venkatasubba Rao, Sir A. Krishnaswami Aiyar, Mr. C. R. Reddy, Sir Mahomed Usman, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Sir M. K. Nair and the Bishop of Dornakal—were in terms which those at all familiar with the College and its work will know to be no exaggeration. As the Madras *Hindu* (which published an excellently produced special supplement on January 28th) remarked, the College “has given to the professions and the public life of this Province, nay of the country at large, thousands of well-equipped, cultured men deeply imbued with the ideal of disinterested service.”

This centenary was the more notable, however, because it was celebrated by the opening by H.E. the Lieutenant-Governor (Lord Erskine) of new college buildings at Tambaram. That event is significant of a future that promises to outpace the achievements of the College's first hundred years in its contribution to India's life.

Madras Christian College is a stout tree that has grown out of the sapling known as “Anderson's School.” The Rev. John Anderson, missionary of the Church of Scotland, son of Scottish farmer folk of characteristic industry and piety, came to Madras in February 1837. In the April, under the inspiration of Alexander Duff's work in Calcutta, he opened a school in Armenian Street, George Town. His prospectus reveals the man and his mind:

The object is simply to convey through the channel of a good education as great an amount of truth as possible to the native mind, especially of Bible truth. Every branch of knowledge communicated is to be made subservient to this desirable end. As soon as a proper class can be formed, the following branches will be taught: English, including reading, grammar and composition, writing and accounts, history, geography, arithmetic, mathematics, and algebra; the elements of astronomy and political economy; logic, moral philosophy, and natural theology; the evidences and doctrines of Christianity, etc.

Opening with fifty-nine boys, the School had 180 entered in two months. Anderson worked by the monatorial method, himself teaching his senior scholars, who in turn instructed the younger. By the next year new premises had to be sought, soon additional staff had to be sent from Scotland, and an interesting early development was the opening of branch schools in such cities as Conjeeveram, Trivellore and Nellore, out of which grew the Christian high schools of those cities. The sapling struck sturdy roots, proving itself able to withstand the competition of other schools, offering free education, or appealing to caste pupils only. Anderson's view was that those who desired this education, and could pay, should do so, at least in part. He refused none on caste grounds, and so pariah boys attended his school. He also weathered a tempest when some of his pupils embraced the Christian faith.

The disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843 threatened a difficulty of another sort, but Anderson and his colleagues (the Revs. Robert Johnston and John Braidwood) adhered to the Free Church, and possible legal difficulties were avoided. That same year, again under the pressure of success, the Mission purchased a building in Esplanade, which became the nucleus of the College premises for ninety years. The cost, Rs. 25,000, was almost entirely raised in India. Then followed years of gathering strength, until in 1855 Anderson died of overwork in an exacting climate, after Johnston had died in 1853, and Braidwood had to be invalided home.

At this critical point, the hour produced its man in one who has been lately eulogised by Mr. Srinivasa Sastri for a great part in shaping the whole of the higher education of Madras Presidency. William Miller landed in Madras in 1862, being then only 24. But he had the assets of a fine academic record at Aberdeen and Edinburgh, private means, and gifts of character that matched his mind. All of these he dedicated to the School at this critical moment. The early enthusiasm for English education, it appears, had waned somewhat in Madras. There was even a suggestion that Anderson's School should be closed. Miller was a young man seeing visions. In 1857 the University of Madras had been founded as an examining and affiliating body, on the pattern of the then University of London. This gave a new impetus to efficient secondary education. Miller took the important decision that

Anderson's School must continue, and take its place, an avowedly Christian institution, in the system of public education. So Anderson's rather sprawling curriculum had to be pruned and shaped to prepare for matriculation. In 1865 Miller's first class of six students were ready for matriculation; next year they took the Intermediate examination; and in 1867 a class for the B.A. degree was started. So the General Assembly's Institution became a College of Madras University. Both the Church and Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Societies began to co-operate financially and by sending students. In 1877 it became the Madras Christian College, governed by Senatus and Council, with the Free Church of Scotland in the background. Twenty years followed during which Miller's great plans were steadily worked out. Numbers increased to 600, 1,000 pupils were at the School, new courses were started, premises extended more than once, until the College became a foremost institution of higher education in the Presidency. The wider aspects of the academic life had full recognition. The College Library was a characteristic work of Miller. He founded the Madras Debating Society, largely composed of senior students of the College, in 1877. Scientific, dramatic, vernacular and other societies were born, and physical training, athletics, and notably cricket, became part of College life. Nothing was more statesmanlike than the foundation of the College hostel system. This began with a house for Brahmin students, which was in effect the Head's house. Then a hostel for Christian students commemorated Fenn, of the C.M.S., and a later hostel was for non-Brahmins. In all this development, the Principal was assisted by men of ability who shared his convictions and enthusiasm, but Miller was the master builder. He founded the College Chapel, many scholarships, staff-retiring funds, and the magazine. Miller's work might be measured by his C.I.E. or Kaiser-i-Hind medal, by honorary degrees, his Vice-Chancellorship of Madras University, his Moderatorship of the United Free Church of Scotland, or by the statue erected in Madras during his lifetime. It might be more truly assessed by the careers of thousands of men who, passing under his influence, mediated his ideals, his conviction that service is the true expression of culture, and the spacious atmosphere and high traditions of the College, to the life of South India. After Miller left India in 1907, his Scottish home was visited by many old students—he forgot nobody—and

when he died in 1923 he left the bulk of his property to the College.

After Dr. Miller has come a worthy succession—Macphail, Skinner, Meston, A. G. Hogg—who have steadily developed his policy. The College gives honours courses in Mathematics, Philosophy, History, English, Physics, and Zoology. In common with all colleges, it has made great advance in scientific studies, providing laboratories and apparatus to prepare men for the B.Sc. degree. Two new hostels have been opened. The basis of support has been widened, and now the Church of Scotland, the London Missionary Society, the American Baptists, the Dutch Reformed Church of America, and the S.P.G. all participate in Madras Christian College.

But, no more than a country registering constitutional advance, can a college pause at a milestone. The real significance of this centenary lies in the fact that Madras Christian College has once again struck its tents, and migrated to a new *campus* which itself indicates a fresh and striking development. By the end of the war the College became aware that it must face difficult problems of accommodation and location. The housing situation in Madras was serious, and it was clear that the College could not long continue to advance and flourish in George Town. After unhurried consideration, on Dr. Meston's initiative, and with the approval of the Governing Body in Britain, it was decided "to mark the centenary of the College by an advance which would greatly strengthen liberal education in South India." It was learned that the Forest Department were abandoning the Selaipur Reserve Forest at Tambaram, fourteen miles out of Madras, and there the College sought a site. In 1930 the Madras Government alienated 400 acres of land at Tambaram to the College. The "Minimum Scheme," representing the barest necessities in building and equipment, was estimated to cost £250,000, towards which Government promised a grant up to £120,000 (to be paid on a 50 per cent. basis as money was expended).

Meantime the Lindsay Commission, appointed by the International Missionary Council to survey the work of the Christian Colleges in India, under the Chairmanship of the present Master of Balliol, visited Madras in the cold weather of 1930-1. This Commission strongly approved the removal of the College to Tambaram, but made an important recommendation, whereby the plans for College hostels were

abandoned, and new plans drafted for a new College on the hall system. Another important development (also inspired by the Lindsay Commission) was that in 1933 the S.P.G. decided to transfer the College work of the Bishop Heber College, Trichinopoly, to Tambaram, and there to establish a Heber Hall. This was not an easy decision, for the Trichinopoly College perpetuates a great memory and enshrines a worthy tradition, and it reflects real missionary statesmanship.

Of the "Minimum Scheme," roughly two-thirds has been completed to date, at a cost of £160,000, which has been covered by various grants and gifts, including Government's contribution. The College still needs £50,000 to complete Tambaram. The new College has been designed to secure educational efficiency in fabric and equipment, and the physical, mental and spiritual well-being of students and staff in an exacting climate, with due regard for economy in outlay and maintenance. But the most interesting and important feature of Madras Christian College is the adoption of the "hall" system. This has influenced the planning of buildings, and it will shape and inspire all College work and life. It is a universally accepted view that the most formative element in any true education is the personal intercourse, the interplay of personality, between tutor and those *in statu pupillari*. This method is enshrined in the life of the ancient English universities. It is likewise the traditional India ideal in the relationship of *guru* and *chela*. Madras Christian College has always striven to achieve this, despite the difficulties of size and non-residence—nor, indeed, without success. Nothing has been more striking in the centenary tributes than the testimony of old students to those impalpable things, of infinite worth, communicated by contact with the personalities of their tutors. On the other hand a large college can offer the undoubted advantages of a larger and therefore more varied staff and a wider curriculum. At Tambaram it is hoped to secure, as far as possible, the advantages of both methods. There will be four halls, each accommodating 150 students, with a proportion of non-residents attached. The hall will be a hostel, plus much more. Each will have a resident warden and sub-warden, and all members of the teaching staff will be attached to a hall. The hall will be a centre for tutorial supervision, each student being allotted to a tutor. Each hall will carry on its own cultural and social activities, and games

will be largely organised on the hall basis. Hall life will be a democratic organisation, a preparation for the greater fellowship of post-college life. Each hall will have its own chapel, with daily opportunities of voluntary corporate worship, apart from College service on Sunday. Thus it is hoped to combine the personal values of the small college with the academic advantages of the large institution. Here the relationship of college to university at Oxford or Cambridge is at once suggested. Another analogy, hardly less relevant, is that of provinces with their largely autonomous governments within the federal central government of India.

So Madras Christian College begins its second century, rich in tradition and achievement, and renewing its youth by commencing to work out something distinctive in educational policy, adapted to India, designed to prepare its students worthily to fulfil their part in the great world's life. As a Christian College it will continue to make its distinctive and real moral and spiritual contribution to the new India. To that, indeed, something may be added. With British members of staff growing less in Government colleges as education is Indianised, the Christian colleges alone may practise the fellowship of Indians with British and Americans in a common task. So to Madras Christian College, with its sister institutions, will be committed afresh a ministry of reconciliation.

J. O. DOBSON.

THE OTHER SIDE OF ARAN.

THE film epic of humble humanity which recently so interested the world showed conclusively that life is not all "beer and skittles" on the rocky group of islets off Ireland's western coast. Neither though is it exclusively shark fishing and the back-breaking manufacture of soil, for Providence has tempered the hardships of life even to the people of Aran.

Compared with its two sister islands Aranmore is quite a fair-sized place, totalling over eleven square miles in area. Besides the capital, Kilronan, there are many villages and hamlets, four great prehistoric fortresses, and a wealth of ruined churches, primitive monastic fragments, stone crosses and other relics, many dating back to the very dawn of Christianity in Ireland fifteen centuries ago.

The people of Aran are delightful, with all the kindliness and courtesy of Irish people everywhere. Yet nevertheless they are different in an indefinite but quite tangible way. Some attribute this to long and primitive insularity, some to a reputed Spanish strain in the blood of the people of Connaught, others—and it seems the most probable—to the theory that here in Aran, as in all the other islands of these western seas, is to be found a remnant of the earlier peoples—Picts or Fir Bolg, or what you will—in any case the descendants of the Bronze Age, if not indeed the Stone Age, inhabitants of Ireland. With all their kindliness there is a reserve, an aloofness, a stateliness about even the least of them that is distinctly noticeable, in short the renowned good manners of the Irishman with a touch of the "Grand Manner" applied.

Religion and politics seem to provide here, as elsewhere in Ireland, the chief outlets for the emotional life. The religious life of Irish people everywhere, especially the peasant, is a devout and mystical expression of the human soul and its needs for spiritual uplift. The remains of early churches, primitive monasteries, round towers, and high crosses that are scattered throughout the island prove that this has been the case on Aranmore since Christianity first came. The very place names are witnesses of this fact, for "Aran" is derived from Ara-Na-Naomh, meaning "Ara of the Saints," and numbers of the village names begin with Kil or Kill, the Gaelic term for church. Chief among these towns is Killeany

which lies on the coast to the east of Kilronan. This is a place of the island's most sacred memories ; the name derives from a convert of St. Patrick, the St. Enna who first brought Christianity to Aran and who built his primitive church on the hill-side above the present village. The devout peasants of Killeany have constructed a rude altar on the site, have inscribed a cross on a ruined slab, and here bring their floral offerings and their prayers. On the very top of the high hill are the remains of a later monastic settlement of which the central oratory remains. This Temple St. Benen is one of the most ancient and curious churches in the British Isles and is said to be the smallest in the world, its dimensions (interior) being given as eleven feet long, seven feet wide, and, curiously, twenty-one feet high. Around it may still be traced the outlines of the cells which once surrounded it. Temple St. Benen is attributed to the sixth century, which means that it has stood on this stormy hill-top, time and the elements defying, for fourteen hundred years.

Near Killeany, too, is the Holy Well of St. Columbcill. It lies under an overhanging cliff at the very edge of tide water. A rude stone coping surrounds it, a canopy protects it, and a very primitive stone cross has been erected. It is all very simple and primitive, but it is revered by the people of Aran, and here they come from all over the island in pilgrimage on St. Columb's feast day—women in modern attire, women in the native red petticoat and shawl, men in "store clothes," and men in the home-spun and "pampooties" of Aran's ancient wear ; together in prayer they circle around and around the Holy Well as their forefathers have done for countless generations.

Another manifestation of the deep religious feeling of these islanders is discovered in the curious, and so far as we have seen unique, memorials for their dead. These are not the usual graveyard tombstones, but are found bordering at least two of Aranmore's main roads, and they are so massive and so primitive in construction that in the distance, except for the crosses on top, they suggest megalithic monuments. They are enormous stone cairns, rectangular in shape, six to eight feet or thereabouts high, each bearing on its top a squat, heavy, stone cross, and on its face a tablet rudely carved with simple ornament and a pathetic memorial inscription. The following is typical of all : "Lord have mercy on the soul of —, died

in the —th year of her age, 18— ; Erected by her father ——” In all, about fifteen of these monuments were seen along the edge of one road and four or five along another. A very curious feature was that in the case of every one noticed, the inscription was in the English language—and the Aran Islands are supposed to belong to the Gaeltacht! In this connection, too, it must be said that English is spoken on the island to a much greater degree than expected. This does not mean when talking to visitors, for, of course, even in the most Irish-speaking districts there are few people who are not bilingual. The unexpectedness of it lay in the fact that English seemed to be used in conversation among the natives themselves nearly as often as the Irish tongue.

The physical conditions of Aranmore are much as the film shows them—great rugged cliffs, stony fields, grey desolation, aridity and treelessness—the whole surrounded by a restless sea which even in a summer calm makes thunder on the western and northern coasts. This is Aran as Nature made it, but “Man of Aran,” by the characteristics which the film so convincingly emphasises, has made it in places to blossom—well even if not quite like the rose, at least to blossom. Here and there fields of crops may be seen that would do credit to an Ontario farmstead. Small trees and shrubs flourish, most of the cottages grow flowers, and at the north-west end of the island gardens are found where high walls with large glazed openings promote a quite luxuriant growth, even that palmetto species being seen which is so common in coastal North Carolina. To appreciate the enormous amount of grim determination, the generations of tireless energy, and the hard labour which have gone to the making of this fertility, a walk towards the south-east corner of the island, along the slopes and across the top of the ridge which is the island’s backbone, should be taken. Here bleak desolation reigns supreme. For miles the surface is one sheet of grim grey rock, broken continuously by the action of the elements into great yawning fissures in the depth of which a multitude of wild flowers have found sustenance, wild flowers which would grace a city garden. But except for them it is a burnt-out world—Earth after Judgment Day—finished and deserted with all life extinct save the flowers which Nature has sown in memory. Even the goats and sheep of the rocky meadows on the slopes have vanished, nothing but grey and tortured rock

remains, and were it not for the blue sky above the scene, would be almost unbearable. Presently the voice of the sea is heard, and with it the first sound of life in the wilderness, the seagull's plaintive cry. Nothing more solitary than the view from Dubh Cathair can be imagined nor, should the day be cloudy, more forbidding. On one side is a waste of grey water, on the other an even more awe-inspiring desolation of grey rock—for here there is not even movement.

If Aran has any feature to offer more interesting even than its life of the present, it will be found in the crowded memories of its past. Everywhere, on Aranmore at least, relics of the various periods of the island's story may be found, carrying back beyond the bounds of history to the dim ages, possibly before the coming of even the Celt to Erin's shores. The four fortresses, Dubh Cathair, Dun Aengus, Dun Oghil, Dun Onaght, are among the most important of their kind in Ireland, and of Dun Aengus an eminent archæologist has said that "it is the most magnificent barbaric monument now extant in Europe." Dubh Cathair is supposed to be the oldest of all by one thousand years, though why is not clear to the casual eye for, except that it is smaller and more dilapidated, it seems much akin to Dun Aengus. Dun Onaght is the most remote fort, while Dun Oghil, the most commandingly placed, is not only in the best state of preservation but is also the most accessible from Kilonan.

Dun Aengus is considered by most authorities to be at least two thousand years old, though there has been a suggestion of late that its origin may belong to the period of Danish invasions in the eighth to ninth centuries. Whatever its age, Dun Aengus is the most famous of the stone forts and, with Dubh Cathair, most worth a visit. Like Dubh Cathair it is perched precariously on a high cliff at the very edge of the sea, and like it more or less demolished by the falling of the cliffs during winter storms, so that now these forts are semicircular or horseshoe-shaped rather than circular as general opinion considers their original shape to have been. Dun Aengus' inner cashel consists of a three-tiered wall of dry masonry of which the outer section is said to be twenty feet high and the inner about eight feet, the base width being eighteen feet. Outside this massive wall, some yards away, lies another encircling rampart protected by a *chevaux de frise* of great pointed stone slabs stretching over an area thirty feet

in width. A third and outer wall completes the series of defences.

The inner enclosure of the fort is supposed once to have been a circular space about one hundred and fifty feet in diameter. From this ground level a series of steps at frequent intervals led to the different levels of the inner face of the wall. The interior appearance is somewhat reminiscent of a Roman amphitheatre, except that the rough character of the masonry, formed of comparatively small and undressed stones, gives it an aspect at once more primitive and barbaric. The fort is supposed to have been built by one Aengus, a chieftain of an earlier race of Ireland, the Fir Bolg, whom the invading Milesians drove to these far confines of the west.

But with all the fame Dun Aengus has worthily attained it is Dubh Cathair, the Black Fort, which is, of all, the most awe-inspiring and mysterious. It stands on a cliff that is almost a peninsula. In form and in type of masonry it is very similar to Dun Aengus, except that it is much less complete. Across the neck of the promontory at its rear extends a *chevaux de frise*, looking in its wild desolation of tottering slabs like a graveyard after the bugle blast of Judgment Day has driven the sleepers from the tombs and left the gravestones in chaos. In the inner enclosure a series of low walls forms five semi-circular, or semi-elliptical, roofless chambers. On the point of the promontory a mass of scattered boulders and slabs remain from huts that have been destroyed by the ravaging waves within living memory. The entire plateau as well as its culminating point, Dubh Cathair, is a place of death—the blasted, haunted abode of ancient men to whose forgotten memory the sea sings a dirge and the seagulls add their wail of lost souls.

The beehive huts, in Ireland at least, seem to occupy a position between prehistoric and early Christian times, and to belong to both, for they are known to have been used as dwellings by pre-Christian peoples, and as religious retreats by the early hermits and monks. From the archæologists' standpoint they are of enormous interest, for they are considered to be "akin in construction to the Mycenean tombs, and the Treasury of Atreus"—a most interesting point when the traditional return of the Fir Bolg from captivity in Greece is remembered. An unusually perfect example of these "clochans," or stone beehive huts, is found in a rocky wilderness by the sea on the northern coast of Aranmore. Its

structure is still as sound and its characteristic roof masonry as intact as though it had been built in recent years. The interior is cool and dim with the grey-green of moss-clad rock and the perpetual twilight ensured by its one tiny window slit, its small roof-flue, and the two low square-headed doorways which alone admit the light of day. Who shall say how old this "clochan" is or when it last knew human habitation? Time has dealt gently with it; has thatched it and welded its roof stones together with field grass and wild flowers; and the reverent folk of Aran have spared it to be a memorial and a link with Ireland's ancient days.

Aran's list of churches, monastic cells, and other survivals from her early Christian period is far too long for more than passing notice. They are scattered broadcast throughout these islands so aptly named "Of the Saints." Besides the buildings for worship or for habitation, there is also a wealth of ruined high crosses, and upright stone slabs on which the various forms of the Celtic cross have been rudely cut. Many of these latter almost certainly have been prehistoric pillar stones originally, on which the emblem of Christianity has been incised probably by the missionary monks or their converts. Aranmore can show the stump of one round tower only, a rather curious fact when the numbers of this type of ecclesiastical building on the mainland are considered.

There is one ancient church at the north-western end of the island, between Kilmurray and Dun Aengus, which is so outstanding in appearance as to warrant special notice. For St. McDug is one of the most interesting of all the ancient things on Aran. Said to be seventh century it looks earlier, in fact its fabric, its construction, its immediate surroundings, all conspire to make it seem at first glance a pre-Christian building. It is of the cyclopean type of architecture, its great blocks of stone of the size and kind used by those mysterious builders of the megalithic period. Its doorways and one of the windows are of the trabeated type, with the inclined jambs so common in Europe's most ancient architecture, and which existed in Ireland down to, and in some cases throughout, the period of Romanesque.

Before St. McDug's western doorway stands a great monolith on which a primitive cross has been incised. Surrounding this pillar and beginning almost at the church door extends a thick grove of trees with an undergrowth of grass

and weed knee-high in depth. Standing in this little wood where the light falls dim and green, on the one hand the great blocks of cyclopean masonry, on the other the monolith looming mysterious like the menhir of some ancient cult, not only Druidism seems to have returned to claim its own but an earlier Faith that dwelt in Aran perhaps before the Celt had left his Baltic shores.

All this is Aran even yet, but how long will it so continue now that the islands are thrust into the publicity which has been the doom of so many simple, pleasant places? Is it not possible for the curious Modern to touch Eden without blighting it, to refrain from importing into its tranquillity the dance hall, the petrol pump, and the cocktail bar? To go to these islands—to see, to ponder, to wonder, and to smile a little perhaps—and then to depart leaving untouched what time and the changing tides of civilisation have so far spared—the simple, kindly folk of Aran?

ETHEL BREWER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

HUMAN PROBLEMS : (I) RUSSIA

ON November 7th next twenty years will have passed since the "Petrograd" revolution enthroned the bolsheviks in power. Recorded history contains few things quite so big as the effect upon Europe and the world of what took place in Russia a generation ago. The counter-revolution, first in Finland, where General Mannerheim's 100,000 White Guards made him the first European fascist dictator, then in Hungary, in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, has by now produced something like a general emergency which in the opinion of some people threatens to engulf Europe in a war of opposing ideologies in dictatorship.

It matters not at all that Lenin happened to be the son of a nobleman, Mussolini of a blacksmith. The ideology professed by Russia's dictatorship does not indeed differ much in essentials from that professed by Germany's or Italy's dictatorship. Yet circumstances have ranged the two against each other ; and the devil himself has inspired the so-called democratic countries, including Great Britain, to see in the Russian pattern something less offensive than they see in the German or the Italian pattern, with the appalling result that France and Czechoslovakia are bound by treaty to Russia, and Great Britain is in danger of being dragged into the maelstrom.

The nemesis in human affairs was never more merciless than in the still active consequences of 1914. On that famous day, July 29th of that year, when an Imperial Council at Potsdam decided on war against Russia, a war which before it was to end was destined to involve the whole world, there began a process of sin and retribution as fatal, as clear and as elemental as any that was unfolded by the Greek tragedians.

In 1914 the chief countries of Europe had reached a stage of civilisation where a definite "ruling class" found itself in unchallenged authority. Russia happens to have been merely the crudest example. One of the truths that becomes consistently clear in historical retrospect is that as a man or a class or a nation sows, so do they reap. The ruling classes of 1914 had authority. They had privilege. They had responsibility. They wielded their authority and enjoyed their privilege ;

but ignored their responsibility. The trust that was reposed in them was nothing less than the well-being of their fellow men. In a blind manifestation of fury not equalled in the history of mankind, the ruling classes of Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and Great Britain—the five Great Powers of Europe—plunged into an orgy of mutual destruction. The lives, the property, the happiness of themselves and of the people whose fate was in their hands, were shattered.

To talk of “war-guilt” as applicable to the ruling class of one country as distinct from another is an exercise of folly no longer tolerated by reasonable people. No doubt there were degrees of culpability. But if the German ruling class in 1914 was the first to betray its trust, what shall be said of those others who in the suicidal name of *la victoire intégrale* persisted in completing the disaster?

The nemesis first raised its head in Russia. The Tsarist ruling class had taught the ignorant peasants to shoot their enemies, the diagnosis of what constituted an enemy being reserved to that ruling class itself. And when the sufferings of the Russian masses had killed their faith in their rulers, and the opportunist bolshevik adventurers saw and took the opportunity of suggesting that those peasants should turn their weapons against their true enemy, namely the ruling class that had betrayed them, the revolution was given at the outset an irresistible momentum. The argument rang true.

Having thus started in Russia, the moral reaction swept through Europe from east to west. Thrones toppled. The authority and the privileges of the old ruling classes were everywhere challenged. “Socialism in our time” became a certainty. The only uncertainty was which particular gang of political adventurers would succeed in gaining the leadership of the various socialist crusades. Adolf Hitler was busy in Bavaria in the early post-war years organising a following against the “communism” that radiated from Russia. But his own creed was in substance as communist as anything that emerged from the minds of Marx, Bakunin, Chernyshevski, or Lenin. It was not a perversity which made Signor Mussolini a “socialist” in his early days. In the name of fascismo he has “nationalised” every human activity in Italy as effectively as Herr Hitler in Germany, or Lenin in Russia. It is merely a question of the particular personnel of the new political bosses thrown

up by the great abdication of power by the pre-war ruling classes.

In Great Britain the revolution came with a subtlety that in some degree disguised its character. To a large extent the old ruling classes in Great Britain retain a semblance of their power ; but their privileges are largely gone, and the doctrine they preach in effect is socialism. The so-called Conservative party in Great Britain is responsible for the mass of the socialist legislation that has been added to the Statute Book in the twenty years since Lenin began the bolshevik process. To-day the British ruling classes have preserved the form of their authority only by emptying it of its substance and by beating the bolsheviks at their own game. Judged by the amount of property that is annually confiscated by the British Government from its "upper classes," Great Britain is to-day the most bolshevik country in the world. Only this year a "Conservative" Chancellor of the Exchequer launched a project of so extremely bolshevik a quality that the "Socialist" Opposition stood aghast at the spectacle.

In France, last of the pre-war strongholds of privilege, M. Léon Blum has been able to form the first Socialist Government known to the Third Republic. In Spain, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera proved to be merely a palliative, a delaying force, which, however, in the long run, could not prevent the head-on clash between the rivals for dictatorial power in that country. To talk of the Valencia camp as the champions of "democracy" is to miss the point of the struggle for mastery between two sets of dictators whose professions and purposes are equally bolshevik in substance, though for war purposes they may be distinguished by the ideological fiction of Left against Right.

What does it all mean ? And what precise stage have we reached in the macabre orgy of politics let loose in 1914 ? In one sense the words bolshevism, fascism, nazism, democracy, merely confuse the issue. Their essential common attribute is their political substance. It was impossible that the world in 1914 should abandon itself to the dictatorship of the politicians, should give to the politicians the competence to mobilise unquestioned every human force—labour, property, money, life itself—without limit, for the exclusive purpose of senseless mutual destruction : such a thing was impossible

without the enthronement of political power on a pinnacle wellnigh impregnable.

It is a ghastly sight to-day, twenty-three years after the outbreak of the fatal war, fatal not only in its immediate but in its still continuing effects, to see the whole world obsessed by war as the great instrument, actual or potential, of political power. Japan is organised on a permanent war basis, bent in effect upon the conquest of as much of China as may be. China for a quarter of a century has been engaged in multi-form civil war. Russia is virtually mobilised for war against Japan in the east and against Germany in the west. Germany and Italy are organised on a routine war footing, though the particular enemy or enemies are not clearly defined. Spain is an actual cockpit, in which Spanish, Italian, German, Russian, French, British nationals have been fighting in a variety of hypothetical causes. In his recent book, *Armaments: The Race and the Cost*, Mr. Francis Hirst quotes the estimate, made by a serious source, that last year the world spent on armaments twice as much as it spent in 1929, and nearly four times as much as it spent in the last year before the Great War. And the unimaginable figure of last year's expenditure was nearly £3,000,000,000. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, a leading politician, has expressed dismay over what he called "the incredible folly" of "civilisation": civilisation being merely the political organisation of the world.

Who can stop it? How many people even recognise, as does apparently Mr. Chamberlain, the nature of the dilemma itself? The disease is politics. The doctors are the politicians themselves. In Russia, where the logic is always clearest because crudest, they have reached the stage where the politicians simply shoot each other. Apart from the happy Scandinavian countries, untouched as yet by the world-wide plague of politics, there seems to be no corner of the earth which is not being devastated. The United States, largely isolated from the diplomatic epidemic, is struck down by the scourge of industrial politics.

The real emergency in present human affairs derives its fearsomeness largely from the prevalent blindness of the victims. They are lost in the forest and do not know the wood from the trees. The spectacle of Mr. Herbert Morrison (for instance) standing on the plinth of Nelson's Monument in Trafalgar Square and working up an immense concourse of

people to wild indignation about Spain and in particular about the need of supplying arms to the Valencia party in the war : that is the sort of thing that made Coriolanus exclaim :

“ Behold, the heavens do ope,
The gods look down, and this unnatural scene
They laugh at.”

An immense amount of thought is devoted to such incidental problems as the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain, German designs in Central Europe, Italian designs in the Mediterranean ; but the real problem that embraces them all, how to rescue the world from its political obsession, seems hardly to be considered at all. Yet the apparently destructive expedient of ridiculing the political pundits, of reducing the whole political graft to absurdity, seems to be the only practical and in the end constructive thing for the sensible people to do. The charge that such a device would be merely destructive hardly lies. Is it merely destructive, when a house is on fire, to destroy the fire by water ? If some human agency could only inspire the human race, instead of always saying “ The Government ought to do something about it,” to say “ The Government ought to stop doing things,” and if the same agency could turn men’s minds into other channels, religious, philosophical, or what not, then much of the madness at present afflicting mankind might be allayed.

It may be that there is something in the blood of man to make of politics an unconquerable perversity. The theory of civilisation is that it helps mankind in its material circumstance. In practice, can any serious person confidently maintain that on balance civilisation has done good to mankind ? Measure the brute beast against civilised man : and see if the contrast is as clear as it ought to be. Man has his religion, in its various forms. He trains himself still to believe in the deity he in his conduct defies. Considered dispassionately, and as it were in a remote detachment, what does the whole organisation of international diplomacy amount to ? The embassies, the foreign offices, with their war offices, admiralties, and air forces : what are they but an incredible machinery for the periodic mass destruction of human beings and property ? The brute beast could not do it. Because he is denied the power to formulate in words the dictates of his intellect, he is saved from the artificial evils that are inflicted by the

human intellect upon the less fortunate human race. Civilisation, in so far as it rests upon the uncurbed machinations of the human brain, is a terrifying thing. What is to curb it? To answer that question is to solve one of the mysteries of life on earth.

(2) PALESTINE

Another commission of inquiry has made a report on the problems of Palestine. Those problems are so typical of what is normally presented to that form of human perversity we know as international diplomacy, that is to say, they are so wholly insoluble, that a certain paradoxical comfort may be derived from the contemplation of them.

Arthur Balfour, that historic monument of human ingenuity and finesse, made his tantalising declaration on behalf of the British Government on November 2nd, 1917, thus: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."

Could any conundrum be more flatly unanswerable? Palestine is a small country, of some 9,000 square miles, only slightly larger than Wales, part of a big area traditionally inhabited by a proud Arab race, but as Sir George Adam Smith put it in his *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, a country that "has never belonged to one nation and probably never will." The Turkish Revolution of 1908 did not carry out its initial promise of full equality for the Moslems, Jews and Christians of Palestine. The policy radiating from Constantinople was one of increasing Ottomanisation leading to increasing resistance from the Arabs of Syria and Palestine: a resistance which had the effect of inducing the Turkish Government to pass the vilayet laws of 1913 and 1914. Those laws granted a real measure of local government, but their effect could not be tested because of the outbreak of war.

Concurrently the Jewish element in Palestine was increasing by leaps and bounds. The creation of the Zionist Organisation in 1897 had given a new momentum to the movement for the

return of the Jews to Palestine. Between 1880 and the outbreak of the Great War the Jewish population of Palestine had increased five-fold. When the war broke out there were nearly 90,000 Jews out of a total population of 700,000. In the early years of the war the country became wholly disorganised and demoralised. When General Allenby conquered it in 1917 and entered Jerusalem on December 11th of that year, the military administration he set up had to begin by an emergency organisation of food supplies by military transport.

It was five weeks before Lord Allenby entered Jerusalem that Mr. Balfour made the historic declaration that was destined to lead to twenty years of appalling muddle. The Allied Powers endorsed it. It was incorporated in the Treaty of Sèvres, which further provided that the country should be administered by a League of Nations mandate. Until the League mandate was constituted and put into force the country was administered on British initiative without any legally constituted government. Hebrew was added to Arabic and English as an official language.

As long ago as the spring of 1920, before the mandate was constituted, there were Arab nationalist demonstrations against the Jews, and on April 4th and 5th of that year riots took place in Jerusalem. That was one reason why on July 1st, 1920, a civil government was set up with Sir Herbert Samuel as the first high commissioner. The riots, however, continued. November 2nd, 1921, the fourth anniversary of the Balfour declaration, was made the occasion of a ceremonial outbreak in Palestine, which had been preceded by riots in Jaffa.

Mr. Winston Churchill, Colonial Secretary, thought it wise even at that early date to emphasise the dual nature of the purpose in Palestine. He made a public statement to the effect that it was not the purpose to create a wholly Jewish Palestine, nor to subordinate the Arab population, language, or culture to the Jewish. He reiterated the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine, as distinct from the idea of Palestine as the home of the Jews, in these words : " The nationality to be acquired by all citizens of Palestine, whether Jews or non-Jews, whether for purposes of internal law or international status would be Palestinian and nothing else. But in order that the Jewish community should have the best prospect of free development, it is essential that it should know that it is in

Palestine as a right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed." The Palestine Arab delegation, which was the official mouthpiece in London of the Arabs, refused to accept that statement as satisfactory to the Arabs.

The League of Nations mandate came into operation in 1923, the British Government thereupon in name transforming the administration into that of the mandate. Palestine was now launched upon a troubled, unending conflict between Arabs and Jews, characterised periodically by open terrorism, made worse by the greatly increased rate of Jewish immigration into the country that resulted from the German and other persecution of the Jews in Europe. In 1936 it became clear beyond any doubt that the Balfourian notion of a vague Jewish home within Palestine was unpractical.

A Royal Commission, chairmaned by Lord Peel and constituted by Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Laurie Hammond, Sir Morris Carter, Sir Harold Morris and Professor Coupland as its other members, was sent out to investigate on the spot the lines of a possible solution. They spent the winter in Palestine and issued their report textually on July 8th last, a summary having been broadcast from Jerusalem the day before. It was greeted by indignant and impartial protest by both Jews and Arabs, by which fact perhaps there was established at any rate its own quality of impartiality.

In their report the commissioners made the premise that Jewish and Arab aspirations in Palestine had been proved to be irreconcilable. The solution they offered, therefore, was that of a partition of the country. The mandate, they suggested, should be replaced by a treaty relationship between an Arab sovereign State, a Jewish sovereign State, and the British Government. The Jewish State would stretch along the littoral, broadening in the north to include Nazareth. The Arab State would add a part of Palestine to Transjordan. The British Government would become a permanent mandatory "as a sacred trust of civilisation" over the sacred places. There should be a corridor, including Jerusalem and Bethlehem, giving access to the sea at Jaffa. The "sacred" mandate should extend over Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee. The report made an impressive appeal, suggesting that "the inestimable boon of peace" was worth a sacrifice on both

sides ; and neatly hinting that " the quarrel which the mandate started could be ended with its termination."

As if to prove the truth of that diagnosis, both Jewish and Arab spokesmen promptly formulated their reactions to the commission's proposals. Even before the report itself was published, the first unofficial forecasts of what it contained led to a statement, published in the *Observer* of June 27th, of representative opinion on both sides. The Arab statement ran thus : " The Arabs demand a national government with the termination of the Mandatory rule, and the substitution of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine such as was granted to Iraq. They demand the cessation of Jewish immigration, owing to the economic chaos to which the country has been reduced by the arrival of 400,000 alien immigrants. The Arabs are suffering in agricultural regions, in the professions, now flooded with Jewish competitors, in trade and in labour. Palestine is a small country about the size of Wales, unable to absorb such a quantity of immigrants. The Arabs are against partition. The country, which was once part of Syria, should be reunited to Syria, and should maintain its integrity. The Arabs fought for the Allies in the Great War on the understanding that they would gain the independence of their land when peace was declared. Even before the war they were planning to get rid of Turkish rule. Provided they acquire what they have been struggling for since 1914, there is no reason why peace should not once more descend on the land."

The Jewish statement ran thus : " The Zionists cannot now accept any policy which restricts the scope of the Jewish National Home. Their record in Palestine since the Mandate is one which is unique in the modern world. They have converted a barren waste wilderness, capable of supporting a population of under half a million, into a flourishing agricultural and industrial country which now supports a population of over a million and a quarter, and is capable of absorbing many more. Moreover, the benefits that the Jews have introduced are enjoyed not only by them alone, but also by the native Arab population. The level of real wages, for instance, among the Arabs is three times as high as that of the neighbouring Arab countries ; their standard of life has vastly improved ; the extent of malaria has enormously decreased, and there has been a conspicuous decline in their death and infant mortality rates. But British policy in Palestine ought to take

account of Jewish persecution in the rest of the world. To close the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration would not only be a breach of a solemn pledge, but would also be morally unjustifiable. There is no innate hostility on the part of the Arabs towards the Jews. Such hostility is confined to a handful of Arab agitators, whose main interest is feathering their own political nests. An extension of the territory available for the Jewish National Home and the sanction of unrestricted Jewish immigration is the only solution capable of benefiting Jews, Arabs, and Great Britain."

The British Government set a prompt example to Jews and Arabs by accepting the commission's proposals simultaneously with the publication of the report, and by issuing a strongly worded statement pleading for its acceptance by Jews and Arabs. The following sentences are quoted from that statement. ". . . His Majesty's Government and their predecessors, since the obligations of the Mandate were accepted, have taken the view, which the tenor of the Mandate itself implies, that their obligations to Arabs and Jews respectively were not incompatible, on the assumption that in the process of time the two races would so adjust their national aspirations as to render possible the establishment of a single commonwealth under a unitary government. . . . In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission they are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. . . . In supporting a solution of the Palestine problem by means of partition, His Majesty's Government are much impressed by the advantages which it offers both to the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. They would be finally delivered from all fear of Jewish domination, and from the anxiety which they have expressed lest their Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control. The Arab State would receive financial assistance on a substantial scale, both from His Majesty's Government and from the Jewish State. On the other hand,

partition would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieve it from any possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. It would convert the Jewish National Home into a Jewish State with full control over immigration. Its nationals would acquire a status similar to that enjoyed by the nationals of other countries. The Jews would at last cease to live a 'minority life,' and the primary object of Zionism would thus be attained. Under the proposed treaties the rights of minorities in both States would be strictly guaranteed. Above all, fear and suspicion would be replaced by a sense of confidence and security, and both peoples would obtain, in the words of the Commission, 'the inestimable boon of peace.' "

Whether or not by the time this paper sees the light, the initial resentment of Arabs and Jews has been modified, and some prospect emerges that the commission's proposals may be made the basis for an attempted new start in the adventure of enabling Jews and Arabs to live amicably in their country, what is certainly established is that the statement issued by the British Government on July 8th, 1937, finally exploded the subtle and lighthearted theory enshrined in the same Government's statement of November 2nd, 1917. Thus in twenty years the whirligig of time proves in one particular example the vanity of human affairs in their political aspect.

(3) THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

September is normally the month when Geneva resounds with the polyglot idealisms. The annual Assembly, preceded by the Council, has in the past seventeen years offered a spectacle of encouragement and almost of hope to those who have tried to make of international diplomacy an instrument of peace rather than of war. It is one of the readiest protests of the human spirit to resent those whose criticisms are destructive. To despair is to refuse help in the common cause and in the always pressing need of improving the human lot. Of course, it is said, the League of Nations was a difficult enterprise. It could succeed only by the collective faith of peoples in the mass. Those who help to strengthen such faith are doing their bit. Those who scoff are doing a deeper harm than they know.

Yet such protests themselves ignore a simple truth. If war be the product of politics, is it necessarily the best or the only way of avoiding war to attempt it by political means ? The greatest war (so far) known to history led to the establishment of this still existent, though clearly moribund, League of Nations. It has in practice been proved ineffective in its purpose. Why ? To argue that it would have been effective if the United States had taken part in it, if Japan and Italy had remained faithful to it, if Germany and Russia on being admitted to it, had become useful members of it : to argue in that way is surely to beg the question. The forces that constituted the League of Nations in 1919 were political forces. True, the motive derived from an almost universal reaction against the senselessness, and worse, of war as a political method. But even such a motive was destined to be proved incapable of inducing common sense in political work. The remorse, in fact, did not ring true. The words of Prometheus, unbound, ought to have been the spirit in which the League of Nations was founded :

“ I speak in grief,
Not exultation, for I hate no more,
As then ere misery made me wise.”

But that was not the spirit of Geneva. Both Germany and Russia in a spirit of stupid vindictiveness, were deliberately excluded at the outset from participation in a political organisation whose whole theory was remorse over international strife and a regenerate determination to substitute co-operation and peace for division and war among the nations. The door was shut against two of the European Great Powers. How could such a start lead to success ? On every hand, nearly twenty years after the last great war came to an end, we see the still rampant political antagonisms that led to it. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition of what is rotten down to bedrock. Then and not till then can the retreat from politics begin.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 12th, 1937.

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

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GERMAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER NAZI RULE.*

That the German universities, so long the glory of the country, have been trampled underfoot by the uncivilised men who seized power in 1933 is known to and lamented by us all. But what has actually happened? How many dismissals have occurred in each? What system has replaced the theory and practice of academic freedom, of procuring the best available scholar for the vacant post? What effect has the Nazi revolution had on the students themselves? These questions are answered in Mr. Hartshorne's excellent little book, based on personal experience as well as on careful study of documentary material. It should be read not only by those who are primarily interested in education, but by all students of the mentality of the Third Reich. For every Dictator aims above all at the conversion of the rising generation in the shortest possible time to his own peculiar philosophy. The most vivid pages in the volume record the author's impressions of the celebration of the "Day of National Glory" at the University of Berlin on January 30th, 1936, the third anniversary of the accession of Hitler to power. The mass meeting, we are told, has never been brought to such perfection

* *The German Universities and National Socialism.* By E. Y. Hartshorne, jun. Allen & Unwin.

as a political instrument as in Nazi Germany. No one can visualise such an orgy of patriotic emotion without a heightened realisation of its explosive possibilities.

The dismissals from the teaching staff differ widely in the different Universities, and the author estimates the total loss of "non-Aryan" and other innocent victims of racial and political intolerance as somewhere between 15 and 21 per cent. But, as he reminds us, the lot of many of those who remain is painful in the extreme. "Uncertain of the duration of his appointment and even of his salary; continually on his guard before non-intellectual critics; competing with glamorous, quasi-militaristic extra-curricular appeals for the interest of his students; lecturing before rows of brown-shirts; flanked in his seminars and informal discussion groups by zealous young Nazi teachers; in his free time called upon to participate in official functions, and to read official papers and periodicals; harassed by the thought of his banished and often expatriated colleagues and masters; disgusted at the habit of compromise and self-deception practised by others and even forced upon himself; fearful or cynical with regard to the future, the University teacher lives a truly unenviable existence; in a *Universitas Litterarum* which has lost its respect for Letters, a veritable caricature of the old *civitas academica*, in which scholarly seclusiveness is decried as a political sin, and in which the worthy old German 'calling' of science, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, has well-nigh lost its meaning."

In his closing chapter the young American scholar attempts a final estimate of the momentous change. Science as a whole, he declares, has lost. "A second conclusion stands out scarcely less clearly: Germany has gained something." In his laudable effort to be fair he sets forth ten entries on the credit side. The number of students has been reduced, a reform which will reduce unemployment in the academic professions. Student riots, the result of political differences, have ceased. There are fewer well-to-do loafers. The emphasis on one's duty to the community and the state stimulates youthful idealism in many cases. Physical fitness is seriously cultivated. Sleepy institutions have been woken up, and many a doddering teacher has been stirred to bring new life into his lectures or writing. The Universities are envisaged, as never before, as training grounds for the nation's leaders. Yet when all these advances have been impartially noted, the hideous

reality remains. "All the fine, free play of the human intellect is submerged under the dull, stupefying vapour of ideological conformity."

Many a German exile exclaims in the bitterness of his heart that the old Germany which he and we used to love is dead. It is far too soon to give way to such pessimism. The political tradition of the country is authoritarian, the intellectual tradition critical and creative. The land of Bismarck and Frederick the Great is also the home of Lessing, Goethe and Kant. The liberalism of Weimar may not return in its old shape, for nations like individuals are continually weaving new patterns of life. But moods change, and the instinct of political and spiritual self-determination will reassert itself. How soon a great and gifted people will tire of this heavy-handed regimentation none can foretell.

G. P. G.

WHAT IS AHEAD OF US?*

The names of the six prophets who here predict the future of Capitalism, of Soviet Communism, of Dictatorships and of Economic Nationalism, will rightly command the attention of all those concerned with the critical position of the world to-day. Mr. Cole, in a temperate and well-argued opening chapter, shows grounds for holding that the collapse of Capitalism from economic causes in the democratic countries is by no means imminent. By concessions and adjustments they can hold their control of the business system, provided that Fascist States stand aloof. But Mr. Cole argues, and here is supported by Sir Arthur Salter and Mr. Wickham Steed, that Fascism is driven by political necessity to an interfering and aggressive policy. For Fascism and Nazism live upon prestige. Hitler came to power and keeps it on condition of maintaining an appeal to the pride of the German people, damaged in the Great War and the Bad Peace, and demanding a forcible display of recovery.

Mr. Wickham Steed considers war can only be averted by a firm rally of the peace forces in the democratic nations. Hitler, the danger-man, would not dare to move if he were sure he had to meet the combined hostility of Britain, France, Russia, Scandinavia and America. Even if America were left

* George Allen & Unwin.

out, the risk would be too great, hence the present effort to get Britain to detach France from Russia.

But Mr. P. M. S. Blackett argues that, though Hitler plays astutely with the democratic fear of Bolshevism, suggesting that he should have a free hand in the East, a war with Russia, necessarily protracted, would not suit his quick game. Several of the prophets pin their faith in peace upon a strong determined policy from the Left in this country and France, demanding an effective Popular Front. Mr. Blackett holds that "a united working class" is essential, and that "Just as the military power of the U.S.S.R. is an essential part of any effective international anti-Nazi policy, so also is the aid of the Communist Party an essential basis of an effective internal progressive policy" (p. 108). The relation between the internal class conflict and the international situation is of course in some measure an economic struggle, but the writers here do not overstress the element of economic causation. Pride and prestige play an even greater part than property in the war situation.

Mr. Sidney Webb deals with the future of Soviet Communism by painting a roseate picture of the success of Russia in the economic and political fields. The Communist Party dominates by virtue of "its unique Vocation of Leadership," the people generally respond to the demand for public service in the place of private profit, the individual citizen possesses more liberty than elsewhere if liberty is interpreted in terms of opportunity. "Western critics find it hard to approve the angry condemnation to death of successive blocks of 'traitors' even after public trial, and the incomprehensible 'confessions' of the accused. A philosophic comment is that any hard-fought and successful revolution leaves all parties in the new community state bound in a certain pattern of behaviour formed in the revolutionary struggle" (p. 130).

J. A. HOBSON.

THE BASES OF THEISM.

Professor Dawes Hicks has published his Hibbert Lectures under the title *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*,* and in so

* *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*. By G. Dawes Hicks. George Allen & Unwin.

doing has made a valuable contribution to thought accessible to a wider circle than that of those who were privileged to hear the Lectures. The eight Lectures deal, in succession, with Religion and Philosophy, Man's Place in Nature, Religious Experience, The Cosmological Argument, The Teleological Argument, Values and the Moral Argument, Pantheism and Theism.

It is evident from these titles that the author is travelling a well-worn road, and that there is little scope for originality in regard to the main issues that are raised. Yet the volume is valuable and timely, for the treatment is marked throughout by such insight, clarity and acuteness as make it a distinctive contribution to the elucidation of the great themes with which it deals. Old and in the main familiar reasoning is presented with a freshness that is the result of independent thinking and of easy mastery of the most recent phases of philosophical thought. The book is, therefore, an admirable guide to those who are beginning to study the grounds of Theistic belief and enables such to appreciate their strength as confronting alike Naturalism, Agnosticism, and Pantheism. Not the least merit of the work consists in the keen detection and the lucid exposure of looseness of thought, whether it be found in the upholders or in the opponents of Theism.

In the course of his exposition, Professor Hicks calls attention to the most outstanding thinkers, both ancient and modern. His summing-up is always luminous and concise; his tone and temper showing throughout the calm urbanity of one who is so sure of his own conclusions that he can deal considerately with those from whom he differs. In particular, mention may be made of his treatment of Schleiermacher and Otto, of Martineau and Professor A. E. Taylor. In each case appreciation and criticism are harmoniously united. The title of the volume clearly defines the range and limitation of the Lectures. The author is concerned to show the rational grounds upon which it is believed that the universe as it is known requires for its explanation the existence of a Supreme and Conscious Mind—that the reasonableness, which is assumed to be universal both by science and in practical life, depends upon a rational and conscious source. Not the least of the merits of the argument is that at every point, and especially in dealing with religious experience, Professor Hicks

insists upon the presence and supreme influence of reason and thought, as against the over-emphasis of feeling, erroneously supposed to be independent of intellectual elements, which, in fact, impregnate and constitute it. This insistence upon the rationality of religious faith is particularly valuable at the present time. The style of the writing is so clear and transparent as to make it easy and pleasurable reading for those who shrink from the obscurity of many philosophical treatises.

J. S. L.

EPITAPH ON SMYRNA.

Mr. Pallis makes his contribution* to the vast literature, Greek and other, on the Greek part in the Great War and the subsequent adventure in Asia Minor. He himself was one of the first officers to take service with the revolutionary government set up by Veniselos, and had occupied a post in the Greek Administration in Macedonia when the break took place between Veniselos and Constantine (September 1916). But he is broadminded about his own past. As he looks back his passions are calmer. "I am quite prepared," he writes (p. ix), "to admit that those of my compatriots—and they were extremely numerous, perhaps even the majority—who took the other view, were, with few exceptions, actuated by equally patriotic motives in wanting Greece to remain neutral."

In recounting the history of Greece from 1915 to the climax (August 1922) of the destruction of Smyrna and the resultant execution of the Prime Minister, Mr. Gounaris, the author makes this confession, fifteen years after the event: "On one important issue of Veniselos's policy—the occupation of the Smyrna enclave—I have been led, in the light of subsequent events and the evidence which has become available since the war, thanks to the publication of numerous memoirs and official documents, somewhat to modify my original opinion concerning the soundness of that portion of the great Cretan's political programme" (p. xii).

Those who have lived through this rotten period of the world's history find it hard to be patient with those who write history in the conventional patriotic strain. The Great War,

* *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After*. By A. A. Pallis. Methuen.

not only for Greece but for all of us, was in its diplomatic aspect the very ecstasy of nonsense ; and in its human aspect a wholly stupid and meaningless exhibition of mass murder. Yet it was conducted with all the cheap catchwords about king and country, glory, heroism, and what not. And the same indignant people who, between 1914 and 1918, wrote and spoke of Germany as the anti-Christ and who were prepared to pay and did pay for *la victoire intégrale*, are now clamouring for it to be fought all over again. The Greek case is merely typical of the rest.

By far the best thing in the book before us, though the author himself obviously would not agree, is the dedication : To the common people of Greece and to the rank and file of the Greek Army who, during ten years of arduous struggles for the emancipation of their brethren in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor, gave freely of their blood and treasure, and whose sacrifices were largely rendered vain through the faults and dissensions of their leaders.

G. G.

GERALD OF WALES.*

We have had to wait curiously long for the autobiographical writings of Gerald of Wales to be made generally accessible. For his figure, as it emerges from the *Itinerary through Wales* (published in Everyman's Library), is one that must make every reader eager to know him better, and his vivacious narratives, which till now had to be sought in the ponderous volumes of the Rolls Series, cried out for translation.

To the directly autobiographical *De Rebus a se gestis* Professor Butler has added the autobiographical fragments that had a way of creeping in into all Gerald wrote, so that we may follow him from his childhood at Manorbier so charmingly described, when the sand-castles he built with his brothers foreshadowed his future in being not castles but abbeys and churches, to his last years, when he traces a final self-portrait that comes as a farewell : " So Giraldus ran the course that was ordained for him, nor in his day was he a sluggard or a coward. But now that others run and follow the court and pile up vain vexations, let him take his rest and in his humble

* *The Autobiography of Giraldus Cambrensis*, edited and translated by H. E. Butler, with an Introductory Chapter by C. H. Williams. Jonathan Cape.

habitation indulge his love of books and in the corners of churches weep for his sins. . . ." It should be noted, however, that the book from which this passage comes is entitled *Invectiones*, and that Gerald had yet to write his *Speculum Ecclesiæ* (for which Professor Butler suggests the sub-title "Scenes from Clerical Life or The Legend of Bad Clergymen"), as wicked and humorous as any of his earlier works.

During his youth, the twelfth-century renaissance was at its height ; it was an age rendered articulate by grasp of literary expression in a Latin which, though not classical, has its own magnificence, so that personalities reveal themselves with a rare completeness. It was the age of the wandering scholars, when all Christendom was one province. Gerald himself may be accounted of their number. He was about thirty when he went to Paris a second time, to triumph in the Schools as before, and he would have proceeded to the equally famous University of Bologna (though suggesting that it had little to teach him), had he not been harassed, like the rest of the tribe, by his creditors, from whom he was saved only by miraculous intervention. It was an age of great Churchmen, and again he must be numbered among these (St. Thomas of Canterbury was his ideal and model). Norman-Welsh, as fiercely Welsh as his cousins the Geraldines were soon to become fiercely Irish, he was also unmistakably a scion of a fighting stock. "Many and great wars," said a Welsh Prince, "have we Welshmen waged with England, but none so great and fierce as his who fought the King of England and the Archbishop and withstood the might of the whole clergy and people of England, for the honour of Wales."

The story of that epic struggle for the recognition of metropolitan status to the See of St. David's is here consecutive and complete ; there is real grandeur in it, and the pathos of failure, but nothing could be more entertaining than its telling. "Neither a sluggard nor a coward. . . ." Gerald was engagingly ready to dissert on his own merits—witness the question in the dialogue of *De iure et statu Memevensis Ecclesiæ* : "Why would not the Chapter of St. David's accept such a good and great man as Giraldus to be their Bishop ?" But here at least we may well feel he has made an under-statement.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

COMMONWEALTH AND NATIONALITY.*

The evolution of the British Commonwealth has been examined afresh in two important books by Professor W. K. Hancock and Professor R. MacGregor Dawson. The former has contributed an extensive study of post-war developments in the first volume of his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, which is issued under the auspices of Chatham House. It deals not only with the emergence of the Dominions as individual national states, but also discusses at length problems of nationality in those parts of the Empire which have yet to achieve Dominion status. While the work contains some prolixity and repetition needless to the argument, it does embody a very valuable attempt to ascertain in a series of close factual studies the ideas and tendencies behind events. How far have the oft-proclaimed ideals of self-determination and unity, individual destiny and a common purpose, equality in race and creed, been resolved in fact? Equality is, of course, axiomatic of the Commonwealth, and Professor Hancock goes further to show that the aim of British policy since the middle of the nineteenth century has been to heal communal divisions and to inculcate a local patriotism, which grows into a national consciousness, as exemplified in Canada and South Africa. This too, he contends, in the course of a long examination of the Irish problem, was ultimately the purpose of British policy in Ireland, only to be frustrated by the recalcitrance of Ulster. A somewhat similar argument in respect of Palestine is not invalidated by the partition scheme, proposed since this was written. Professor Hancock also discusses at length developments in Ceylon and Kenya and the constitutional regressions in Malta and Newfoundland; but rather oddly he has postponed his account of nationalism in India to his second volume dealing with economic questions. Indian emigration to South Africa and Kenya, however, enables him to examine at length the practice and theory of racial equality.

The steady move of the Dominions towards individual nationalism, after a short period of tentative centralisation during and immediately after the Great War, is well known

* (1) *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*. Vol. I, *Problems of Nationality*, 1918-1936. By W. K. Hancock. Oxford University Press. (2) *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*. By Robert MacGregor Dawson. Oxford University Press.

and has been restated with lucidity and concision by Professor Dawson in *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*. Opinions may differ as to the interpretation of particular events, and it is noticeable that Professor Dawson places strong emphasis, in the process of decentralisation, upon the British Government's treatment of the Dominions in the Chanak incident, the Lausanne Treaty and the Reparations Conference of 1924. A large portion of this volume contains a new selection of documents, speeches and press articles indicative both of formal change and the march of opinion. Legal unity has been reduced to a minimum and even the symbol of the Throne, as Professor Hancock points out, can be employed to "support a theory and programme of separation" in the divisibility of the Crown, as argued by General Hertzog. Unity must rest on some basis of common policy; and Professor Dawson argues that in foreign affairs inequality of function has "tended to rob equality of status of some of its significance," and that the Dominions are still largely dependent on British diplomacy and in practice they would follow Britain into war, as in 1914. It is difficult to accept this view in the light of the Chanak incident and the temper of Dominion nationalism. While the prime responsibility in defence and foreign affairs rests, by consent, on Great Britain, the Dominions reserve their co-operation as they may determine. Professor Hancock is surely right in arguing that without common responsibility there can be no common cause. It is a factor which flows naturally from equal status, but which as yet the Dominions have been slow to appreciate. Sooner or later the choice between that or complete independence will be demanded by events.

THE MARCH OFFENSIVE.*

The first volume in the official *History of the Great War*, which deals with military operations on the Western Front in 1918 concluded with the appointment of Foch on March 26th to co-ordinate the action of the Allied forces. The new volume* continues the account of the great March offensive by the Germans until its conclusion before Amiens on April 5th, and describes the subsequent attacks, particularly the Lys offensive towards Hazebrouck, begun on April 9th; the

* Macmillan. Also separate case containing 26 maps.

failure of which led to the final abandonment by Ludendorff of the whole German effort on April 30th. At this point the narrative appropriately closes. The detailed story of these critical days has been compiled with great care by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, with the particular assistance of Major-General H. R. Davies and Lieut.-Colonel R. G. B. Maxwell-Hyslop. With the help of numerous sketches and a case of large-scale maps prepared by Major A. F. Becke, the whole intricate course of operations can be studied. But probably most readers will regard this work, like the other volumes in the *History*, as a book of reference for the elucidation of particular events. They will be gratified, for example, to have General Edmonds' vindication of Sir Hubert Gough and the Fifth Army. They resisted the enemy's efforts "with such success that his progress was gradually slowed down and time was gained to bring up reinforcements, so that the great German plan of annihilating the British army in a single offensive failed and had to be abandoned." General Edmonds points out that the removal of General Gough was under consideration as early as March 5th, before the attack commenced.

In the course of some general reflections, General Edmonds attributes in large measure the initial difficulties of the British armies to the blunders of the War Cabinet. He argues that at a critical moment when the German offensive was in preparation, it directed the reorganisation of the British forces, and ordered them to take over a longer front without providing due reinforcements. Haig was thus prevented by lack of means from launching any offensive "as the proper reply to the German menace." In meeting the offensive, General Edmonds points out that no adequate preparations were made for a deep withdrawal and that the troops had received little training in defence "and none in retreat." "On the subject of retirement there was neither a manual nor a doctrine." He is also highly critical of the staff work in directing operations. At first, far behind the lines, the headquarters lost touch with, and appreciation of, the rapidly changing situations of open warfare. Of the latter the junior staff officers, with little training, had no experience. Overworked seniors have stated that many "could not write a comprehensible field message, far less a practical operation order." Moreover, in addition there remained difficulties of allied co-operation, not wholly

solved by Foch's appointment. Under all these conditions General Edmonds can well give the highest praise to the valour and tenacity of the British troops.

THE AGE OF WALPOLE.*

The historical labours of Professor Wolfgang Michael are second to none in importance for the understanding of the opening decades of the eighteenth century, which he groups around the outstanding figure of Sir Robert Walpole. It is gratifying to the author, as it is to his many readers, to note that the publication of the last of his five volumes is announced for 1938. The fourth volume takes into account the different aspects of our national history. The opening book discusses the position of Lords and Commons, and due stress is laid on the aristocratic character of the Commons quite as much as that of the Lords. At the same time the author brings out with proper emphasis the truly national character of Parliament. True, the members of the Lower House came from a rigidly confined class, but that class was far more representative of the whole country than is often imagined. He next turns his attention to the opposition, not only in Parliament but in literature, and he is notably strong in his appreciation of the parts played by Swift and Bolingbroke. With his natural love of research we expected to find that every available document had been consulted, and beyond question that has been done. A far harder test is to ascertain how far he could grasp the extraordinary position attained by the formidable Dean of St. Patrick's. On the whole he is quite fair to him, and it is by no means easy for a foreigner to appreciate the precise weight to be attached to *Gulliver's Travels*. No doubt there are remarks not quite put as one of ourselves would put them on Swift and Bolingbroke, yet this is all to the good, for it is increasingly difficult to find out new facts. He perceives that the great days of them both lay in the past, and he leaves us with the feeling of complete confidence in his exploration of the prominent parts they had taken in the fates of their respective lands.

If the Irishman or the Scotsman reads with care the pages allotted to the history of Ireland and Scotland he will soon find

* *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*. By W. Michael. Vierter Bande das Zeitalter Walpoles. Verlag für Staatswissenschaften u. Geschichte G.m.b.H., Berlin.

that the author is every whit as much at home in their native land as he is in England. One can sometimes judge a book better by its secondary than by its primary matter, and judged by this test the volume emerges with success. Thanks to his patient labours there are new facts in all his volumes. There is ample room for his learned book which, by telling the story of Walpole's England as a whole, in the light of all the manuscript and other evidence now available, will avoid the tendency, on the one hand to episodic treatment, on the other to parochialism of outlook. The first, by restricting the range of inquiry, serves to furnish the raw material of history rather than a contribution to history regarded as a science. The second, precluding a deep and wide survey, accepts surface eddies as adequate causes of the drifting of the craft upon the peaceful sea at home and the stormy sea abroad, and ignores, or discerns but imperfectly, the under-currents whose reality and persistence often provide the only clue to seeming aberrations of policy at Westminster or Paris, Madrid or Vienna. These dangers have been successfully avoided by Professor Michael, who relates his tale in close connection with European history, and the last quality to be attributed to such a good European is parochialism of outlook.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Framework of France,* by H. G. Daniels, records the impressions and reflections of the *Times* Correspondent in Paris from 1926 to 1936. It is neither a history nor an encyclopædia, but a thoughtful analysis of some of the main features and problems of post-war France. The only bias to which he confesses is in favour of democratic government, and without such an attitude he would be unable to understand one of the most democratic communities in the world. Though the French, like other peoples, have occasionally been subjected to autocratic rule, they have always shaken it off, and there is no reason to fear its return. Mr. Daniels never lets himself go, and he avoids superlatives, but the whole work breathes a genuine sympathy with the great nation he knows so well. Two of the most instructive chapters are on Alsace-Lorraine and on the colonial empire. The former freely admits the errors made after

* Nisbet.

the recovery of the provinces by politicians obsessed by the fetish of centralisation and uniformity. The ungrudging recognition of regional differences is the beginning of wisdom in any country which is not altogether homogeneous, and it is apparently a very difficult lesson to learn. Of equal interest is the chapter on population, which is full of valuable statistics and which raises questions of the highest significance not only for France but for the world. For if the cause of political and intellectual freedom is to triumph or even to survive, the free nations must not decline to a point which would enthrone a group of ruthless autocrats as the arbiters of Europe. However much the reader may know about our nearest neighbour, he will be glad to enrich his knowledge from the stores of information and observation provided in these cool and carefully considered pages.

* * * * *

The latest addition to the *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought*, edited by Dr. Coulton, is Mr. R. F. Bennett's volume, *The Early Dominicans*.^{*} The author won the Hulsean Prize in 1934 for an essay on the subject, and has since engaged in research upon it abroad. The result is a work of fine scholarship, which, while primarily intended for students, and assuming a certain acquaintance with thirteenth-century history and that of the Order, may be read with interest by all. Some parts, e.g. that dealing with the Constitution, are necessarily technical, but others strike a more human note. As is natural in a study of the Preaching Friars, three chapters are devoted to their sermons and those who heard them, the manner of their delivery, the choice of subjects, and the homely *exempla*, or anecdotes, which pointed their moral. Others deal with the relations of the Order with the Universities (a topic of the first importance), with the secular clergy, and the Inquisition. The office of Inquisitor, it is shown, was not exclusively held, or, indeed, coveted, by Dominicans in this period. Mr. Bennett has studied the Franciscan movement also, and discusses its similarities to and contrasts with the Dominican. Though denying the probability of the alleged personal influence of St. Francis on St. Dominic, he considers that the latter's adoption, about 1220, of a Rule of stricter poverty was due to the example of the Minors; the extreme *usus pauper*, however, was never extolled or practised by his followers, for whom theological study, as a weapon in defence of the Church, always held the first place. Mr. Bennett deprecates the perpetual comparison of St. Dominic with St. Francis, and points out that Loyola would furnish a better parallel. Space forbids the mention of other interesting questions treated in this valuable book; here and there a critic might possibly disagree with the author's attitude or conclusions, but he would be rash to contest his facts, amply documented as they are in his footnote references.

^{*} Cambridge University Press. 1937.

*We or They** is a significant study of the world situation by a distinguished American publicist, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the director of the Council of Foreign Relations, whose personal views on the rôle of the United States in international affairs will be read with particular interest. This little book contains at once an indictment of dictatorship and an attack upon the American policy of complete isolation. He stresses the fundamental and irreconcilable antagonism between democratic and dictatorial systems. At every point of contact they clash and "intercommunication across the abyss has become almost impossible." He takes an extremely pessimistic view as to the possibility of normal friendly intercourse. Tyrannical government is inherently and inevitably aggressive and "we should be under no illusions that a live-and-let-live relationship between democracies and dictatorships can last indefinitely." In these premises, solidarity of all liberal states is essential in order to warn off attack, or, if it comes, to struggle victoriously. Mr. Armstrong then argues forcibly that it is to America's advantage to co-operate. "We must be alert to favour in every way possible our friends and resist in every possible our enemies." It is idle to pretend that the United States can remain unaffected by the fate of Europe. Isolation encourages the dictators and may well leave America alone to defend her interests. The theory of absolute neutrality contains the makings of its own frustration. In short, active co-operation with the European democracies is sound insurance for American security.

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The latest publication of the Wayfarer Series† is on the Baltic States: *Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. The book is out in time for this year's holiday makers and seems well to fulfil its threefold purpose. Mr. E. C. Davies, the author, depicts the Baltic states as indeed the land of milk and honey for, without a thought of slimming, we can get all we want in a really good and delightfully prepared meal for a sum that is equivalent to sixpence! Food, he tells us, is always so good that it becomes quite a part of the enjoyment of a Baltic holiday. The inhabitants of these provinces are good looking, especially the women; they still wear their national costumes in various parts and there are charming illustrations of these costumes in the book. We read of the varied architecture; Russian and Swedish fortresses side by side, Dutch buildings and Baroque treasures everywhere, remote monasteries, modern cities. The tiny islands, too, each furnished with a characteristically interesting church. The best and cheapest way to travel there is by sea, though it is two days longer than the overland route via Germany. Going by boat there is the splendid silhouette of Tallinn (Estonia) to marvel at, no other so lovely unless it be that of Rhodes. The Baltic Riviera (Latvia), rich in pine woods and "to

* Macmillan.

† Methuen, London.

pebble-free sands, add a laughing, blue-green sea flecked with lazy, sun-kissed waves" and you have a picture that is a good invitation to a bathe both in sea and sun. These sun-kissed shores become for those who enjoy their delights a deeper joy in their message of the possibilities of hope and peace, for they have emerged, not only from the horrors of the World War, but also from the aftermath thereof in the shape of the Red Terror. Because so much was destroyed, this part of Latvia can now boast of up-to-date hotels and pensions built with characteristic courage by the Letts. It has been done, too, without the usual ugliness of the present-day bathing resort. Riga, both old and new, so lovely architecturally, so full of historical association and infinite interest, is famous also for the Brethren's Cemetery, a Latvian war shrine.

The last part of the book is devoted to Lithuania with its vast forests, its lakes, its miraculous dunes so fascinating in summer and a fairy-like dream of beauty in winter. Mr. E. C. Davies interlaces his descriptions with historical information, explaining the varied character of a land surrounded by countries such as Russia, Poland, Scandinavia, Finland and Germany, and yet open to the glorious sea. The book will do much towards making the Baltic country more popular for a pleasant holiday. In most parts of the country as many as from four to six languages are spoken, but as English is the first foreign language taught in the schools we English will soon feel ourselves at home in this otherwise rather remote country.

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*Vagrant in Summer.** Miss Nina Murdoch again provides a very happy holiday for those of us who stay at home and read. Her sojourn in Salzburg can be shared by us all for she enjoys it so much and dwells so lovingly on all the nooks and corners and old buildings, on the Austrian people and their charm, on the histories and legends of this ancient town, the pleasant *Bräustübl*, the marionette theatre, the market, the church interiors, the hotel garden. Is it the difficulty of language that seems to suggest not quite such bliss in the Italian Tyrol? Merano, Bolzano, Chiusi. "Call a place by its Italian name to an old South Tyrolese inhabitant and you will quite likely be told he is not aware of the existence of such a street or house or locality, any more than the Italian population will recognise the original German names." The soreness of feeling is only lightly touched upon.

The book opens with a chapter on Gibraltar, over which the authoress clammers and makes many discoveries. She gets into touch with everyone, soldiers, guards, Spaniards, and even the Mediterranean inhabitants scornfully referred to as "rock scorpions" by the English community. Her final delight is in Portugal, a land of corn and wine, of warmth and sunshine, of rich production, colour, order and beauty. Coimbra, the

* Harrap.

university town and Oporto, the seaport, provide as interesting and charming memories as any. Much of the prosperity is put down to the successful dictatorship of General Carmona.

All this, of course, was before the Spanish Civil War.

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Library Co-operation in the British Isles,* by Colonel Luxmoore Newcombe, is the fourth volume in the Practical Library Handbooks series. The author, as Principal Executive Officer and Librarian of the National Central Library, is particularly well suited for the task of explaining the subject to the general public as well as to librarians. The need for co-operation among libraries has been recognised for a great number of years, but the realisation of an organised scheme is of comparatively recent date. In 1916 Dr. Albert Mansbridge founded the Central Library for Students (which grew into the National Central Library), and in so doing began the present system of national co-operation. To-day the National Central Library, together with the great network of Outlier and Regional libraries, the University libraries and the system of international library loans, does work of immense value to scholars and students alike. Colonel Newcombe's excellent little book describes in detail the work of the National Central Library, the Outlier libraries, the Regional library systems, the University libraries inter-lending system, international library loans, and union catalogues. He discusses the difficulties as well as the success of co-operation, and also considers future developments. The book has a good bibliography, and should be of real interest and value to all serious readers.

* Allen & Unwin.